

# Intermediary Balance Sheets and the Treasury Yield Curve \*

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## Abstract

We document a regime change in the Treasury market post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC): dealers switched from net short to net long Treasury bonds. We construct “net-long” and “net-short” curves that account for balance sheet and financing costs, and show that actual yields moved from the net short curve pre-GFC to the net long curve post-GFC. Our theory shows the regime shift caused negative swap spreads and co-movement among swap spreads, dealer positions, and covered-interest-parity violations. Furthermore, the effects of various monetary and regulatory policies are regime-dependent. We highlight Treasury supply as a plausible driver of this regime shift.

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# Introduction

Prior to the GFC, yields on Treasury bonds were below the fixed rates on interest rate swaps (specifically, overnight index swaps (OIS)) of the same maturity. This positive swap-Treasury spread (“swap spread,” for short) pre-GFC was in part due to the “convenience yield” of the Treasury bonds (à la [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen \(2012\)](#)). However, post-GFC, yields on U.S. Treasury bonds have been consistently above the corresponding swap rates, suggesting that Treasury bonds are now in some sense “inconvenient.” Likewise, prior to the GFC, CIP deviations were almost non-existent, but have emerged as significant and persistent following the crisis. The emergence of CIP deviations and the change in the sign of swap spreads are both well-documented in the literature.<sup>1</sup>

We provide new empirical evidence to link swap spreads and CIP deviations with *regimes* in which primary dealers are net long or net short with respect to Treasury bonds. Figure 1 illustrates a significant change in the Treasury market over the past twenty years. Pre-GFC, primary dealers on net maintained a short position in Treasury bonds, and the swap spread was positive. Post-GFC, primary dealers switched to a net long position in Treasury bonds, and the swap spread became negative. That is, dealers were short Treasury bonds when those bonds had yields lower than swap rates, and became long Treasury bonds once those bonds had higher yields than swap rates. The sign switch in the swap spread exactly coincided with the sign switch in dealers’ net position.

We explain the collection of evidence in Figure 1 via a unified framework that incorporates the convenience (or lack thereof) of Treasury bonds, covered interest rate parity (CIP) deviations, and primary dealers’ net Treasury positions. Our framework emphasizes the role of balance-sheet constrained dealers in the Treasury market. This framework naturally leads to regimes in which dealers are net long, net short, or flat with respect to Treasury bonds. Intuitively, in the long regime, Treasury yield should be above the swap rate of the same maturity to compensate for balance sheet costs, while in the short regime, both balance sheet costs and financing spreads lower Treasury yields relative to swap rates.

Our paper shows that the Treasury market regime is central to understanding pricing dynam-

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<sup>1</sup>On the sign switch for long-maturity LIBOR swap spreads, see [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#) and [Jermann \(2020\)](#). On the sign switch at all maturities for OIS swaps, which are swaps based on the effective federal funds rate, see [Augustin et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Fleckenstein and Longstaff \(2021\)](#). On the CIP deviations, see [Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan \(2018b\)](#).

ics and the effects of policy implications. Specifically, relative to the existing literature on swap spreads and CIP deviations, our main contributions are four-fold. First, we quantitatively demonstrate that the same balance sheet costs that rationalize CIP violations can also rationalize swap spreads, both before and after the GFC (i.e. across regimes), after properly accounting for the differences between the financing rates of long and short positions. Second, we show that dealers' actual net Treasury bond positions co-move with their incentive to act as arbitrageurs between Treasury bonds and swaps. That is, dealers' net Treasury demand curves are motivated by arbitrage. Third, we propose a framework to endogenize dealers' position, and suggest that Treasury supply is a significant driver of the regime shift and hence of negative OIS swap spreads at all maturities (complementing the pension demand channel of [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#), which is relevant primarily at the 30yr maturity). Lastly, we show that effects of a wide range of monetary policies and regulatory policies are regime-dependent, and use our framework to explain why Treasury yields fell relative to other interest rates during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) but rose during the March 2020 COVID-19 crisis ([He, Nagel, and Song \(2022\)](#) and [Duffie \(2020\)](#)).

Our formal analysis proceeds in the following steps. We first derive what we call the “net-long” and “net-short” curves. The net long curve describes a Treasury yield above which a dealer would always want to be net long Treasury bonds, regardless of its beliefs about future Treasury yields. Similarly, the net short curve provides a yield below which a dealer would always be willing to be net short the bond. We construct these curves taking the interest rate swap curve and the structure of CIP violations as given. Our construction uses interest-rate swaps to measure discount rates free from balance sheet costs, CIP violations to measure balance sheet costs,<sup>2</sup> and takes into account the spreads between financing rates and discount rates.

The use of swap rates and CIP violations is motivated by a single assumption: that all zero-cost, zero-balance-sheet trading strategies are at least weakly unprofitable under a common stochastic discount factor (SDF).<sup>3</sup> This assumption allows us to compare the strategy of financing the purchase of a Treasury bond with the strategy of borrowing unsecured and engaging in CIP arbitrage (the difference between these is a zero-cost, zero-balance-sheet strategy). We use this comparison to derive our net long curve, and construct our net short curve in a similar manner.

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<sup>2</sup>The interpretation of these costs is consistent with the view of [Jermann \(2020\)](#) that swap spreads are affected by “bond holding costs,” but more specific in that these costs affect both swap spread and CIP deviations.

<sup>3</sup>This assumption is implicit in the models of [Jermann \(2020\)](#) and [Du et al. \(2022\)](#). Under this assumption, the SDF prices zero-cost and zero-balance-sheet strategies (e.g. derivatives including swaps with negligible balance sheet cost and zero initial cost), but does not directly determine the price of cash securities such as Treasuries.

The net long and net short curves differ for two reasons: financing rates and balance sheet costs. In particular, because taking either a net short or net long position increases the size of a dealer’s balance sheet, higher balance sheet costs will increase the net long yield but decrease the net short yield. We find that actual Treasury yields are quite close to the estimated net short curve pre-GFC and close to the estimated net long curve post-GFC, across a variety of maturities. This finding is consistent with the data on dealer net positions (i.e. dealers were net short pre-GFC and net long post-GFC), providing evidence in support of our view of dealers as arbitrageurs and our notion of Treasury market regimes.

We next construct a two-period, two-market supply-demand model for Treasury bonds and synthetic dollar lending in the foreign exchange (FX) swap market. Dealers arbitrage the spread between synthetic dollar lending rate and the swap rate (i.e., the CIP deviation), and the spread between swap rate and Treasury yield (i.e., the swap spread). In the model, the CIP deviation endogenously reflects the shadow cost of dealer balance sheet. Apart from dealers, we model two types of clients for Treasury bonds. One type is “real-money” investors such as domestic pension funds who do not rely on dealers’ balance sheets to fund their positions. Real-money investors decide between holding Treasury bills versus long-term Treasury bonds, and their demand for bonds is an increasing function of the expected excess returns on the Treasury bonds. Second, we model foreign investors who invest in U.S. Treasury bonds financed by “synthetic dollars” (foreign currency converted to dollars using short-dated FX swaps).<sup>4</sup> We assume that foreign investors’ demand for bonds increases in the expected return on the Treasury bond net the synthetic dollar rate.

We close the model by imposing market clearing conditions for Treasury bonds and synthetic dollars, as well as an intermediary balance sheet constraint. The model has a unique equilibrium, which falls into one of the three regimes: intermediaries are either long, short, or flat with respect to Treasury bonds. The regime itself is determined by the difference between Treasury bond supply and client demand; that is, dealers act as “buyer of last resort” in the long regime and a “short-seller of last resort” in the short regime.

In our framework, the change in sign of dealer positions leads naturally to a change in sign in the swap spread. Our quantitative model shows that the change in net dealer positions from

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<sup>4</sup>FX-hedged foreign investors do not use leverage but nevertheless rely on dealer balance sheets to obtain FX swap hedging. A canonical example of an FX-hedged foreign investor is a Japanese life insurance company, with liabilities denominated in yen and substantial U.S. dollar fixed-income assets.

short to long and associated change in financing costs is on its own sufficient to explain the sign changes in swap spreads, even in the absence of changes in the balance sheet costs. However, the large increase in the balance sheet cost post-GFC is essential to quantitatively explain the size of the observed change in swap spreads and the post-GFC co-movement of swap spreads and CIP violations, even though the balance sheet cost alone cannot directly explain the sign switch in dealers' Treasury position. More specifically, the spread between the financing rate and the floating rate in the interest rate swap is a significant determinant of the positive swap spreads pre-GFC, whereas balance sheet are the main driver of the negative swap spread post-GFC.<sup>5</sup> The former is consistent with an earlier literature on swap spreads, e.g. [Grinblatt \(2001\)](#) and [Feldhütter and Lando \(2008\)](#).

Our framework also allows us to analyze the drivers of the pre- to post-GFC regime change. The model generates a clear prediction that an increase in the Treasury supply increases dealers' Treasury position, other things being equal. Since the GFC, the supply of Treasury bonds, net of Federal Reserve purchases, has experienced a four-fold increase, which acts as an important driver for the regime shift in dealers' position and the sign switch in the swap spread. Meanwhile, as discussed in [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#), underfunded pension funds significantly increased their demand for duration through interest rate swaps post-GFC. As dealers are natural counterparties for the swap demand of pension funds, an increase the swap spread can in theory increase dealers' positions. Our regression analysis suggests that interest rate swap demand from pensions is indeed important in explaining the swap spread at the 30-year maturity, while the Treasury supply factor is significant at all maturities. Our discussion on the role of Treasury supply is also consistent with the evidence documented in [Fleming, Rosenberg, and Nguyen \(2022\)](#) that an increase in Treasury issuance leads to an increase in dealer inventory.

Furthermore, the model helps explain a new empirical fact we document in the paper: dealer's net long position in Treasury bonds is negatively correlated with the term spread between the long-term Treasury bond yield and short rate in the post-GFC period. That is, dealers hold more bonds when the price is high relative to the short rate (i.e. a small term spread) and fewer bonds when the price is low relative to the short rate (i.e. a large term spread). This behavior at first appears puzzling, on the grounds that a larger term spread predicts larger expected returns of bonds vs. the short rate ([Campbell and Shiller \(1991\)](#)). Our view of dealers as arbitrageurs absorbing the

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<sup>5</sup>Appendix Figure A9 illustrates a decomposition of these forces within our quantitative model.

excess supply/demand for Treasury bonds can rationalize this fact: during the post-GFC period, when the term spread is low, client demand for Treasury is low. To clear the market, dealers must increase their holdings, which requires that Treasury bonds offer an attractive yield relative to interest rate swaps (after accounting for financing rates and balance sheet costs). In contrast, the existing literature has often emphasized instead returns-seeking behavior (as in the intermediary asset pricing literature, [He and Krishnamurthy \(2013\)](#)) and the role of dealers as over-the-counter market makers (as in [Duffie et al. \(2005\)](#)). These perspectives are not mutually exclusive with our view; however, they do not naturally lead to the prediction that dealers should buy high and sell low in the Treasury market, as suggested by the data.

In the last section of the paper, we demonstrate that the effects of a variety policy interventions are regime-dependent, using our two-period model. We also show that the effects of dealer distress differ across regimes, offering an explanation for why Treasury yields went down relative to swap rates in the GFC and up during March 2020. These differences arise from differences in the comparative statics of our model across regimes, which ultimately are a consequence of the difference in the way balance sheet costs affect Treasury yields. The model, with minimal modification, is capable of speaking to the effects of quantitative easing and tightening, inter-central-bank swap lines, regulatory exemptions to the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), and interest rate policy. We discuss the effects of each of these policies, and emphasize how they differ in the long and short regimes. Finally, we discuss the implications of the framework for the ongoing tightening cycle, and draw a parallel with the experience of 2017-2019 tightening cycle.

Our paper is most closely related to [Jermann \(2020\)](#) and [Du, Hébert, and Huber \(2022\)](#), in that we model swap spreads ([Jermann \(2020\)](#)) and CIP violations ([Du, Hébert, and Huber \(2022\)](#)) as arising from constraints on intermediaries. Our paper combines these perspectives quantitatively and shows that the same balance sheet costs can jointly explain these arbitrage opportunities and data on dealers' positions.<sup>6</sup> Related to this, [Favara, Infante, and Rezende \(2022\)](#) show evidence that SLR shocks have reduced large banks' participation in the U.S. Treasury market, and [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2023\)](#) provide evidence that dealer balance sheet constraints contribute to the diminishing convenience of T-bills. [Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan \(2018b\)](#), [Hébert \(2020\)](#), and [Du, Hébert, and Huber \(2022\)](#) argue that CIP deviations can proxy for the shadow cost of the these

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<sup>6</sup>Another difference between our paper and [Jermann \(2020\)](#) is that [Jermann \(2020\)](#) treats Treasury yields as exogenous, and as a result predicts that dealer positions are increasing in the term spread, in contrast to our framework and the data.

constraints. The strong co-movement of CIP violations and swap spreads post-GFC we document is consistent with these perspectives.

Recent work by [Liu \(2019\)](#) and [Siriwardane, Sunderam, and Wallen \(2021\)](#) examines co-movement across different near-arbitrages. [Liu \(2019\)](#) argues in favor of a significant common component across arbitrage opportunities, whereas [Siriwardane, Sunderam, and Wallen \(2021\)](#) provide evidence suggestive of market segmentation. In both papers, the correlation between CIP deviations and the swap spread stands out being among the highest, which supports the use of CIP deviations as a balance sheet cost proxy for Treasury trading activities. Our view is closer to that of [Liu \(2019\)](#), in that we expect (especially at lower frequencies) a strong degree of co-movement across arbitrage spreads that require dealer balance sheet.

Considering swap spreads and CIP deviations together helps address a puzzle: why would long-maturity (e.g. 30 year) swap spreads be affected by fluctuations in current balance sheet costs? The answer suggested by [Du, Hébert, and Huber \(2022\)](#) is that there is a substantial risk premium associated with the risk that balance sheet costs increase; our quantitative analysis confirms that this risk premium plays a significant role in long maturity swap spreads. Our quantitative term-structure framework is substantially more general than the models employed in these papers, and our two-market equilibrium model is able to address a broader range of policy questions.

The key limitation of our static model is that it treats swap rates as exogenous, and we do not attempt to explain the behavior of dealers' swap counter-parties. In contemporaneous work, [Hanson, Malkhozov, and Venter \(2022\)](#) start from a similar set of motivating facts and adopt an approach broadly similar to our two-period model to explain the way in which shocks to the demand for interest rate swaps affect swap spreads. [Hanson, Malkhozov, and Venter \(2022\)](#) focus on the swap market, treating the Treasury market as exogenous; combining the two approaches is an interesting direction for future research. Their interest is in separating supply and demand shocks, whereas our focus is on providing estimates of the dealer net long and short Treasury curves, validating the notion of Treasury market regimes, and analyzing policy interventions.

More recently, the dislocation of the Treasury bond market during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 has led some authors to question whether U.S. Treasury bonds remain convenient (e.g. [Duffie \(2020\)](#) and [He, Nagel, and Song \(2022\)](#)).<sup>7</sup> Relative to this literature,

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<sup>7</sup>The convenience yield literature argues that Treasury securities are valued not only by their fundamental cash flows, but also by the superior liquidity and safety ([Longstaff \(2004\)](#); [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen \(2012\)](#); [Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein \(2015\)](#); [Joslin, Li, and Song \(2021\)](#)), with macro-finance implications of this con-

we highlight the importance of the regime change in the dealers’ net position and the interaction between dealer balance sheet constraints and client demand for Treasury bonds.

Complementary to our analysis on the role of dealers, the role of hedge funds in the Treasury market has been examined in [Barth and Kahn \(2021\)](#) and [Kruttili et al. \(2021\)](#), particularly regarding their activities in the Treasury cash-futures basis arbitrage funded by dealers’ balance sheets. We develop the net long and net short curve from the perspective of a securities dealer, but argue in Appendix Section F.1 that dealers will in effect transmit their balance sheet costs to hedge funds and other levered clients, consistent with [Boyarchenko et al. \(2018a\)](#). As a result, the curves we develop are applicable for these levered clients as well.

The negative correlation between dealers’ net position and Treasury yield curve slope we document is the opposite to the pattern observed in typical (excluding the largest) commercial bank portfolios ([Haddad and Sraer \(2020\)](#)). This contrast emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the Treasury activities of securities dealers and commercial bank subsidiaries. Fluctuations in dealers’ inventory have also been linked to overall liquidity conditions ([Goldberg \(2020\)](#)).

The structure of the paper is as follows. We provide institutional background on Treasury trading by dealers in Section 1. We derive and estimate the net long and the net short curves in Section 2. We introduce the demand from real-money investors and build an equilibrium model for Treasury market dynamics in Section 3. We analyze policy implications in Section 4, and in Section 5 we conclude.

## 1 Institutional Background

In this section, we outline the mechanics about how dealers go long or short Treasury securities and hedge with swaps. We then discuss when these strategies are arbitrages, and compare them with CIP arbitrage. For interest rates, yields, and returns, capital letters denote gross rates, and lowercase letters denote log rates.

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venience discussed in [Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl \(2018\)](#), [Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig \(2021\)](#), and [Krishnamurthy and Li \(2023\)](#). Our results highlight that no convenience demand is needed to explain intermediaries’ demand for Treasury bonds.

## 1.1 The Long Treasury vs. Swap Arbitrage

Suppose that the dealer goes long (buys) a zero-coupon Treasury bond of maturity  $n$  at time  $t$ . At the onset of the trade, the dealer buys the Treasury bond at gross yield  $Y_{n,t}$ , and finances the entire position period-by-period at the time  $t + j$  gross financing rate  $I_{t+j}^l$  (for  $j = 0, \dots, n - 1$ ). This trade is zero-cost, in the sense that the entire purchase cost of the bond is financed through a mix of secured (repo) and unsecured debt financing ( $I_{t+j}^l$  is the effective one-period gross financing rate of this mix at time  $t + j$ ).<sup>8</sup>

A dealer can hedge the interest rate risk of this trade by entering into a swap contract.<sup>9</sup> Interest rate swaps exchange a fixed interest payment ( $R_{n,t}$ ) for a sequence of floating interest payments ( $R_{t+j}$ ).<sup>10</sup> To hedge a net long bond position, the dealer pays the fixed rate and receives the floating rate in a swap, whose maturity is set to match the bond ( $n$  in our example).

After hedging, the dealer will receive the spread between the floating rate  $R_{t+j}$  and the financing rate  $I_{t+j}^l$  each period. If the dealer holds the bond and swap to maturity, the dealer will earn the yield  $Y_{n,t}$  on the bond and pay the fixed rate  $R_{n,t}$  on the swap; the difference of these two is the negative of the “swap spread”  $R_{n,t} - Y_{n,t}$ . Thus, if the floating rate is guaranteed to exceed the financing rate ( $R_{t+j} \geq I_{t+j}^l$  for all  $j$ ), and the swap spread is negative, the dealer is guaranteed to earn a profit on this trade if held to maturity. If in addition the spread  $R_{t+j} - I_{t+j}^l$  is constant, the dealer’s profit is certain ex-ante (because  $R_{n,t} - Y_{n,t}$  is known at the trade’s inception). In this sense, the swap hedges the bond.<sup>11</sup> During this trade, the dealer will have a larger balance sheet, approximately equal to the value of the Treasury net long position.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>See Internet Appendix Section A for more details.

<sup>9</sup>Dealers have an incentive to hedge their net interest rate risk, due to risk-based capital requirements, but will typically do so at the trading desk level or the whole book level as opposed to trade-by-trade.

<sup>10</sup>Our analysis will focus on overnight index swaps (OIS), in which one party pays a fixed rate of interest in exchange for a series of floating payments indexed to the overnight interbank federal funds rate. Prior to the GFC, swaps indexed to LIBOR were more commonly used, and recently swaps indexed to SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate) have been introduced. OIS rates are available for our entire sample and are similar to LIBOR swap rates pre-GFC and to SOFR swap rates in the recent period.

<sup>11</sup>If  $R_{t+j} - I_{t+j}^l$  is not constant, there is residual “basis risk,” but negative swap spreads are nevertheless an arbitrage opportunity if  $R_{t+j} - I_{t+j}^l$  is guaranteed to be positive.

<sup>12</sup>To a first approximation, the interest rate swap is entirely off-balance-sheet. More precisely, trading interest rate swaps can increase the size of the balance sheet slightly (Boyarchenko et al., 2018b). The total exposure includes initial and variation margins (typically a couple percent of total notional), and an additional 0-1.5% of the swap notional calculated for off-balance sheet interest rate derivative exposure using the Current Exposure Method, depending on the maturity of the interest rate swaps. We ignore the additional balance sheet costs of trading derivatives to simplify our analysis.

## 1.2 The Short Treasury vs. Swap Arbitrage

Short-selling a Treasury bond and hedging with a swap works in an essentially identical way, with the directions of the trades reversed. When a dealer short-sells a Treasury bond, the dealer borrows the bond from its owner, and offers the owner cash as collateral. The dealer raises that cash by selling the borrowed bond, and each period receives an effective interest rate of  $I_{t+j}^s$  on this cash.<sup>13</sup>

The dealer can hedge with an interest rate swap by receiving the fixed rate  $R_{n,t}$  and paying the floating rate  $R_{t+j}$ . If the spread between  $R_{t+j}$  and  $I_{t+j}^s$  is bounded above, and the swap spread  $R_{n,t} - Y_{n,t}$  exceeds this bound, the dealer is guaranteed to make a profit, assuming the position is held to maturity. This arbitrage also increases the size of the dealer's balance sheet. The asset in this case is a "loan" to the original owner of the bond (the dealer has given the original owner cash in exchange for Treasury collateral), and the liability is a security to be delivered.

Thus, the long Treasury-swap and short Treasury-swap arbitrage strategies are both zero-cost,  $n$ -period strategies that use balance sheet and, under certain assumptions, deliver a guaranteed profit if held to maturity. We will compare these strategies to another  $n$ -period, zero-cost, balance-sheet-intensive arbitrage opportunity: CIP arbitrage.

## 1.3 CIP Arbitrage

One-period USD-EUR CIP arbitrage involves borrowing dollars in the cash market, converting the dollars to euros in the spot foreign exchange market, lending out the euros, and using a forward contract to lock in the exchange rate at which the euro proceeds of the loan are converted back to dollars. Suppose the dealer borrows dollars in unsecured funding markets at the rate  $R_t$  (the same rate used in the interest rate swap), and define the "synthetic" dollar rate  $R_t^{syn}$  as the synthetic dollar lending rate in the FX swap market obtained by converting the euro lending rate into dollars. The profit of the one-period CIP arbitrage is the difference between these two rates,  $R_t^{syn} - R_t$ , and is positive for most major USD-pairs in the post-GFC period (Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan (2018b)). This trading strategy is also zero-cost, in that the synthetic dollar lending is entirely financed by unsecured dollar borrowing.

A dealer who plans to engage in the CIP arbitrage for  $n$  periods can lock in the profits of this trade using interest rate and cross-currency basis swaps (the details of which are unimportant at this

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<sup>13</sup>See Internet Appendix Section A.2 for more details.

stage of our discussion). However, engaging in CIP arbitrage will increase the size of the dealer’s balance sheet; in this case, the asset is the euro loan and the liability is the dollar borrowing.

## 1.4 Comparing Arbitrages

Each of these three arbitrages lasts for  $n$  periods if held to maturity, has zero initial cost, and uses balance sheet.<sup>14</sup> The core of our analysis focuses on perturbations in which a dealer does less CIP arbitrage and more of one of the two Treasury vs. swap arbitrages. These perturbations can be viewed as zero-cost, zero-balance sheet trading strategies.

Empirically, the gross rate at which dealers finance the long Treasury trade ( $I_{t+j}^l$ ) is higher than the gross rate at which they finance the short Treasury trade ( $I_{t+j}^s$ ). We document in Internet Appendix Section A.2 that the annualized rate the original bond owners (“security lenders”) pay to dealers is on average roughly 20 basis points below  $I_{t+j}^l$ , even for securities that are not “special”, using data from Markit Securities Finance.<sup>15</sup> Because of this difference, the long and short Treasury vs. swap arbitrages will never both be appealing to dealers. If swap spreads are sufficiently low/negative, as in the post-GFC period, the long arbitrage will be profitable, while if swap spreads are sufficiently large, as in the pre-GFC period, the short arbitrage will be profitable.

Each of these arbitrages is subject to market-to-market fluctuations. For example, the two-period CIP arbitrage has a risk-premium associated with the possibility that the one-period CIP arbitrage becomes larger next period (Du et al. (2022)). To account for this, we construct a model, based on a single critical assumption: that all zero-cost, zero-balance-sheet trading strategies are weakly unprofitable under a common SDF. Using this assumption, we carefully compare the swap-Treasury and CIP arbitrages.

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<sup>14</sup>There are differences between the strategies with regards to the timing of payments. We develop our term structure model to account for these kinds of issues.

<sup>15</sup>When a dealer makes a repo loan to a hedge fund client (typically at a rate above  $I_{t+j}^l$ ), the client selects the Treasury collateral. A dealer who wants to short a specific bond cannot rely on this kind of lending to find the bond. Instead, the dealer borrows the bond from a security lender at the lower rate  $I_{t+j}^s$ .

## 2 The Long and Short Treasury Yield Curves

In this section, we construct what we call “net long” and “net short” yield curves. These yield curves represent arbitrage bounds at which a dealer would be willing to go net long or net short Treasury bonds. In frictionless models (in which arbitrage capacity is unlimited and the gross financing rates  $I_t^l$  and  $I_t^s$  are equal), there is a single Treasury yield curve. At yields above this yield curve, dealers would want to go net long bonds, while at lower yields, dealers would want to go net short bonds. In our model, two frictions create a wedge between the yield at which dealers would go net long and the yield at which dealers would go net short.

The first friction is balance sheet costs. As emphasized in the previous section, going either net long or net short a Treasury bond increases the size of dealer balance sheets. This has an opportunity cost, and this opportunity cost acts like a tax on both these trades. It raises the yield dealers require when going net long, while lowering the yield they require when going net short. We proxy for balance sheet costs using CIP deviations.

The second friction is the difference in financing rates of the long and short Treasury positions. When a dealer goes net long, they finance the position at a relatively high rate ( $I_t^l$ ); when a dealer goes net short, they receive a relatively low rate on their cash ( $I_t^s$ ). The difference between these two rates creates another wedge between the net long and net short curves.

Our analysis in this section is partial equilibrium. We take swap rates, financing rates, and Treasury yields as given, and ask if dealers are willing to go net long or net short Treasury bonds. We will then compare our answer to this question, which is based on price data, with our quantity data on dealers’ net Treasury positions.

We proceed in four steps. First, we will introduce a very simple model of dealer behavior, to illustrate the trade-off a dealer faces between going net long or short Treasury bonds and other arbitrage activities. Second, we generalize the ideas illustrated in this simple model, and construct the net long and net short curves. Third, we discuss the assumptions under which these curves represent arbitrage bounds. Finally, we build a term structure model to estimate the net long and net short curves.

## 2.1 One-Period Net-Long and Net-Short Treasury Yields

We first consider the problem of a risk-neutral dealer who can choose between trading a single  $n$ -period zero-coupon Treasury bond and a one-period CIP arbitrage, subject to a fixed balance sheet constraint. We make these stark assumptions (risk-neutrality, only one bond, fixed balance sheet) to illustrate the main idea; they are not imposed in the more general analysis that follows. The dealer makes this choice at a single date in this simplified example; for this reason, we will omit time subscripts.

Let  $q^{bond}$  be the dealer's bond position (in dollars, not notional), with negative values implying short-selling. Let  $q^{syn}$  be the dealer's "synthetic dollar" position (in dollars), which we define as the currency hedged investment leg of the CIP arbitrage (the other leg is borrowing dollars). We assume that the gross synthetic dollar rate (e.g. the currency-hedged euro rate) is above the gross dollar borrowing rate ( $R^{syn} > R$ ), so that the direction of the arbitrage is to lend in synthetic dollars and finance in actual dollars.

Suppose the dealer faces a fixed balance sheet constraint,

$$q^{syn} + |q^{bond}| = \bar{q}, \quad (1)$$

where  $\bar{q} > 0$  is the balance sheet capacity for Treasury and CIP arbitrage. Note that the absolute value of  $q^{bond}$  enters this expression, reflecting the fact that both long and short positions require balance sheet.

We assume, following the discussion above, that if the dealer buys the bond, the dealer will finance its position with at the gross interest rate  $I^l$ . If the dealer instead short-sells the bond, it receives a gross return  $I^s$  on its cash. We define  $ER^{bond}$  as the expected gross bond return. In this simple example, we will treat this expected return as exogenous. The dealer will buy the bond if  $ER^{bond}$  is sufficiently high, and short the bond if  $ER^{bond}$  is sufficiently low.

The dealer's problem is

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{q^{bond}, q^{syn}} \left( \underbrace{ER^{bond}}_{\text{return of owning bond for one period}} - \underbrace{I^l}_{\text{financing of long position}} \right) \cdot \max\{q^{bond}, 0\} \\
& + \left( \underbrace{I^s}_{\text{return earned on cash collateral}} - \underbrace{ER^{bond}}_{\text{return of shorting bond for one period}} \right) \cdot \max\{-q^{bond}, 0\} \\
& + \left( \underbrace{R^{syn} - R}_{\text{CIP arbitrage spread}} \right) \cdot q^{syn}
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

subject to the balance sheet constraint in (1). That is, the dealer chooses between the long Treasury trade, the short Treasury trade, and the CIP arbitrage.<sup>16</sup>

We assume that the profit of the Treasury trade does not dominate the synthetic lending trade, so that the synthetic lending amount is always non-zero. This assumption eliminates the corner case of  $q^{syn} = 0$ , which has less empirical relevance, and implies that the shadow cost of balance sheet constraint is measured by CIP deviations. We also assume, as in the data, that  $I^s < I^l$ .

Solving the problem, we find three different regimes. The first regime features  $q^{bond} > 0$  and  $q^{syn} > 0$ . In this regime, the dealer must be indifferent to reallocating balance sheet capacity between the long Treasury and synthetic lending trades (simultaneously increasing  $q^{bond}$  and decreasing  $q^{syn}$  by equal amounts, or the reverse). That is, the first-order conditions require

$$ER^{bond} = I^l + (R^{syn} - R).$$

To further build intuition, we log-linearize the expected bond return:

$$ER^{bond} = E[\exp(ny - (n-1)y')] \approx 1 + ny - (n-1)E[y'],$$

where  $y$  is the log bond yield and  $y'$  is the next period log bond yield.

The log yield  $y$  in this regime must equal the “net long yield”  $y^l$ , which can be approximated as

$$y^l \approx \frac{n-1}{n} E[y'] + \frac{1}{n} (I^l + R^{syn} - R). \tag{3}$$

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<sup>16</sup>We have omitted the swap part of the Treasury-swap arbitrages from these calculations, as a simplification. This simplification is justified under the assumption that the swaps are fairly priced from the perspective of the dealer.

Here and in what follows, for interest rates, we use lower-case letters to indicate log rates (e.g.  $i^l = \ln(I^l)$  and  $r^{syn} = \ln(R^{syn})$ ).

The second regime features  $q^{bond} < 0$  and  $q^{syn} > 0$ . In this regime, indifference at the margin between CIP arbitrage and the short Treasury trade requires that

$$ER^{bond} = I^s - (R^{syn} - R).$$

The log yield  $y$  in this regime is equal to the “net short yield”  $y^s$ , which can be approximated as

$$y^s \approx \frac{n-1}{n} E[y^l] + \frac{1}{n} (i^s - r^{syn} + r). \quad (4)$$

Comparing these two regimes, we can see that the expected return is lower in the short regime than in the long regime, for two reasons. First, the funding rate is lower ( $I^s < I^l$ ), and second, the opportunity cost of balance sheet ( $R^{syn} - R$ ) is subtracted from the short funding rate but added to the long funding rate. As a result, the short yield is below the long yield, reflecting (intuitively) that the dealer requires a low yield/high price to justify a net short position and a high yield/low price to justify a net long position.

The third possible regime features  $q^{bond} = 0$  and  $q^{syn} > 0$ . In this regime, the Treasury bond yield has to satisfy  $y^s \leq y \leq y^l$ . That is, the profit on the long and short Treasury strategies does not justify the balance sheet cost, so the dealer chooses to have a zero net Treasury position.

To gain further intuition, consider the case of a one-period bond that matures next period ( $n = 1$ ). Defining  $r^{cip} = r^{syn} - r$ , (3) and (4) can be written in the  $n = 1$  case as

$$y^l \approx r - (r - i^l) + r^{cip},$$

$$y^s \approx r - (r - i^s) - r^{cip}.$$

The net long yield can differ from  $r$  (which we will think of as the one-period swap rate) for two reasons. First, holding Treasury bonds takes up bank balance sheet, so the yield has to be higher by an amount equal to the opportunity cost of the balance sheet (measured by  $r^{cip}$ ). Second, if dealers’ financing rate is lower than their unsecured funding cost,  $i^l < r$ , then there is a financing benefit to owning the Treasury bond, which makes the dealer willing to accept a lower yield.

The net short yield can differ from  $r$  for similar reasons. The impact of the opportunity cost of

balance sheet affects the sell yield with a negative sign. The sell yield has to be lower (the price to be higher) to justify dealer’s short position, which also takes balance sheet. The sell yield is further lowered if the return on the cash collateral is lower than the dealer’s borrowing cost,  $i^s < r$ .

## 2.2 Multi-Period Net Long and Net Short Curves

We next extend the logic of these yields to a more general, multi-period setting, constructing what we will call the “net long curve” and “net short curve.”

We make three key assumptions: (i) there is an SDF that prices interest rate swaps and cross-currency basis swaps, (ii) some synthetic dollar lending occurs in equilibrium, and (iii) all zero-cost, zero-balance-sheet trading strategies are weakly unattractive under this SDF (i.e.  $0 \geq E[MR]$  in the standard notation). We will interpret this SDF as a dealer’s SDF, under the usual intermediary asset pricing assumption that dealers are active in all of these markets. Let  $\mathbb{Q}$  denote the risk-neutral measure associated with this SDF.

The first assumption is justified by the observation that essentially all of the arbitrages documented in the literature involve the use of balance sheet.<sup>17</sup> That is, no-arbitrage between derivatives appears to hold in the data. The second is justified by the empirical observation that currency dealers actively engage in CIP arbitrage.

The third assumption generalizes the first-order condition of our simple model. In that model, the strategy of increasing or decreasing  $q^{bond}$ , financed at the appropriate financing rate, and offsetting the change in balance sheet by changing  $q^{syn}$ , is weakly unattractive for the dealer. Our generalization of this condition assumes that all feasible zero-cost, zero-balance sheet perturbations are weakly unattractive.

These assumptions are much more general than the simple model of the previous section. In particular, we have made no assumptions on the pricing of balance-sheet-increasing or balance-sheet-reducing strategies, and hence are agnostic about why dealers find it costly to increase the size of their balance sheet. We have said nothing about how many maturities of Treasury bonds are available, or what other assets are also traded by dealers. We have not taken a stance on whether (and if so, why) dealers are risk-averse; the dealer’s risk-neutral measure  $\mathbb{Q}$  could depend on shareholder preferences, managerial preferences, value-at-risk constraints, and other considerations.

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<sup>17</sup>This is true, for example, of all of the arbitrages considered in and [Boyarchenko et al. \(2018a\)](#) and [Siriwardane, Sunderam, and Wallen \(2021\)](#).

In the equations that follow, each period is a month and all rates and yields are monthly. Consider the strategy of going long the Treasury bond at log yield  $y_{n,t}$ , financing via repo, and offsetting the balance sheet effect by reducing CIP activity. As in our simple model, the expected bond return cannot exceed the cost of financing a long-position, adjusted for balance sheet costs:

$$\underbrace{I_t^l}_{\text{secured financing}} + \underbrace{(R_t^{syn} - R_t)}_{\text{forgone CIP profits}} \geq \underbrace{E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{ny_{n,t} - (n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}}]}_{\text{expected bond return}}. \quad (5)$$

The left-hand side of this expression represents costs paid at time  $t + 1$  per dollar invested at time  $t$ . The financing of the bond purchase must be repaid (the first term), and the profits of the forgone CIP arbitrage are lost (the second term). These must be weighed against the expected bond return (the payoff at time  $t + 1$  per dollar invested at time  $t$ ). Note that because both sides of this equation are defined in terms of  $t + 1$  payoffs, the discount rate associated with the SDF is irrelevant.

Define the log interest rate

$$x_{1,t} = \ln(I_t^l + R_t^{syn} - R_t), \quad (6)$$

and iterate:

$$y_{n,t} \leq y_{n,t}^l = -\frac{1}{n} \ln(E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} x_{1,t+j})]) \approx E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} (i_{t+j}^l + r_{t+j}^{syn} - r_{t+j})]. \quad (7)$$

The yield curve  $y_{n,t}^l$  defines what we call the “net long curve.” This curve represents the point at which dealers would be willing to switch from CIP arbitrage activity to taking a net long position in a Treasury bond. Since zero-cost, zero-balance-sheet strategies are weakly unattractive, this net long curve is, by induction, an upper bound on Treasury yields (under the assumption that dealers engage in CIP arbitrage).

This net long curve can also be viewed as a lower bound on swap spreads (defined as the difference between swap rates and Treasury yields of matching maturity). Let  $r_{n,t}^{cip}$  be the log  $n$ -period CIP violation (the  $n$ -period synthetic dollar rate minus the  $n$ -period swap rate). Linearizing (7) and recalling that  $r_{n,t}$  is the log  $n$ -period swap rate,

$$r_{n,t} - y_{n,t} \geq r_{n,t} - y_{n,t}^l \approx - \underbrace{r_{n,t}^{cip}}_{\text{n-period CIP violation}} + E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\underbrace{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} (r_{t+j} - i_{t+j}^l)}_{\text{financing benefit}}]. \quad (8)$$

The difference between the short-maturity swap rate  $r_{t+j}$  and the financing rate  $i_{t+j}^l$  is generally small and stable over time. As a result, equation (8) implies that if yields are close to the net long curve, we should expect swap spreads to be negative and close in absolute value to the matched-maturity CIP violation.

We should also emphasize the important role of risk premia that is hidden in this expression. The  $n$ -period CIP violation  $r_{n,t}^{cip}$  is well above the physical ( $\mathbb{P}$ ) measure expectation of future short-maturity CIP violations, as emphasized by [Du, Hébert, and Huber \(2022\)](#). That is, net long curve yields are higher than swap rates both because of expectations of non-zero future balance sheet costs and because of the risk associated with the possibility that these costs become larger.

We develop the net short curve via similar logic. Consider the strategy of short-selling the Treasury bond at yield  $y_{n,t}$ , borrowing the bond against cash collateral, and offsetting the balance sheet effect by reducing CIP activity. Again as in our simple model, the return on the cash collateral cannot exceed the bond return after accounting for the opportunity cost of balance sheet:

$$\underbrace{I^s}_{\text{gross return on cash collateral}} \leq \underbrace{E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{ny_{n,t} - (n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}}]}_{\text{expected bond return}} + \underbrace{(R_t^{syn} - R_t)}_{\text{forgone CIP profits}}. \quad (9)$$

The left-hand side of this expression is the cash generated at date  $t + 1$  per dollar invested at  $t$  by selling the bond and posting the cash as collateral. The right-hand side represents the costs of this trade at date  $t + 1$  per dollar invested at  $t$ , including both the cost of repurchasing the bond and the forgone CIP profits. Define the log interest rate

$$x_{2,t} = \ln(I_t^s + R_t - R_t^{syn}) \quad (10)$$

and iterate:

$$y_{n,t} \geq y_{n,t}^s = -\frac{1}{n} \ln(E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} x_{2,t+j})]) \approx E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} (i_{t+j}^s - r_{t+j}^{syn} + r_{t+j})]. \quad (11)$$

The yield curve  $y_{n,t}^s$  defines what we call the “net short curve.” This curve represents the point at which dealers would be willing to switch from CIP arbitrage activity to taking a net short position in a Treasury bond. The net short curve is a lower bound on Treasury yields (again under the assumption that dealers engage in CIP arbitrage).

The net short curve can also be viewed as an upper bound on swap spreads. Linearizing (11),

$$r_{n,t} - y_{n,t} \leq r_{n,t} - y_{n,t}^s \approx \underbrace{r_{n,t}^{cip}}_{\text{n-period CIP violation}} + E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \underbrace{(r_{t+j} - i_{t+j}^s)}_{\text{security lending spread}} \right]. \quad (12)$$

The difference between the short-maturity swap rate and the security lending rate is positive, and the n-period CIP violation in our definition is also positive and proxies for the balance sheet cost. Taking these two forces together, equation (12) implies that if yields are close to the net short curve, we should expect positive swap spreads.

Our assumptions are sufficient to determine an upper and lower bound on Treasury yields (or, equivalently, on swap spreads), but are not enough to pin down Treasury yields themselves. In a frictionless world, the net long and net short curves converge to one curve and thus exactly pin down Treasury yields. In the presence of frictions, yields can fall anywhere in between the net short and net long curves.

## 2.3 Discussion

Before proceeding, we elaborate on the interpretation of these curves in pre-GFC and post-GFC periods, the role of interest rate swap hedges, the connection between yields and positions, and a broader interpretation of intermediaries as dealers and their levered clients.

**Pre-GFC and Post-GFC.** Pre-GFC, CIP violations were roughly zero and security lending rates ( $i_t^s$ ) were below one-month swap rates ( $r_t$ ) by an average of 25 basis points annualized.<sup>18</sup> It follows (by (12)) that net short curve yields were significantly lower than matched-maturity swap rates, which is to say there was a significant positive swap spread. In contrast, the net-long financing rate ( $i_t^l$ ) is only about five basis points (annualized) below swap rates (during both the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods), leading to a net-long curve that is only slightly above the swap curve (by (8)).

Post-GFC, synthetic lending rates are well above swap rates ( $r_t^{cip} = r_t^{syn} - r_t \gg 0$ ). By (8), this leads to a significant “negative swap spread” between swap rates and the net long curve. In

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<sup>18</sup>This spread is time-varying, and correlated with yield curve factors. As a result, there is a non-trivial risk premium that lowers the net short curve even further in our quantitative model.

contrast, the net short curve now features yields far below swap rates, reflecting both the spread between the short financing rate and one-month swap rates and the CIP violations.

Actual swap spreads went from being large and positive pre-GFC to negative post-GFC. This fact, combined with the discussion above, previews our result that Treasury yields went from being close to the net short curve pre-GFC to close to the net long curve post-GFC. We discuss the consequences of this shift in Sections 3 and 4.

**The Net Short and Net Long Curves as Arbitrage Bounds.** The bound  $y_{n,t} \in [y_{n,t}^s, y_{n,t}^l]$  is an arbitrage bound if  $y_{n-1,t+1} \in [y_{n-1,t+1}^s, y_{n-1,t+1}^l]$  with probability one, which follows from our key assumptions. This observation gives rise to the following interpretation: the net long yield is a yield at which a dealer would be willing to go long even if the dealer believed all dealers would be net long the bond in the future with probability one. Likewise, the net short yield is the yield at which a dealer would be willing go short, even if the dealer believed all dealers would be net short in the future with probability one. Yields falling in between these bounds can be loosely interpreted as related to the probability that dealers will be either net long or net short in the future.

In Internet Appendix Section F.2, we show that if  $y_{n,t} > y_{n,t}^l$ , dealers will perceive an arbitrage opportunity, even if future yields could be outside the bounds (i.e. if it is possible that  $y_{n-1,t+1} > y_{n-1,t+1}^l$ ). The net short curve does not share this property. However, we are able to derive a lower value for yields which we call “partial equilibrium net short curve” such that the dealer will always be willing to go short, and show that the net short curve described in the main text is a close approximation of this partial equilibrium net short curve.

**Hedging with Swaps.** It is standard practice to hedge a Treasury position with an interest rate swap.<sup>19</sup> Prior to the GFC, hedging using LIBOR swaps was typical; following the GFC, OIS rose in prominence, and more recently swaps referencing repo rates (SOFR swaps) have replaced LIBOR swaps following the benchmark reference rate reform. Our analysis will focus on OIS swaps, which are available for a reasonably long sample (unlike SOFR swaps) and are insensitive to credit risk (unlike LIBOR swaps).<sup>20</sup>

Hedging Treasury bonds with interest rates swaps leaves the dealer exposed to mark-to-market risk associated with fluctuations in the Treasury-swap spread. In our log-linearized equations (8)

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<sup>19</sup>Hedging can be static or dynamic, and based on matching maturity, duration, or cashflows.

<sup>20</sup>See more details in Internet Appendix Section A.

and (12), we can see that the swap spreads for the net-long and net-short curve depend on the risk-neutral expectations of future balance sheet constraints and residual basis spreads between money market rates.

Thus, the net long curve  $y_{n,t}^l$  can be hedged with a synthetic dollar swap (by swapping EUR rates to dollars), under the assumption that the financing spread  $r_t - i_t^l$  is stable. The net short curve  $y_{n,t}^s$  can be hedged via a combination of swaps and synthetic dollar swaps, under the assumption that the financing spread  $r_t - i_t^s$  is stable.

If one assumes that a Treasury yield will always be at one end of these boundaries, then the Treasury bond itself can be hedged. But note that the hedge will differ depending on which of the two boundaries is assumed to apply, and in neither case is the hedge a single swap. The intuition for this result is that balance sheet costs matter, and hedging the Treasury bond with an interest rate swap hedges interest rate risk but does not hedge balance sheet risk.

**Dealers and Levered Clients.** In developing the net long and net short curves, we have adopted the perspective of a dealer. In Internet Appendix Section F.1, we argue that these curves are also arbitrage bounds from the perspective of the dealer’s levered clients (i.e. hedge funds). Dealers’ balance sheet costs are in effect transmitted to these clients via bilateral lending markets, a point emphasized by Boyarchenko et al. (2018a). As a result, balance sheets costs will influence a substantial segment of the Treasury market, even though dealers on their own hold a relatively small quantity of Treasury bonds on net. Internet Appendix Section F.1 also contains some suggestive evidence supporting this perspective. In what follows, we will treat dealers and their levered clients as a consolidated entity.

## 2.4 Term Structure Estimation

To estimate the net long and net short curves, we need to construct the risk-neutral expectations of  $x_{1,t+j}$  and  $x_{2,t+j}$ . This is where our assumption that interest rate swaps and cross-currency basis swaps are priced by a common SDF applies. The risk-neutral expectations we need are determined primarily by the swap curve and the term structure of CIP violations. We will proceed by constructing an SDF (in particular, a term structure model) that fits swap rates and CIP violations, and then use that SDF to construct the net long and net short curves.

At the heart of our calculations is a comparison between a Treasury hedged with a swap and a CIP violation of the same maturity. A rough version of this comparison can be done without a model: one simply compares the swap spread with the CIP violation. Our term structure model allows for a more careful version of this comparison. First, it allows us to consider Treasury bonds with maturities and coupon structures that do not exactly line up with the available points of the swap and CIP curves. Second, it allows us to explicitly account for the residual basis risk between financing rates. Third, it allows us to model the unwinding of the trade when the bond has six months remaining maturity (which helps fit the short-end of the yield curve). Fourth, it smooths the swap and CIP curves, reducing micro-structure-induced noise. Lastly, it accounts for covariances that are omitted from the naive spread calculation; that is, we use the exact, non-linear equations from the preceding section, as opposed to their linearized approximations.

Our term structure model largely follows the standard approach in the no-arbitrage term structure model literature (Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu, 2011; Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton, 2014). At first glance, this might seem strange, given that our model necessarily features arbitrage. In particular, our term structure model must match both swap rates and CIP violations, which is equivalent to matching dollar swap rates and synthetic dollar swap rates. Our term structure model therefore features two different short rates, and as a result two different yield curves, as in Augustin et al. (2021).<sup>21</sup> We use a no-arbitrage approach (as opposed to other methods of yield curve interpolation) on the grounds that such an approach is consistent with our assumption of no-arbitrage across derivatives.

We will use lower case symbols to denote scalars or vectors and uppercase symbols to denote matrices. Let  $z_t$  denote a vector of  $N$  risk factors (our empirical exercise will have  $N = 5$ ) for our term structure model. We assume that, under the physical (actual) probability measure  $\mathbb{P}$ ,  $z_t$  follows a Gaussian AR(1) process,

$$z_{t+1} = k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{P}} + K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{P}} z_t + (\Sigma_z)^{1/2} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{P}}, \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{P}} \sim N(0, I_N), \quad (13)$$

where  $I_N$  is the  $N \times N$  identity matrix,  $k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{P}}$  is an  $N \times 1$  vector of constants,  $K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{P}}$  is an  $N \times N$  matrix, and  $\Sigma_z$  is a symmetric positive semi-definite  $N \times N$  matrix. The intermediary's log stochastic

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<sup>21</sup>We follow a similar approach to those authors when constructing our term structure model.

discount factor that prices derivatives is

$$m_{t+1} = -(\delta_0 + \delta_1^T z_t) - \frac{1}{2} \lambda_t^T \lambda_t + \lambda_t^T \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{P}}, \quad (14)$$

where  $\lambda_t = (\Sigma_z^{-1})(\lambda_0 + \Lambda_1 z_t)$  is the price of risk associated with each shock. We will assume that the profits of derivatives trades are discounted using the OIS curve, consistent with industry practice.<sup>22</sup> That is,  $r_t = \delta_0 + \delta_1^T z_t$ , where  $r_t$  is the log of the fixed rate associated with a one-month overnight index swap.

This standard specification leads to a risk-neutral ( $\mathbb{Q}$ ) measure dynamics for the state vector  $z_t$ ,

$$z_{t+1} = k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} + K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} z_t + (\Sigma_z)^{1/2} \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{Q}}, \quad \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{Q}} \sim N(0, I_N), \quad (15)$$

where the parameters  $k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}}$  and  $K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}}$  are functions of the physical measure parameters and the SDF parameters. It also leads zero coupon-swap rates that are affine in the state vector,

$$r_{n,t} = -\frac{1}{n} \ln(E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} -r_{t+j})]) = \frac{1}{n} (a_n^{swap} + (b_n^{swap})^T z_t), \quad (16)$$

where  $r_{n,t}$  denotes log of the annual fixed rate associated with an  $n$ -month swap.

The log synthetic dollar rate is likewise assumed to be affine,

$$r_t^{syn} = \hat{\delta}_0 + \hat{\delta}_1^T z_t, \quad (17)$$

which generates the recursion

$$r_{n,t}^{syn} = -\frac{1}{n} \ln(E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} -r_{t+j}^{syn})]) = \frac{1}{n} (a_n^{syn} + (b_n^{syn})^T z_t). \quad (18)$$

We assume that the rates  $x_t = (x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, y_t^{bill})$  are affine functions of our state variable, where  $x_{1,t}$  and  $x_{2,t}$  are the discount rates associated with our net short and net long curves, and  $y_t^{bill}$  is the

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<sup>22</sup>The choice to use OIS rather than some other discount rate does not substantially impact our results, as we use the SDF only to price zero-NPV derivatives, whose value is not sensitive to shifts in the level of the discount rate.

monthly log yield on a six-month Treasury bill. Specifically,

$$x_t = \gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t + (\Sigma_x)^{\frac{1}{2}} \varepsilon_{x,t}, \quad \varepsilon_{x,t} \sim N(0, I_3). \quad (19)$$

These additional variables can be thought of as akin to the “macro factors” often included in standard term-structure models. The key assumption is that the measurement errors  $\varepsilon_{x,t}$  do not enter the SDF (and hence have the same distribution under  $\mathbb{P}$  and  $\mathbb{Q}$ ). The coefficients  $\gamma_0$  and  $\Gamma_1$  can be identified from regressions of these factors on the state variables.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, we assume that the dealer unwinds their position when the remaining maturity reaches six months, at which point the Treasury bond is equivalent to a Treasury bill. We make this assumption to capture the empirical observation that, pre-GFC, bill yields fell below other short-term risk-free rates (see e.g. Nagel (2016)). Incorporating this effect is important when constructing bounds on a one-year bond (which will become equivalent to a bill relatively soon) but has a minimal effect on long-maturity bonds. The curves we construct are thus

$$y_{n,t}^l = -\frac{1}{n} \ln(E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-\sum_{j=0}^{n-7} x_{1,t+j}) \exp(-6y_{t+n-6}^{bill})]), \quad (20)$$

$$y_{n,t}^s = -\frac{1}{n} \ln(E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-\sum_{j=0}^{n-7} x_{2,t+j}) \exp(-6y_{t+n-6}^{bill})]). \quad (21)$$

Under the assumptions of our term structure model, these curves are also affine in the state variables.

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<sup>23</sup>The tri-party repo and secured lending rates (which are essentially the long and short financing rates) are overnight rates. Given data limitations, we use overnight tri-party repo rates and overnight security lending rates to construct  $x_t$ . The 1-month CIP basis data are available, but to avoid the quarter-end effect (Du et al., 2018b), we instead use the 3-month CIP basis to obtain the synthetic rate in  $x_t$ . Our estimation reveals that there are unit-root elements in the  $z_t$  process. A more sophisticated approach is to require that the spreads  $x_{1,t} - r_t - r_t^{cip}$  (approximately the tri-party repo and fed funds spread),  $x_{2,t} - r_t + r_t^{cip}$  (approximately the security lending rate and fed funds spread), and  $x_{3,t} - r_t$  (approximately the T-bill and fed funds spread) are stationary, i.e., have zero loading on the unit-root element. Our main approach is the direct regression of  $x_t$  on  $z_t$ , but we show in the internet appendix that results are similar if we impose stationarity on the spreads. See Internet Appendix Section D for more details.

## 2.5 Term Structure Estimation Results and Predictions

We obtain data from various public sources, as documented in Internet Appendix Section A. We then estimate the term structure model to fit dollar swap rates and synthetic dollar swap rates, using a standard maximum likelihood approach. The goal of our estimation procedure is to accurately fit and interpolate these curves, and the model is flexible enough to fit both sets of rates with a high degree of accuracy. For details on the estimation procedure and on related issues such as coupon vs. zero-coupon bonds, and for illustrations of model fit, see Internet Appendix Section D.6.

In Figure 4, we show the model-implied net long and net short curves, in comparison with the Treasury yield curve. We show both levels and their differences with the OIS curve. For brevity, we only show the standard 2-year and 10-year maturities. Graphs with a richer set of maturities are shown in Appendix Figures A7 and A8.

Several patterns are immediately apparent. Prior to the GFC, bond yields were close to the net short curve, consistent with the net position data of Figure 1. After the GFC, bond yields are close to the net long yield, suggesting that dealers will be long coupon bonds. This is again consistent with the position data.

Both funding spreads and balance sheet costs play an important quantitative role in the model. Appendix Figure A9 presents decompositions of the net long and net short curves, in which one of these forces have been turned off. The short funding spread  $r_t - i_t^s$  plays a critical role in the pre-GFC period, while balance sheet costs (as proxied for by CIP violations) are essential to explain the post-GFC period.

We next compare Treasury yields relative to the net short and net long curves with position data. The net short and net long curves we construct are estimates of yields at which the dealer should be willing to take a net position in a Treasury bond, after accounting for financing and balance sheet costs. This leads naturally the prediction that if the yield is at the net long yield, dealers should be net long, and if the yield is at the net short yield, dealers should be net short.

We first define a “relative yield index” for each maturity  $n$  by

$$pos_{n,t} = 2 * \frac{y_{n,t} - y_{n,t}^s}{y_{n,t}^l - y_{n,t}^s} - 1. \quad (22)$$

This index takes on a value of one if the yield of the  $n$ -month maturity Treasury bond is equal to the net long yield, negative one if it is equal to the net short yield, and zero if it is equal to the

average of the net long and net short yields.

We then construct a weighted average (across maturities) version of the relative yield index, where the weight for each maturity is the fraction of dealer Treasury bond holding in that maturity bucket over total dealer Treasury bond holdings. We obtain the net primary dealer coupon Treasury bond position from the FR2004 primary dealer statistics published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and normalize the total value by the total assets of primary dealers.

Figure 5 compares the weighted average relative yield index together with total dealer Treasury holding scaled by dealer balance sheet size.<sup>24</sup> The bond position and relative yield index are plotted on different axes (because they are not in comparable units), with the zero points on each axis aligned. For a variety of reasons, we do not expect these series to perfectly align. First, the mapping between how close a yield is to the net long or net short curves and the predicted net dealer position in that maturity is unclear, and may change over time. Second, the arbitrage bounds we construct are motivated by trading strategies that (at least potentially) hold the bond almost to maturity. Dealers also intermediate bonds between clients, and may be willing to buy a bond for the purpose of selling it quickly even if they view the bond as overpriced (close to the net short yield). This kind of intermediation activity acts as a kind of noise in the relationship between net dealer positions and the relative yield index, and is likely accentuated when looking at specific maturity buckets as opposed to overall net dealer positions. Despite these caveats, there is a non-trivial correspondence between the relative yield index and actual positions, as shown in Figure 5.

Summarizing our analysis thus far, Treasury yields have moved from being close to net short arbitrage bounds pre-GFC to being close to net long arbitrage bounds post-GFC, and net primary dealer positions have responded by switching from being net short to net long. The relationship between yields and positions we document is consistent with the view that balance-sheet-constrained dealers act as arbitrageurs between the Treasury and swap markets.<sup>25</sup> We next consider the implications of this perspective, with an emphasis on the causes and consequences of the regime shift we have documented.

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<sup>24</sup>See Appendix Figure A10 for maturity-specific relative yield indices and their comparison with actual dealer positions across four maturity buckets.

<sup>25</sup>We interpret our results as showing that Treasury yields are often at or near arbitrage bounds given swap prices. However, one could equally say that swap yields are at or near arbitrage bounds given Treasury yields, adopting the perspective of [Hanson, Malkhozov, and Venter \(2022\)](#).

### 3 A Model of the Treasury Market

Thus far, we have said little about how the Treasury regime is determined. In this section, we build a supply-and-demand model to endogenize dealers' net position, as a function of their balance sheet constraint, demand for Treasury bonds from non-dealers, and the overall supply of Treasury bonds. This model helps explain the change in the Treasury regime pre- and post-GFC, the striking correlation between the slope of the yield curve and the dealer position in Figure 2, and fragility of the Treasury market when dealers' balance sheet constraints are tight.

#### 3.1 Model Setup

The model has two dates (zero and one), and a single  $n$ -period Treasury bond. Date one exists only for the purpose of determining payoffs; all of our analysis will focus on date zero, and we will omit time subscripts for all date zero rates and yields. We will take as exogenous the date zero log interest rates  $y^{bill}$ ,  $i^l$ ,  $i^s$ , and  $r$ , as well as two different expectations concerning future bond yields. We define the dealer's date zero risk-neutral ( $\mathbb{Q}$ -measure) expectation of date one bond yields as

$$y_{\mathbb{Q}} \equiv E^{\mathbb{Q}}[y_{n-1,1}] = E^{\mathbb{Q}}[r_{n-1,1} - (r_{n-1,1} - y_{n-1,1})] \quad (23)$$

where  $r_{n-1,1}$  and  $y_{n-1,1}$  denote the  $(n-1)$ -period log swap rates and log Treasury bond yields at date one. We define the corresponding physical measure ( $\mathbb{P}$ ) counterpart as  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$ . Note that the dealer's SDF and associated risk-neutral measure  $\mathbb{Q}$  price derivatives, but will generally not price positive-investment assets (such as Treasury bonds and bills).

We have written the definition of  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  in this way to highlight the possible interpretations of comparative statics with respect to  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ . One interpretation, which we emphasize, is that a decrease in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  (holding all else, and in particular  $r$ , constant) represents a decrease in the swap term premium holding constant the risk-neutral expectation of future swap-Treasury spreads.<sup>26</sup> It is also important to distinguish between comparative statics that change  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  holding  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$  constant and comparative statics that change both  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$  and  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ . We interpret the former as a change in swap term premia and

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<sup>26</sup>That is, for the purpose of labeling the horizontal axis in Figure 8 and for our subsequent discussion of policy, we assume a 1:1 relationship between changes in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  and changes in  $E^{\mathbb{Q}}[r_{n-1,1}]$ . An equally valid alternative interpretation of the comparative static with respect to  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  is as a change in the risk-neutral expectation of future swap-Treasury spreads holding the swap curve constant.

the latter as a change in expected future rates.

These interest rates and expected bond prices will allow us to compute the dealer's net long and net short curves, using the approximations (3) and (4) defined in Section 2.1, with  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  in the place of  $E[y']$ .<sup>27</sup> The key endogenous variables are  $y$ , the yield of an  $n$ -period zero-coupon bond at date zero, and  $r^{syn}$ , the one-period synthetic unsecured risk-free rate at date zero. We focus on the following asset prices that are closely related to the empirical motivations in Figure 1.

- The Treasury term spread,  $y - y^{bill}$ .
- The synthetic–swap spread,  $r^{syn} - r$ , which maps to CIP deviations.
- The  $n$ -period swap spread  $r_n - y$ , with  $r_n$  approximated as

$$r_n \approx E^{\mathbb{Q}}\left[\frac{1}{n}r + \frac{n-1}{n}r_{n-1,1}\right]$$

- The swap term spread,  $r_n - r$ .

We will treat dealers and their levered clients as a single consolidated entity, based on the analysis of Internet Appendix Section F.1. In the Treasury market, dealers will interact with two kinds of investors. Hedged investors purchase the Treasury bond and swap it to their local currency. Unhedged investors choose between the Treasury bond and Treasury bills. Dealers also have other counterparties in the synthetic lending market; these other counterparties do not participate in the Treasury market. This structure implicitly assumes that the tri-party repo, bill, and interest rate swap markets are infinitely elastic, whereas the Treasury and synthetic borrowing markets are elastic but not infinitely so; we make these assumptions to simplify our exposition.

Our model of dealers is exactly that of Section 2.1.<sup>28</sup> Recall that  $q^{syn}$  is the quantity (in dollars) of synthetic loans supplied by the dealers at date zero, and  $q^{bond}$  be the quantity (in dollars) of bonds owned (positive) or short-sold (negative), and that the dealer balance sheet constraint is  $q^{syn} + |q^{bond}| = \bar{q}$ .

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<sup>27</sup>We use these approximations to simplify the analysis that follows, at the suggestion of an anonymous referee. A previous version of this paper used exact (non-linear) definitions of the buy and sell curves, and reached identical conclusions.

<sup>28</sup>With the exception that we no longer require the simplification of risk-neutrality, and instead simply treat the  $\mathbb{Q}$  measure as exogenous.

Let  $S^{bond}$  be the supply of bonds (in notional quantities) at date zero, and let  $D_U^{bond}$  and  $D_H^{bond}$  be the demand (in dollars) for bonds from unhedged and hedged investors, respectively. Market clearing in the bond market requires

$$q^{bond} + D_U^{bond} + D_H^{bond} = \exp(-ny)S^{bond}. \quad (24)$$

The bond price  $\exp(-ny)$  enters this expression to convert the notional supply  $S^{bond}$  into dollars.

Unhedged investor demand is a continuously differentiable, strictly positive and increasing function of the expected log excess return of the bond over bills,<sup>29</sup>

$$D_U^{bond} = D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}). \quad (25)$$

Likewise, hedged investor demand is a continuously differentiable, strictly positive and increasing function of the expected log excess return in dollars<sup>30</sup> on the hedged strategy:

$$D_H^{bond} = D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}). \quad (26)$$

When a dealer helps a hedged investor exchange e.g. yen into dollars and hedge using forwards, the dealer will end up with a yen asset (cash) and a dollar liability. As a result, this activity increases the dealer's balance sheet, and is functionally equivalent, from the dealer's perspective, to lending synthetic dollars.

There is an important role for market segmentation in these equations. Both types of Treasury clients are assumed to care about  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$  and not  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , because they trade Treasury bonds but not swaps. Segmentation between constrained agents (dealers) and unconstrained agents (clients), whether endogenous (e.g., [Alvarez and Jermann \(2000\)](#); [Chien, Cole, and Lustig \(2011\)](#); [Biais, Hombert, and Weill \(2021\)](#)) or exogenous (e.g., [Gertler and Kiyotaki \(2010\)](#); [He and Krishnamurthy \(2013\)](#)), is necessary to generate Treasury-swap arbitrage.

Dealers can also lend synthetic dollars to other counterparties (hedged investors buying corporate bonds, for example). We assume that the demands of these other investors for synthetic

<sup>29</sup>As documented in [Haddad and Sraer \(2020\)](#), typical bank portfolios behave like unhedged investors in our model in that their position in long-term bonds is increasing the expected excess return of long-term Treasury bonds.

<sup>30</sup>For simplicity, we use the hedged return in dollars, as opposed to in local currency; this allows us to ignore second-order terms associated with the covariance between interest rates and exchange rates.

dollars are  $D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r)$ , where  $D^{syn}$  is a continuously differentiable, non-negative and strictly decreasing function of the spread between synthetic dollars and risk-free rates.<sup>31</sup> Market clearing in the synthetic dollar market requires that

$$q^{syn} = D_H^{bond} + D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r). \quad (27)$$

These market clearing conditions, together with the net long and net short bounds of our simple model (equations (3) and (4)) and their associated implications for dealer positions, define our model. To guarantee that an equilibrium exists in our model, we make the following assumptions.

**Assumption 1.** *We assume that the demand functions are well-behaved:*

- *Excess synthetic loan demand is possible:  $D^{syn}(0) > \bar{q}$ .*
- *Excess synthetic loan supply is possible: For all  $y$ ,  $\lim_{r^{syn} \rightarrow \infty} D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) + D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) = 0$ .*
- *Excess bond supply is possible:  $\lim_{y \rightarrow -\infty} D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) + D_H(ny - r - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) = 0$ .*

Note that excess bond demand is also possible without additional assumptions.<sup>32</sup>

Our static model features three possible equilibria, which we refer to as regimes: a long regime  $q^{bond} > 0$ , a short regime  $q^{bond} < 0$ , and an intermediate regime  $q^{bond} = 0$ .<sup>33</sup> We discuss the long and short regimes (which are of greater empirical interest) in the main text, and provide results for the intermediate regime in Internet Appendix Section B.

Our focus, when analyzing these regimes, will be on the spread between synthetic dollars and the swap rate,  $r^{syn} - r$ , which is endogenously determined. In our quantitative analysis, this spread was a key input to the model, and we measured it with CIP violations. In this two-market market,

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<sup>31</sup>Note that  $D^{syn}(\cdot)$  is decreasing in its argument (a spread), because the synthetic lending counterparties are paying that spread to dealers. In contrast, the other demand functions,  $D_H^{bond}$  and  $D_U^{bond}$ , are increasing in their arguments (expected returns), because investors are earning those expected returns.

<sup>32</sup>If we take  $y \rightarrow \infty$ , the right hand side of (24) becomes zero while the non-dealer demand  $D_U^{bond} + D_H^{bond}$  is strictly positive, causing an excess bond demand.

<sup>33</sup>In position data, dealers will never have an exactly zero net Treasury position, for reasons (for example, market-making activities) that are outside the scope of our model. We view the intermediate regime as describing a situation in which dealers are targeting a roughly net flat position.

the rate  $r^{syn}$  should be understood as the risk-free return the dealer requires for assets held on balance sheet, as opposed to specifically a euro rate swapped to dollars. Under this interpretation, the spread  $r^{syn} - r$  is the kind of financial intermediation spread that plays a key role in macro-finance models (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; He and Krishnamurthy, 2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010).

### 3.2 The Long Regime

We first consider a regime that dealers are long ( $q^{bond} > 0$ ), in which case the Treasury yield  $y$  is equal to the dealer long curve  $y^l$  as in (3),

$$y = \underbrace{\frac{n-1}{n}y_{\mathbb{Q}} + \frac{1}{n}(i^l + r^{syn} - r)}_{\equiv y^l}. \quad (28)$$

This equation generates a dealer indifference condition between the two endogenous variables  $r^{syn}$  and  $y$ , with  $y$  strictly increasing in  $r^{syn}$ . As synthetic lending spread increases (higher  $r^{syn}$ ), the dealer requires a better return on buying the Treasury bond (higher  $y$ ).

Combining the market clearing conditions in (24) and (27), the intermediary balance sheet constraint in (1), and using  $q^{bond} > 0$ , we have

$$\bar{q} - e^{-ny}S^{bond} + D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) = D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r). \quad (29)$$

The left-hand side of (29) represents the residual balance sheet available for synthetic lending, which in equilibrium must equal the residual demand for synthetic lending. Note that the Treasury bond demand from hedged investors does not appear in this equation, because the dealer balance sheet is unaffected by changes in their demand, holding all else constant.<sup>34</sup> The left-hand side of (29) is strictly increasing in  $y$ , while the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in  $r^{syn}$ . Therefore, equation (29) generates a kind of market indifference condition, where  $r^{syn}$  strictly decreases with  $y$ . In Figure 6, we illustrate this market indifference condition in a plot of the synthetic lending spread  $r^{syn} - r$  against the Treasury term spread  $y - y^{bill}$ . Intuitively, a higher synthetic dollar

<sup>34</sup>An increase in hedged investor demand reduces the quantity of Treasury bonds dealers must hold, but increases the amount of synthetic borrowing they must finance, and hence has no effect on their balance sheet usage, provided that dealers have a net long bond position.

lending spread leads to more dealer balance sheet allocation to synthetic dollar lending but less to bonds. This decline of bond demand from dealers increases the bond yield.

A long-regime equilibrium  $(y, r^{syn})$  is a point where the dealer indifference curve in (28) intersects with the market indifference curve in (29) and  $q^{bond} > 0$ , which requires

$$D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) + D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) < e^{-ny} S^{bond}. \quad (30)$$

Because the two indifference curves have opposite slopes, such an equilibrium is unique if it exists, as illustrated in Figure 6.

We next consider various comparative statics in a long-regime equilibrium.

**Proposition 1.** *In a long regime equilibrium, holding all else constant,*

1. *An increase in  $S^{bond}$  leads to an increase in  $y$  and an increase in  $r^{syn}$ ,*
2. *A decrease in  $\bar{q}$  or a parallel decrease in  $D_U$  leads to an increase in  $y$  and an increase in  $r^{syn}$ ,*
3. *An increase in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  leads to an increase in  $y$  and a decrease in  $r^{syn}$ ,*
4. *A parallel increase in  $D^{syn}(\cdot)$  increases both  $y$  and  $r^{syn}$ .*

*Proof.* See Internet Appendix Section E.1. □

Intuitively, an increase in the bond supply  $S^{bond}$  means that, holding yields constant, less dealer balance sheet is available for synthetic lending, causing a higher synthetic lending spread. As a result, the market indifference curve in Figure 6 shifts upwards, which leads to an increase in both synthetic lending spreads and bond yields in equilibrium.

A decrease in either dealer balance sheet capacity  $\bar{q}$  or in unhedged bond demand  $D_U$  is equivalent to an increase in the supply of bonds  $S^{bond}$ , and hence generates the same comparative statics.

An increase in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  holding  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$  constant is an increase in swap term premium, which shifts the dealer indifference curve to the right in Figure 6. This leads to an increase in  $y$  and a decrease in  $r^{syn}$ .

Lastly, a parallel increase in the synthetic dollar demand  $D^{syn}(\cdot)$  shifts the market indifference curve in Figure 6 upwards, thus increasing both  $y$  and  $r^{syn}$ .

### 3.3 The Short Regime

We next consider a regime in which dealers are short ( $q^{bond} < 0$ ). In this regime, the bond yield  $y$  must equal to the net short yield  $y^s$  as defined in (4),

$$y = \underbrace{\frac{n-1}{n}y_{\mathbb{Q}} + \frac{1}{n}(i^s - r^{syn} + r)}_{\equiv y^s}. \quad (31)$$

This equation generates a dealer indifference condition, where  $r^{syn}$  strictly decreases with  $y$ . The less attractive it is to sell the Treasury bond (higher  $y$ ), the lower synthetic lending rate  $r^{syn}$  must be to generate indifference between these two activities. This relationship has the opposite sign compared to the long regime.

Combining the market clearing conditions in (24) and (27), balance sheet constraint (1), and using  $q^{bond} < 0$ , we obtain

$$\bar{q} + e^{-ny}S^{bond} - D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) - 2D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) = D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r). \quad (32)$$

The left-hand side of (32) again represents the residual balance sheet available for synthetic lending, which in equilibrium must equal the residual demand for synthetic lending. Note that demand from hedged investors has a double impact on the dealer's balance sheet. All else equal, an increase in this demand will result in dealers taking larger short positions and providing more synthetic financing to hedged investors, both of which use up dealer balance sheet.

The left-hand side of (32) is strictly decreasing in  $y$ : unlike the long regime, more demand from investors and less supply require dealers to take larger short positions, using up more balance sheet. Equation (32) therefore generates a kind of market indifference condition, where  $r^{syn}$  strictly increases in  $y$ . In Figure 7, we illustrate this market indifference condition together with the dealer indifference condition. The key difference from the long-regime illustration in Figure 6 is that the slopes flip for both the dealer indifference curve and the market indifference curve.

A short-regime equilibrium ( $y, r^{syn}$ ) is a point where the two indifference curves intersect and  $q^{bond} < 0$ , which requires

$$D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) + D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) > e^{-ny}S^{bond}. \quad (33)$$

Because the two indifference curves have opposite slopes, such an equilibrium is again unique if it exists, as illustrated in Figure 7.

We study the same set of comparative statics, now in the context of the short regime.

**Proposition 2.** *In a short regime equilibrium, holding all else constant,*

1. *An increase in  $S^{bond}$  leads to an increase in  $y$  and a decrease in  $r^{syn}$ ;*
2. *An increase in  $\bar{q}$  or a parallel decrease in  $D_U$  leads to an increase in  $y$  and a decrease in  $r^{syn}$ ;*
3. *An increase in  $y_Q$  leads to an increase in  $y$  and an increase in  $r^{syn}$ ;*
4. *A parallel increase in  $D^{syn}(\cdot)$  increases  $r^{syn}$  and decreases  $y$ .*

*Proof.* See Internet Appendix Section E.2. □

Intuitively, an increase in bond supply  $S^{bond}$  in the short regime means that, holding the bond yield constant, more dealer balance sheet is available for synthetic lending, causing a lower synthetic lending spread. The market indifference curve in Figure 7 shifts downwards, which leads to an increase in the bond yield (as in the long regime) but a decrease in the synthetic lending spread (unlike the long regime).

A decrease in unhedged bond demand  $D_U$  is equivalent to an increase in bond supply, and hence generates the same comparative statics. Unlike the long regime, an increase (rather than decrease) in dealer balance sheet capacity  $\bar{q}$  is equivalent to an increase in supply  $S^{bond}$ , because dealers are short bonds instead of long bonds.

An increase in  $y_Q$  holding  $y_P$  constant shifts the dealer indifference curve to the right in Figure 7, which leads to an increase in  $y$  (like the long regime) but a decrease in  $r^{syn}$  (unlike the long regime).

Lastly, a parallel increase in the synthetic dollar demand  $D^{syn}(\cdot)$  shifts the market indifference curve in Figure 7 upwards, thus increasing  $r^{syn}$  (like the long regime) but decreasing  $y$  (unlike the long regime).

### 3.4 Equilibrium

We next discuss several factors that can determine which of three regimes occur in equilibrium.

**Proposition 3.** *The equilibrium exists and is unique given the exogenous parameters. Holding all else constant,*

1. *There exists an  $0 \leq S^s \leq S^l \leq \infty$  such that a short regime equilibrium exists for all  $S^{bond} < S^s$ , a long regime equilibrium exists for all  $S^{bond} > S^l$ , and an intermediate regime equilibrium exists for  $S^{bond} \in [S^s, S^l]$ .*
2. *There exists an  $-\infty \leq y_Q^l \leq y_Q^s \leq \infty$  such that a short regime equilibrium exists for all  $y_Q > y_Q^s$ , a long regime equilibrium exists for all  $y_Q < y_Q^l$ , and an intermediate regime equilibrium exists for  $y_Q \in [y_Q^l, y_Q^s]$ .*

*Proof.* See Internet Appendix Section E.4. □

Intuitively, when bonds are scarce, dealers will be short to meet client demands, while when bonds are abundant dealers will be long to fill the shortfall in client demand.

Less intuitively, when the term premium is large and the yield curve steep, dealers will be short bonds. Considering the dealer's bond position in isolation, this looks like a money-losing strategy. However, if the swap curve has a higher term premium than the Treasury curve and the dealer is hedging with swaps, then selling bonds and hedging is in fact a profitable strategy. Similarly, buying bonds when the curve is flat looks like a money-losing strategy, but is in fact profitable if the swap curve is even flatter and the dealer hedges. In our model, client demand for Treasury bonds is driven by the expected returns on those bonds; spreads must therefore move in a way that induces dealers to take the opposite position.

Figure 8 illustrates the comparative statics of the model with respect to changes in the swap curve term premium, interpreted as a change in  $y_Q$  holding fixed  $y_P$ . The long regime appears when  $y_Q$  is sufficiently low but the short regime appears when  $y_Q$  is sufficiently high. The swap-Treasury spread is an increasing function of the swap term premium, but the rate at which it increases depends on the regime. In contrast, the synthetic lending spread is U-shaped: it is high in both the long and short regimes, and low in the intermediate regime. Lastly, the dealer Treasury position as a fraction of its capacity  $\bar{q}$  decreases with the swap term premium, consistent with the motivating facts in Figure 2.

### 3.5 Model vs. Data

We now return to the motivating facts illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 and discuss them through the lens of our model. We first discuss the relationship between the yield curve slope and dealers position. We then discuss drivers of the regime change and examine specific features of the pre-GFC and post-GFC regimes.

**Yield Curve Slope vs. Dealer Position** The model is able to explain why dealers' net long position is larger when the term spread (slope of the yield curve) is lower. This pattern is documented in Figure 2, and is at first puzzling in light of the fact that the slope positively predicts future bond returns (Campbell and Shiller (1991)). That is, if dealers held more Treasury bonds when the expected returns on those bonds are higher (as in Jermann (2020)), we would expect a positive relationship between bond holdings and the term spread.

Our model resolves the puzzle by assuming that client demand is increasing in expected excess bond returns. Dealers accommodate client demand by acting as arbitrageurs between the bond and swap markets, which leads naturally to the result that their Treasury positions declines in expected excess bond returns, and hence the term spread. Dealers justify this larger position by charging a larger swap spread.

**Treasury Supply, Pension Swap Demand, and the Sign Switch in the Swap Spreads.** Since the GFC, the supply of Treasury securities has risen significantly. In our model, an increase in the supply of Treasury securities, without being met by real-money demand, can result in dealers switching from the net-short to net-long regime (Proposition 3 part 1), which leads to the sign-switch of the swap spread. In addition to the increase in the Treasury supply, an alternative (and not mutually exclusive) hypothesis is that an increased demand from under-funded defined-benefit (DB) pension to receive fixed and pay floating in the interest rate swap market caused the 30-year swap spread to turn negative post-GFC (Klingler and Sundaresan, 2019). In our model, swap demand enters as a decline in the swap term premium i.e. a decline in  $y_Q$ .<sup>35</sup>

Thorough the lens of our model, an increase in the Treasury supply and an increase in the

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<sup>35</sup>Swap demand will only affect swap spreads if dealers are risk-averse or face risk-based constraints. Under these assumptions, swap demand will affect their SDF and its associated risk-neutral measure,  $Q$ , and hence enter our model via  $y_Q$ .

interest rate swap demand, other things being equal, have the same effects on dealers' Treasury position, because both changes require dealers to increase their holdings of Treasury bonds and their exposure to interest rate swaps by paying fixed and receiving floating to hedge duration risk. Which channel plays a more dominant role in determining the regime is an empirical question.

Figure 3 illustrates a sharp rise in the supply of U.S. Treasury securities since GFC. The outstanding of marketable Treasury securities grew from \$4.7 trillion in 2008 to \$22.5 trillion as of June 2022. This resulted in a large increase in the supply of Treasury bonds, even after accounting for the Federal Reserve's bond purchases.<sup>36</sup> At the same time, the total size of the broker-dealer balance sheet declined relative to its pre-GFC peak. Meanwhile, as discussed in [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#), defined-benefit pensions became increasingly underfunded post-GFC.<sup>37</sup> [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#) argue that the underfunded ratio (UFR) is a proxy for pension swap demand (which is not directly observed).

To examine the effects of Treasury supply and defined benefit pensions interest rate swap demand on the swap spread, in Table 1, we regress changes in the OIS-Treasury swap spreads on changes in the UFR of the defined benefit pensions and the growth of Treasury supply. These regressions follow the specification of [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#); the key changes are the use of OIS instead of LIBOR swap spreads and the inclusion of the growth in net Treasury supply.

Consistent with [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#), the pension demand channel is relevant for 30yr swaps but much less so for other maturities, suggesting some segmentation of long term rates.<sup>38</sup> However, OIS swap spreads of essentially all maturities switched sign at the time of the GFC, as illustrated in Figure 4.<sup>39</sup> In contrast, the growth of Treasury supply consistently has a large and significant explanatory power on OIS swap spreads of all maturities, consistent with Treasury supply as a driving force of the swap-Treasury spread. Including the growth of Treasury

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<sup>36</sup>The Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasury securities grew by about \$5tn between the beginning of 2008 and June 2022, absorbing about 30% of the increase in Treasury supply.

<sup>37</sup>In September 2018, the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Flow of Funds changed the method used to estimate state and local government pension liabilities to a projected benefit obligation basis; previously, they were presented on an accumulated benefit obligation basis. In the original data of [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#), pensions were overfunded pre-GFC and underfunded post-GFC. In the updated data, they were underfunded pre-GFC and became more so post-GFC.

<sup>38</sup>On this point, see [Greenwood and Vissing-Jorgensen \(2018\)](#).

<sup>39</sup>See Appendix Figure A8 for more maturities. [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#) focus on LIBOR swaps, which exhibit negative swaps spreads only at the longest maturities. LIBOR swaps are affected by credit risk and (in the post-GFC period) by uncertainty related to the transition away from the LIBOR benchmark, which may explain why they differ substantially from OIS swaps in the post-GFC era.

Table 1: OIS-Treasury Spreads, Pension Fund Underfunding, and Treasury Supply

	Dependent variable: $\Delta(\text{OIS-Tsy Spread})_t$ of maturity			
	30Y	10Y	5Y	2Y
$\Delta\text{UFR}_t$	-0.685** (0.339)	-0.175 (0.279)	0.163 (0.251)	-0.175 (0.233)
$\Delta\log(\text{Net Tsy}_t)$	-1.405*** (0.364)	-1.156*** (0.300)	-0.970*** (0.271)	-0.702*** (0.251)
Constant	0.018 (0.013)	0.016 (0.011)	0.013 (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)
Observations	76	76	76	76
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.218	0.165	0.126	0.092

*Notes:* This table reports regressions of quarterly changes in the OIS-Treasury spread for different maturities on the quarterly changes of dependent variables. Data are at quarterly frequency from 1996 Q4 (constrained by the availability of OIS data) to 2015 Q4 (same as [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#)).  $\Delta\text{UFR}_t$  is the change in the underfunding ratio of private and local government defined-benefit pension funds, constructed in the same way as [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#). The calculation methods from flow of funds changed from an accumulated benefit obligation basis to a projected benefit obligation basis on September 2018, and we use the updated data. This data update has small effects on the regression coefficients.  $\Delta\log(\text{Net Tsy})_t$  is the growth of net Treasury supply, defined as total marketable Treasury securities minus Federal Reserve holdings. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Statistical significance: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

supply as an explanatory variable increases the  $R^2$  of a regression on 30-year OIS-Tsy spread from 7% to 22%, and the  $R^2$  of a regression on 10-year OIS-Tsy spread from almost zero to 17%. The significant explanatory power of Treasury supply does not diminish as we introduce additional control variables (see Appendix Table A2 for details).

For these reasons, we emphasize Treasury supply as a key driver of the regime change, although we cannot rule out a role for swap or Treasury demand. One implication of this view is that Treasury yields are substantially higher (relative to swap rates) than they could have been had the government not induced a Treasury market regime change via its issuance. Specifically, holding fixed balance sheet costs at their post-GFC levels,<sup>40</sup> the gap between the net long and net short curves is often 100 basis points or more.

**Pre-GFC Dealer-Short Regime.** Prior the GFC, CIP violations were close to zero, swap spreads were positive, and dealers were net short in the Treasury market (Figure 1). Our model reconciles these facts in the following way. First, since dealers had ample balance sheet capacity, CIP violations remained small (Proposition 2 part 2). Second, because dealers were net short, Treasury yields ended up on the net short curve, which is below the OIS swap curve due to funding spreads ( $i^s < r$ ) and low Treasury bill yields (which lead to a lower  $y_Q$ ). Consequently, swap spreads were positive at all maturities. Appendix Figure A9 shows that the funding spreads drive most of the positive swap spread pre-GFC. The T-bill convenience and balance sheet costs play minor role in explaining the pre-GFC swap spread.

Overall, given dealers' short position, ample dealer leverage, and low Treasury bill yields (relative to other rates), our model can replicate the stylized facts illustrated in Figure 1 for the pre-GFC period.<sup>41</sup> Our model also allows us to consider the counter-factual scenario: what if balance sheet constraints were tight pre-GFC. In the dealer-short regime, a higher balance sheet cost would reduce the Treasury yield further, so that swap spreads would become even more positive pre-GFC.

**Post-GFC Dealer-Long Regime.** After the GFC, CIP violations were significant, swap spreads were negative, and there was a strong correlation between the two (Figure 1). Dealers were net

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<sup>40</sup>Treasury bonds are a small part of dealers' overall balance sheets, which is why we view this counterfactual as reasonable.

<sup>41</sup>In Internet Appendix Section C Figure A3, we replicate Figure 8, with a relatively high balance sheet capacity for dealers, relatively low bill yields, and a relatively small supply of Treasury bonds. Our model, with these parameters, predicts a small and roughly constant CIP spread, a positive swap spread, and a negative dealer Treasury position.

long, and the size of their position was strongly negatively correlated with the slope of the yield curve (Figure 2). Dealers faced tight leverage constraints as part of the post-GFC regulatory regime (Duffie (2017)).

Our model reconciles these facts in the following way. First, because dealers had tight balance sheet constraints, CIP violations became large (Proposition 1 part 2). Given that dealers were net long, Treasury yields ended up on the net long curve, which is above the OIS swap curve mainly due to balance sheet costs.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, swap spreads are negative at all maturities. Moreover, because swaps spreads are now driven primarily by balance costs, they are now strongly correlated with other measures of balance sheet costs (CIP violations). Appendix Figure A9 confirms the importance of the balance sheet costs in driving the swap spread post-GFC. Thus, given a large bond supply, limited dealer leverage, and Treasury bill yields comparable to other rates, our model can replicate the stylized facts illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for the post-GFC period.<sup>43</sup>

### 3.6 Regimes and Treasury Market Fragility

During the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Treasury yields fell by more than matched maturity swap rates. During the COVID-induced financial turmoil of March 2020, the reverse was true: Treasury yields did not fall by as much as swap rates, and in fact briefly rose (Duffie, 2020; Haddad, Moreira, and Muir, 2021; He, Nagel, and Song, 2022). The different comparative statics across the long and short regimes in our model offer an explanation for this pattern.

In the short regime, an increase in balance sheet costs (as measured by the spread  $r^{syn} - r$ ), all else equal, will lead to lower Treasury yields (Proposition 2). In contrast, in the long regime, an increase in balance sheet costs will lead, again all else equal, to higher Treasury yields (Proposition 1). Both crises were characterized by large increases in arbitrage spreads; the difference was that the market was in the short regime pre-GFC and in the long regime post-GFC.

He, Nagel, and Song (2022) attribute the differences between these two episodes to client demand for Treasury bonds (a dash-for-cash in COVID, a flight-to-safety in the GFC). Our story is

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<sup>42</sup>The funding spread  $i^l < r$  is small, and in the post-GFC regime bill yields are close to  $r$ . As a result, the OIS-Treasury spread is primarily a function of balance sheet costs.

<sup>43</sup>In Internet Appendix Section C Figure A4, we replicate Figure 8, but with a low balance sheet capacity for dealers, no spread between bill and funding rates, and a relatively large supply of Treasury bonds, as a way of capturing the post-GFC period. Our model, with these parameters, predicts significant CIP violations, negative swap spreads, comovement between these two in response to shocks, and a positive dealer Treasury position.

compatible with theirs, in the sense that Treasury selling in COVID would increase balance sheet costs (the long regime) and Treasury buying in the GFC would also increase balance sheet costs (the short regime). However, our story does not rely customer demand for Treasury bonds as the causal factor behind the increase in balance sheet costs. In both the GFC and COVID episodes, even if clients had not bought or sold Treasury bonds on net, we expect that balance sheet costs would have risen, and as a result predict that Treasury yields would have moved (relative to swap rates) upwards in COVID but downwards in the GFC. Quantifying the role of Treasury demand, as opposed to other forces, is an interesting direction for future research.

## 4 Implications for Policy

In this section we consider a variety of fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies, and study how the effects of those policies depend on the regimes we have identified in the Treasury market. We will emphasize the way in which the Treasury market regime determines the direction of the effects of these policies on Treasury yields and synthetic dollar rates.<sup>44</sup> As discussed above, we view synthetic dollar rates as a proxy for financial intermediation spreads more generally.

All of the policies we consider have effects on inflation, real economic activity, and financial stability that are outside the scope of our model. Policies that increase arbitrage spreads and other financial market distortions can be justified on these grounds. However, combinations of the policies we discuss might achieve these same objectives while avoiding financial market distortions, and the goal of our analysis is to highlight these possibilities.

We view interest rate policy as shifting short term rates  $(r, i^s, i^l, y^{bill})$  and the expectations of future rates ( $y_Q$  and  $y_P$ ). We will first discuss the effects of interest rate policies, and then under the assumption of constant interest rate policy, consider the effects of fiscal policy and quantitative easing/tightening (QE/QT), swap lines with other central banks, and supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) exemptions.

Table 2 summarizes our results, which we subsequently explain in more detail. Setting aside the specifics associated with each policy, our main message is that the effects of each of the policies depend on the Treasury market regime.

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<sup>44</sup>Drawing quantitative conclusions would require estimating client demand curves.

Table 2: Summary of Policy Implications

Policy Type	Long Regime		Short Regime	
	Tsy Yield	Lending Rate	Tsy Yield	Lending Rate
↓ Term premium	↓	↑	↓	↓
↑ Debt supply	↑	↑	↑	↓
Quantitative tightening	↑	↑	↑	↓
Swap lines	↓	↓	↑	↓
SLR exemptions	↓	↓	↑	↓

Notes: Tsy yield is the long-term Treasury yield  $y$ . Lending rate is the synthetic lending rate  $r^{syn}$ .

## 4.1 Interest Rate Policies and Term Premia

The effects of interest rate policy are somewhat nuanced. As a benchmark, consider a policy that causes all short-term rates ( $r, i^s, i^l, y^{bill}$ ) and expected future rates ( $y_Q$  and  $y_P$ ) to shift in parallel, in conjunction with a fiscal policy that holds fixed the dollar value of the bond supply ( $\exp(-ny)S^{bond}$ ). The dealer indifference conditions (equations (28) and (31)) and the client demand functions (equations (25) and (26)) in our model depend only on spreads, and not the level of rates. As a result, such a policy shifts the bond yield  $y$  in parallel with all other rates and otherwise has no effect on quantities and synthetic lending spreads.<sup>45</sup> Interest rate policies matter in our model only insofar as they deviate from this benchmark.

One potential deviation is a change in term premia. There is considerable evidence that interest rate policies can affect term premia (e.g. [Campbell and Shiller \(1991\)](#) and [Hanson and Stein \(2015\)](#)). If a policy reduces  $y_Q$  relative to  $y_P$  (i.e. a reduction in term premia), expected bond returns will decline, thereby reducing client demand (all else equal). In the long regime, dealers will absorb additional bonds, crowding out synthetic lending, whereas in the short regime dealers will supply fewer bonds via shorting, increasing their capacity for synthetic lending (Propositions 1 and 2). In both regimes, bond yields will fall by less than swap yields (see Figure 8).

<sup>45</sup>Without the offsetting fiscal expansion, bond yields will rise less than one-for-one with other rates, and synthetic lending spreads will change in a regime-dependent direction, because the increase in yields reduces the dollar supply of bonds. This effect is potentially offset by forces outside our model— for example, the holders of bonds might experience capital losses and decrease their demand. For this reason, we do not emphasize it as the main effect.

## 4.2 Fiscal Policy and Quantitative Easing/Tightening

We now discuss the effects of quantity changes: Treasury debt issuance and Federal Reserve Treasury purchases. We abstract from the effects of changes in expected future rates induced by these quantity changes, as the effects of changing term premium are discussed in the previous subsection.

The effects of increased debt issuance (fiscal policy) are described, for the long and short regimes, by the comparative statics of Propositions 1 and 2. In both regimes, intuitively, debt issuance raises bond yields. In the long regime, this increases synthetic lending spreads, as dealers are forced to absorb additional bond supply on balance sheet. In the short regime, synthetic lending spreads decrease, as dealers absorb bond supply by reducing the size of their short positions, which increases the amount of their balance sheet available for synthetic lending.

We define QE (QT) as the Federal Reserve's purchases (or sales/redemptions) of Treasury bonds in the secondary market.<sup>46</sup> The effects of QE/QT are similar to the effects of Treasury supply, but also involve changes in the levels of reserves held at the Fed. Here, we will separately consider the Treasury demand and reserve supply channels of QE/QT. We assume that no SLR exemption is applied to reserves or Treasury securities.

To isolate the effects of the Treasury demand channel, we consider a hypothetical version of QE in which the Fed purchases Treasury bonds in exchange for Treasury bills. This operation (which is somewhat akin to "Operation Twist") leaves the supply of reserves unchanged. We model this operation, which isolates the Treasury demand channel of QE, as a parallel outward shift in the demand curve for Treasury bonds ( $D_U$ ) in our static model, which is equivalent (in both the long and short regimes) to a shift in bond supply. Holding fixed money market yields and swap rates, in the long regime quantitative easing will reduce both yields and synthetic lending spreads (see part two of Proposition 1). In contrast, in the short regime, quantitative easing will reduce yields while increasing synthetic lending spreads (see part two of Proposition 2). Both of these effects operate through the balance sheet mechanism; the regime matters because it determines whether balance sheet constraints are tightened or loosened by QE. If the goal of quantitative easing is to lower financial intermediation spreads, then our results imply that QE is effective via the Treasury demand channel in the long regime but not in the short regime.

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<sup>46</sup>The Federal Reserve and other central banks have at times purchased mortgage, corporate, and other bonds as part of quantitative easing programs. The model described thus far considers only Treasury bonds, and for this reason we restrict attention to Treasury purchases.

To isolate the reserve supply channel, we consider a hypothetical purchase of Treasury bills in exchange for reserves, which leaves the supply of longer-maturity Treasury bonds unchanged. Note that the combination of these two operations is QE: the purchase of Treasury bonds in exchange for reserves. Note also that the effects of QT are exactly the opposite of those of QE. The effects of QE through the reserve supply channel are more complex, and depend in particular on whether the Fed's overnight reverse repo (ONRRP) facility is actively used.

With an actively used ONRRP facility, the reserve supply channel is muted. The ONRRP facility allow money market funds to make repo loans to the Federal Reserve. If the Fed exchanges reserves for bills, these funds will sell bills and receive deposits at their clearing banks, and then lend those deposits back to the Federal Reserve using the ONRRP facility. Thus, with an active ONRRP facility, the effects of QE operate entirely through the Treasury demand channel. In contrast, without an active ONRRP facility, the reserves created by the QE operation will end up on bank balance sheets, potentially offsetting the Treasury demand channel in the long regime, but amplifying its effect in the short regime.

### 4.3 Central Bank Swap Lines

We next consider the policy of establishing swap lines between the Federal Reserve and other central banks. These swap lines allow foreign central banks to borrow dollars from the Federal Reserve, using their own currency as collateral. The foreign central banks then lend those dollars to their local banks, typically for the purpose of financing a position in dollar-denominated assets. In the discussion that follows, we hold all other monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies constant.

Swap lines allow non-U.S. banks to borrow dollars, and is a substitute for borrowing synthetic dollars via a dealer.<sup>47</sup> We therefore incorporate swap lines into our static model as equivalent to a demand shift in the synthetic lending market (a parallel shift in  $D^{syn}$ ). The swap lines established by the Federal Reserve generally have rates determined by policy. If the rate is higher than the prevailing market rate, the facility will go unused, and the equivalent demand shift is zero. If the rate is appealing, it is equivalent to a rate ceiling in the synthetic loan market, and hence to an endogenously sized decrease in the demand for synthetic dollars.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>We are assuming that dealers are not themselves borrowing using the swap lines; providing subsidized dollar funding to dealers would have additional effects not described in this section.

<sup>48</sup>During normal times, because of stigma associated with tapping central bank liquidity facility and moral suasion

Any demand decrease in the synthetic lending market will lead to reduced synthetic lending spreads in both the long and short regimes (see part four of Propositions 1 and 2). In the long regime, these reduced lending spreads will also lead to reduced Treasury yields (and hence swap spreads), whereas in the short regime reduced lending spreads would lead to increased Treasury yields. Again, both of these effects operate through the relaxation of balance sheet constraints, and the regime determines the relationship between balance sheet tightness and Treasury yields.<sup>49</sup>

We should note that, in our model, a swap line with a rate equal to the swap rate and large capacity could drive the synthetic lending spread to zero. This would break the link between CIP violations and balance sheet costs.<sup>50</sup>

#### 4.4 Leverage Ratio Exemptions

We next consider changes to regulatory policy that involve temporarily exempting certain kinds of low-risk assets from the SLR calculation. We consider two possible exemptions: exempting Treasury bonds and repo loans against Treasury collateral (exempting Treasuries, for short), and exempting reserves. Similar policies were implemented during the most acute parts of the COVID-induced market disruptions in 2020.

Recall in our static model that we have consolidated dealers and their levered clients into a single entity, based on the analysis of Internet Appendix Section F.1. This consolidation is based on the fact that both repo loans that dealer provide to their levered clients to hold Treasury bonds and direct holdings of Treasury bonds increase the size of the dealer's balance sheet. For this reason, it is simpler to consider a policy that exempts both repo loans against Treasury bonds and Treasury bonds directly owned by dealers.<sup>51</sup> As in the previous subsection, we hold all other monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies constant. In particular, we assume that the regulatory exemptions are temporary and do not affect  $y_Q$  or  $y_P$ .

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from central banks discouraging banks to use swap line to fulfill their routine funding needs, the take-up in the swap line is extremely low even when the swap line rate borrowing rate is temporarily below the implied dollar rate from the FX swap market.

<sup>49</sup>In both cases, there would be an increase in the demand for Treasury bond financing (either tri-party repo or security lending). Our model assumes these rates are fixed, but in a more complex model these rates might also adjust.

<sup>50</sup>That is, the CIP violation would cease to be a measure of balance sheet costs. Other financial intermediation spreads would decline (due to the relaxation of dealer balance sheet constraints), but would not go to zero.

<sup>51</sup>Exempting one but not the other would shift the net holdings of Treasury bonds from dealers to their levered clients or vice versa, in addition to relaxing balance sheet constraints.

Exempting Treasuries will both free up dealer balance sheet capacity for synthetic lending and remove the need to reduce CIP arbitrage activity when taking a net position in Treasury bonds. This will lead to Treasury discount rates that are a function only of financing rates ( $i^l$  in the long regime,  $i^s$  in the short regime), and therefore have the effect of reducing yields in the long regime and increasing yields in the short regime. In both regimes, the SLR exemption will allow dealers to allocate the regulated portion of their balance sheet entirely to synthetic lending ( $q^{syn} = \bar{q}$ ) and lead to a reducing in financial intermediation spreads.

Exempting reserves (or any other assets) frees up the dealer balance sheet space for Treasury holding and synthetic lending, and thus is equivalent to expanding the balance sheet capacity  $\bar{q}$  in our static model. In the long regime, this would result in a decline in bond yields and synthetic lending spreads; in the short regime, bond yields would rise while synthetic lending spreads fall (see part two of Propositions 1 and 2).

## 4.5 The Post-COVID Period

In the two years following March 2020, the supply of Treasury bonds expanded substantially (Figure 3). Despite this expansion of supply, balance sheet costs and swap spreads remained near their pre-COVID levels (see Figure 4).<sup>52</sup> Our model predicts that, if all else were equal, the expansion of Treasury supply would have led to higher balance sheet costs and more negative swap spreads.

However, all else was not equal. The Federal Reserve expanded its quantitative easing program, absorbing a substantial portion of the additional bond issuance (Figure 3). The Fed also expanded its swap lines with other central banks and temporarily relaxed regulatory constraints on banks' Treasury holdings. Our interpretation of the post-COVID period is that these policies were able to offset the effects of increased Treasury supply on swap spreads and CIP violations.

## 4.6 Implications for Monetary Policy Tightening Cycles

In June 2022, the Fed began increasing short-term interest rates substantially while engaging in quantitative tightening, initiating a “tightening cycle.” Tightening cycles are often associated with with flat or inverted Treasury yield curve, and low expected returns on long-term Treasury bonds.

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<sup>52</sup>The spike in balance sheet costs during March 2020 is apparent in the 2-year maturity net long and net short curves, but CIP spreads and other balance sheet cost measures reverted rapidly to their pre-COVID levels.

In our model, this dampens real money investors' demand for Treasury bonds, and it is particularly challenging for dealers and levered investors to accommodate a reduction in Fed holdings of Treasury bonds (QT) when client demand is weak.

Consider the experience of the 2017-2019 tightening cycle, in which the Fed normalized its balance sheet for the first time post-GFC and increased the short-term interest rates from the zero-lower-bound to 2.5 percent. During that tightening cycle, dealers' increased their Treasury holdings by about \$100 billion and hedge funds increased their holdings by about \$350 billion, together accounting for the entirety of the \$390 billion Fed balance sheet normalization from October 2017 to September 2019. The swap-Treasury spread and the Treasury cash-futures basis widened considerably over the period.<sup>53</sup>

Consistent with this experience, our model suggests that the combination of QT with an active ONRRP facility and a declining term premium, in the long regime, can lead to more negative swap spreads and higher financial intermediation spreads. SLR exemptions and the use of the swap lines established with foreign central banks have the potential to ameliorate these effects.

## 5 Conclusion

We have documented a regime change in the U.S. Treasury bond market. Prior to the 2008-2009 financial crisis, dealers were net short-sellers of Treasury bonds, swap spreads were positive, and CIP violations were small. Following the GFC, dealers became net long Treasury bonds, swap spreads turned negative, and covered interest parity violations emerged. Our analysis ties these observations together by constructing arbitrage bounds, the net short and net long curves, and providing evidence of dealers-as-arbitrageurs in the Treasury market.

We then discuss the causes and consequences of this regime change. We view the large increase in Treasury supply as the primary driver of this regime change. Using a stylized static model, we have argued that this regime shift has amplified the effects of quantitative easing and of the yield curve slope on borrowing spreads. In the post-GFC dealer-long regime our model predicts tighter dealer balance constraints in response to Fed quantitative tightening and a flat or inverted Treasury yield curve, and more elevated financial intermediation spreads. Our analysis suggests that other

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<sup>53</sup>Crowded dealer balance sheets and the build-up of the levered investor positions may have contributed to the repo market distress of September 2019.

policies, including the use of swap lines and of exemptions to SLR calculations, can help offset these effects.

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
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
Figure 1: Primary Dealer Treasury Holdings, Swap Spreads, and Cross-Currency Basis.



*Notes:* This figure plots the spread between the 10-year OIS-Treasury swap spread (in green), and the 10-year USD-EUR cross-currency basis (in orange), and primary dealers' net holdings of coupon Treasury bonds. The Treasury yield and cross-currency basis are from Bloomberg, the 10-year OIS rate is from J.P. Morgan Markets, and the primary dealer position data are from the publicly available primary dealer statistics published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The quote on the cross-currency basis swap effectively measures the direct dollar interest rate minus the synthetic dollar interest by swapping EUR interest rate into dollars (Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan (2018b)).


Figure 2: Term Spreads and Primary Dealer Treasury Holdings

(a) Treasury Term Spread and Dealer Treasury Holding (b) Treasury Term Spread and Dealer Treasury Holding




*Notes:* Panel (a) plots the yield spread between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill (in blue), and the primary dealers' net holdings of Treasury bonds. Panel (b) plots the relationship between the two variables post-2009 in a scatter plot. The pricing data are from Bloomberg, and the primary dealer position data are from the publicly available primary dealer statistics published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Figure 3: Treasury Supply and Broker-Dealer Total Assets.




*Notes:* This figure plots the total marketable Treasury securities outstanding (in red), the total marketable Treasury outstanding minus Federal Reserve holdings (in orange), and the financial assets of the U.S. broker-dealer sector (in blue) in trillions of dollars from Flow of Funds.

Figure 4: Long and Short Yields.




*Notes:* In this figure, we show the model-implied net-long and net-short curves for 2yr and 10yr Treasury coupon bonds, together with the actual Treasury yields. We plot levels (top row) and their differences with respect to OIS rates of comparable maturities (bottom row). Data are from 2003 to 2021. All yields are par yields. More details on the term structure model can be found in Section 2.4.

Figure 5: Relative Yield and Position in Aggregate.




*Notes:* In this figure, we plot the weighted average of the relative yield index across maturities vs. primary dealer Treasury positions. For each maturity, the relative yield index is defined as  $2 \cdot (\text{long curve} - \text{Treasury curve}) / (\text{long curve} - \text{short curve}) - 1$ . Each relative yield is then weighted by the dealer sector's net coupon Treasury holdings for the corresponding maturity bucket. The primary dealer Treasury position is the ratio of total primary dealer net position in all coupon Treasury securities (published by Federal Reserve Bank of New York) to total financial assets of the broker-dealer sector (published by Flows of Funds). Data are from 2003 to 2021.

Figure 6: Indifference Curves in the Long Regime.




Notes: This figure illustrates the dealer indifference curve defined in (3) and the market indifference curve defined in (29), under three different levels of  $S^{bond}$  and two different levels of  $y_Q$ . The functional forms and parameters used to generate the figure are described in Internet Appendix Section C.

Figure 7: Indifference Curves in the Short Regime.



Notes: This figure illustrates the dealer indifference curve defined in (4) and the market indifference curve defined in (32), under three different levels of  $S^{bond}$  and two different levels of  $y_Q$ . The functional forms and parameters used to generate the figure are described in Internet Appendix Section C.

Figure 8: All-Regimes and the Swap Term Premium.



Notes: This figure plots the synthetic lending spread  $r^{syn} - r$ , swap-Treasury spread  $r_n - y$ , and the ratio of Treasury position over total Treasury and CIP arbitrage position  $q^{bond}/\bar{q}$ , as a function of the swap curve term premium  $r_n - r$ , holding fixed expected future rates. The functional forms and parameters used to generate the figure are described in Internet Appendix Section C.

# Internet Appendix

## "Intermediary Balance Sheets and the Treasury Yield Curve"

### A Data and Additional Empirical Analysis

#### A.1 Data Sources

We obtain the Treasury term structure from Bloomberg, for maturities 0.25, 0.5, 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30 years, all at daily frequency. The T-bills are from the ticker "GB", representing actively traded T-bill yields, and the non-bills are from the ticker "C082", representing the widely-used Bloomberg fair value Treasury yield curve.

We obtain OIS term structure denominated in USD from Bloomberg for maturities 0.25, 0.5, 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30 years, all at daily frequency. The ticker is "USSO" and data availability is different across maturities. For example, 3-month OIS is available starting from 2001, while 30-year OIS is available only from 2011. To cover a longer period, we supplement the Bloomberg OIS data with OIS data from JPM Markets. OIS data from these two different sources are almost identical for the overlapping periods, and adding the JPM data allow us to go back to 1996.

We construct the synthetic dollar lending rate from Euro (EUR). For this purpose, we obtain OIS term structure for EUR for maturities 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30 years. The EUR OIS data are from Aug 2009 to Dec 2021.

Then we obtain the above-one-year maturity LIBOR basis at a daily frequency for EUR-USD from Bloomberg. The EUR-USD LIBOR basis covers Nov 1999 to Dec 2021, and includes the following maturities (in years): 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30. EUR 3-month LIBOR basis is from Bloomberg, and they are at daily frequency from Jan 2000 to Dec 2021.

To construct the OIS basis, we also collect EUR inter-bank interest-rate swap (IRS) term structure from Bloomberg at daily frequency. EUR IRS data are from Sep 1999 to Dec 2021. Then we construct the OIS basis for each maturity as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EUR-USD OIS basis} = & \text{EUR-USD LIBOR basis} + (\text{USD OIS} - \text{USD IRS}) \\ & - (\text{EUR OIS} - \text{EUR IRS}) , \end{aligned}$$

where each term has the same maturity.

Due to data limitation, we use the “hybrid OIS basis”, defined as follows:

- Whenever OIS data are available, we construct the OIS basis from the LIBOR basis and LIBOR-OIS basis swap.
- When OIS data are not available (only happens before 2008), we use the LIBOR basis instead

This approach is essentially OIS basis throughout the whole sample period because OIS basis and LIBOR basis are almost the same before the global financial crisis. A comparison between the OIS basis and the LIBOR basis is shown in Figure [A1](#).

Our data on the tri-party repo rate also comes from Bloomberg. We assume a two percent haircut (which is standard in the tri-party repo market), and define (at a daily frequency)


$$I_t^l = 0.98 * R_t^{tri} + 0.02 * FF_t \quad (A1)$$

where  $R_t^{tri}$  is the tri-party repo rate and  $FF_t$  is the effective federal funds rate (which is a proxy for unsecured borrowing costs and is also obtained via Bloomberg). Note that the federal funds rate is the floating rate associated with OIS swaps.

For the short-regime financing rate  $I_t^s$ , we use security lending rates, which we discussed in more detail in Internet Appendix Section [A.2](#).

On the quantity side, dealer net holdings are Treasury securities are based on the primary dealer statistics published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Figure A1: Comparison of LIBOR EUR Basis and OIS EUR Basis



*Notes:* This figure illustrates the LIBOR EUR-USD basis and the OIS EUR-USD basis. The cross-currency basis is defined as the dollar rate minus the synthetic rate, which is exactly the opposite to the CIP violations we used in the model.

## A.2 Treasury Securities Lending Rebate Rates

Dealers who wish to short-sell a Treasury bond must find someone to lend them the bond. There are, generally, two ways of borrowing a bond as a dealer. The first is when that bond is posted as collateral by a levered client (typically a hedge fund), and the second is by borrowing the bond from a security lender (an asset manager, insurance company, or similar institution).

Dealers lend cash to clients against Treasury collateral in bilateral repo markets, at rates that are generally higher than rates in the tri-party repo market (which is to say, the rate at which dealers can borrow against Treasury collateral). However, to earn these relatively high rates, dealers must be willing to accept whatever Treasury collateral their clients wish to borrow against. A dealer who wishes to short-sell a specific bond or bonds of a specific maturity might not be able to find a client who wants to take a levered long position in that same bond or maturity. In fact, if dealers and their levered clients generally share the same view on which bonds are relatively cheap or expensive, we should expect that the bonds dealers would like to short will not be the bonds their levered clients would like to long.


A dealer wanting to short a bond is therefore more likely to borrow that bond from a security lender. Security lenders require collateral from dealers. We will first assume cash collateral, although collateral swaps, discussed below, are also common. A dealer therefore lends cash when borrowing the bond. The security lender is borrowing this cash, and must invest it until the dealer returns the bond.

The security lender is willing to do this because it can earn a spread between the rate it pays to the dealer on the cash collateral ( $I_t^s$  in our model) and the rate it earns on its invested cash. Because the dealer can demand its cash back at any time, the security lender has a strong incentive to invest only in safe and liquid assets. For example, a security lender who reinvests the cash in a government money market fund, which in turn invests in the tri-party repo market, is likely to receive no more than the tri-party repo rate on its investments, and therefore will offer the dealer an even lower rate on its cash collateral. If the security lending market is competitive and the cash is re-invested in tri-party repo market, the spread between the tri-party repo rate and the rate on cash collateral is a measure of the costs to the security lender of running a security lending program.

We use data from Market Securities Finance to calculate the rebate rate on the cash collateral when the dealer is borrowing Treasury bonds from a security lender. Figure [A2](#) shows that the 95 percentile of all Treasury securities lending rebate rates (the “rebate rate”, for short) is consistently

below the tri-party repo rate. The spread between tri-party and rebate rates is about 20 basis points on average and quite stable throughout our sample. We emphasize the 95th percentile to highlight that this spread applies to all securities, and not merely those that are “special” (meaning that they are particularly hard to borrow).

Figure A2: Comparison Between Securities Lending Rebate and Triparty Repo Rates



*Notes:* Panel (a) plots the Triparty repo rate in red, and the 95th percentile of the rebate rate from the securities lending data against Treasury collateral from Markit. Panel (B) plots the difference between the triparty repo and the 95th percentile of the rebate rate.

In practice, dealers might demand a haircut when lending cash to clients and be required to provide excess cash (a negative haircut) when borrowing from securities lenders. [Baklanova et al. \(2019\)](#) pools these two cases and demonstrate that the haircut is small in absolute value (a few percent at most). We therefore assume a zero haircut for want of better evidence, and would like to thank Sebastian Infante for making us aware of this issue.

Collateral swaps (in which the dealer posts a different bond as collateral) are also common. In a collateral swap, the dealers offers a bond of equal value as collateral in lieu of cash, and pays a cash fee. Our data from Market Securities Finance shows that the average fee in a collateral swap is roughly 20bps on an annualized basis (i.e. .002% of the bond value if borrowed for a whole year), consistent with our view of the tri-party repo rate as the security lender’s outside investment option.

### A.3 Analysis of Pension Demand, Treasury Supply, and the Swap Spread

In this section, we provide supplementary analysis to Section 3.5 on the role of pension fund hedging demand (Klingler and Sundaresan, 2019) and contrast it with the effect of Treasury supply.

Klingler and Sundaresan (2019) argue that underfunded pension funds hedge their interest rate risks via interest-rate swaps, and their underfunding ratio drives swap demand, which in turn affects the swap-Treasury spread. They show that quarterly changes in UFR (underfunding ratio) have a significant correlation with changes in the 30-year swap-Treasury spread. Such an effect is significant at 30-year maturity but mostly insignificant at other maturities, indicating a segmentation of the swap market.

In Table A1, we largely replicate the main results of Klingler and Sundaresan (2019), despite two minor differences: (1) we use overnight-index swaps instead of LIBOR-based swaps since the latter involves significant credit risk post-GFC, and for consistency with our measures in the main paper; (2) the calculation methods of pension funding status changed from an accumulated benefit obligation basis to a projected benefit obligation basis, and we use the updated data from FRED (data from the old method are no longer available). This second change is largely inconsequential in our specifications, but affects certain results in Klingler and Sundaresan (2019).<sup>54</sup>

Next, we study the robustness of the explanatory power by net Treasury supply. We show regressions on the 10-year OIS-Treasury spread in Table A2. Column (1) is the same as the 10Y maturity regression in Table 1. Then column (2) adds the quarterly change of the 3-month LIBOR-Tbill spread. Column (3) further adds the quarterly change of the fed funds rate. Finally, column (4) includes the term spread between the 30-year Treasury yield and the 3-month T-bill rate. Across all specifications, we find that the growth of net Treasury remains significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient remains similar across all specifications. We omit other maturities for brevity, but the coefficient on net Treasury growth is significantly negative in the same regression setup for all other maturities.

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<sup>54</sup>In addition to the regressions we replicate, Klingler and Sundaresan (2019) use specifications that distinguish between periods in which pensions are under-funded and periods in which they are over-funded. In their original data, pensions were over-funded prior to the GFC and underfunded afterwards. In the revised data, pensions are underfunded for most of the 2000 to 2008 period, and become even more underfunded post-GFC.

Table A1: OIS-Treasury Spreads and Pension Fund Underfunding

	Dependent variable: $\Delta(\text{OIS-Tsy Spread})_t$ of maturity			
	30Y	10Y	5Y	2Y
$\Delta\text{UFR}_t$	-0.939** (0.362)	-0.385 (0.298)	-0.013 (0.266)	-0.302 (0.239)
Constant	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.001 (0.009)
Observations	76	76	76	76
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.071	0.009	-0.013	0.008

*Notes:* This table reports regressions of quarterly changes in the OIS-Treasury spread for different maturities on the quarterly changes of dependent variables. Data are at quarterly frequency from 1996 Q4 (constrained by the availability of OIS data) to 2015 Q4 (same as [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#)).  $\Delta\text{UFR}_t$  is the change in the underfunding ratio of private and local government defined-benefit pension funds, constructed in the same way as [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#). The calculation methods from flow of funds changed from an accumulated benefit obligation basis to a projected benefit obligation basis on September 2018, and we use the updated data. This data update has small effects on the regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Statistical significance: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table A2: Robustness of OIS-Treasury Spread Regressions

	OIS-Tsy Spread 10Y			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta UFR_t$	-0.175 (0.279)	-0.159 (0.281)	-0.018 (0.269)	-0.013 (0.273)
$\Delta \log(\text{Net Tsy}_t)$	-1.156*** (0.300)	-1.172*** (0.302)	-0.972*** (0.292)	-0.960*** (0.306)
$\Delta(\text{LIBOR-Tbill Spread}_t)$		-0.023 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.035)	-0.015 (0.035)
$\Delta \text{FFR}_t$			0.072*** (0.023)	0.076** (0.037)
$\Delta \text{Term Spread}_t$				0.005 (0.034)
Constant	0.016 (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)	0.017 (0.010)	0.017 (0.010)
Observations	76	76	76	76
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.165	0.158	0.250	0.239

*Notes:* This table reports regressions of quarterly changes in the 10-year OIS-Treasury spread on the quarterly changes of dependent variables. Data are at quarterly frequency from 1996 Q4 (constrained by the availability of OIS data) to 2015 Q4 (same as [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#)).  $\Delta UFR_t$  is the change in the underfunding ratio of private and local government defined-benefit pension funds, constructed in the same way as [Klingler and Sundaresan \(2019\)](#). The calculation methods from flow of funds changed from an accumulated benefit obligation basis to a projected benefit obligation basis on September 2018, and we use the updated data. This data update has small effects on the regression coefficients.  $\Delta \log(\text{Net Tsy})_t$  is the growth of net Treasury supply, defined as total marketable Treasury securities minus Federal Reserve holdings.  $\Delta(\text{LIBOR-Tbill Spread})_t$  is the change of the spread between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month T-bill rate.  $\Delta \text{Term Spread}_t$  is the change of the spread between the 30-year Treasury bond yield and 3-month T-bill rate. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Statistical significance: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## B The Intermediate Regime

In this appendix section we consider the intermediate regime of our static model, in which  $q^{bond} = 0$ . In this regime, the yield must fall between the net short and net long yields,

$$y^s \leq y \leq y^l, \quad (\text{B-1})$$

the bond market must clear without dealers taking a position,

$$D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) + D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) = e^{-ny} S^{bond}, \quad (\text{B-2})$$

and the dealer balance sheet constraint is reduced to  $q^{syn} = \bar{q}$ . Equating  $q^{syn}$  with synthetic lending demand, we obtain

$$\bar{q} = D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) + D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r). \quad (\text{B-3})$$

The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics in this case. We restrict attention to interior intermediate equilibria, for which  $y^s < y < y^l$ , and discuss the determinants of regime boundaries below.

**Proposition 4.** *If an interior intermediate regime exists, it is the only such equilibrium. In an interior intermediate regime equilibrium, holding all else constant,*

1. *An increase in  $S^{bond}$  leads to an increase in  $y$  and an increase in  $r^{syn}$ ;*
2. *An increase in  $\bar{q}$  or a parallel increase in  $D_U$  leads to a decrease in both  $y$  and  $r^{syn}$ ;*
3. *An increase in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  leaves both  $y$  and  $r^{syn}$  unchanged;*
4. *A parallel increase in  $D^{syn}(\cdot)$  increases both  $r^{syn}$  and  $y$ .*

*Proof.* See Internet Appendix Section E.3. □

When dealers are not active in the Treasury market, increases in supply lead to higher yields as a consequence of clients demanding higher expected returns in exchange for holding larger positions. Some of these clients are hedged clients, whose increase position size requires additional synthetic dollar financing from dealers, reducing those dealer's ability to lend to other synthetic dollar clients, which results in increasing synthetic lending rates.

As usual, an increase in unhedged demand is equivalent to a decrease in supply. However, the comparative statics with respect to balance sheet is unlike either the long or short regime; the effect is driven by the role of the hedged demand in the Treasury market.

Unlike either the long or the short regime, in the intermediate regime the OIS term premium is disconnected from Treasury yields. Dealers are not actively arbitraging bonds and swaps, and neither type of client trades swaps; as a result, changes in the swap market term premium do not affect the Treasury market.

## C Functional Forms and Parameters for Figures

This appendix section describes the functional form and parameter assumptions used to generate Figures 6, 7, and 8. It also presents alternative parametrizations meant to capture stylized facts about the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods, and shows the results in Figures A3 and A4 below. These functional form and parametric assumptions are for illustrative purposes only and do not represent a calibration of the model.

We assume a constant elasticity functional form for the Treasury demand curves. Note that both of these demand curves are functions of the hedged bond log risk premium  $\pi_{n,H}$  (the expected excess log return using  $r^{syn}$  as the risk-free rate). We assume that

$$D_H(\pi_{n,H}) = D_{H,0} \exp(\eta_H \pi_{n,H}) \quad (\text{C-1})$$

where  $D_{H,0} > 0$  represents the demand at zero risk premium. The parameter  $\eta_H > 0$  is the semi-elasticity of bond demand to the log risk premium.

We similarly assume that

$$D_U(\pi_{n,U}) = D_{U,0} \exp(\eta_U \pi_{n,U}), \quad (\text{C-2})$$

where  $\pi_{n,U}$  is the log risk premium with respect to Treasury bills, with  $D_{U,0} > 0$  and  $\eta_U > 0$ . Note that  $\pi_{n,H}$  and  $\pi_{n,U}$  are log risk premia; an  $\eta_U$  or  $\eta_H$  of 50 implies a roughly 1.35x change in demand given a 1% excess return.

For the synthetic demand curve, we assume that

$$D^{syn}(x) = D_0^{syn} x^{-\xi}, \quad (\text{C-3})$$

where  $x = r^{syn} - r$  is the spread in basis points and  $\xi > 0$  is the elasticity of demand to the spread. This functional form imposes an Inada-type condition that ensures that demand is large as the spread becomes close to zero.

Note that these functional forms satisfy Assumption 1, irrespective of the parameters employed.

We use three sets of parameters to generate Figure 8 and the figures below. The illustrative parameters are chosen to generate clear graphs, and in particular have the property that the regime can change given modest changes in term premium or bond supply. The pre-GFC parameter set perturbs this parameter set using a smaller Treasury supply, larger dealer balance sheet capacity, and larger repo-bill spread. The post-GFC parameter set uses instead a large bond supply, comparatively tight dealer balance sheet, and zero repo-bill spread.


The parameters are chosen under the assumption of an annual holding period and that the bond is a two-year bond ( $n = 2$ ). The table below lists the sets of parameters we employ. Note that Figures 6 and 7 plot dealer indifference curves for different levels of  $y_Q$ , holding all else constant. Likewise, Figure 8 and Figures A3, and A4 below have the OIS term premium on the x-axis, which is equivalent to  $y_Q$  (holding  $y_P$  constant). For this reason, we do not list  $y_Q$  in the set of parameters below.

Table A3: Parameters for Figures

Parameter	Illustrative Value	Pre-GFC	Post-GFC
$s^{bond}$	10.5	9.5	14.5
$\bar{q}$	2	7	2
$y^{bill}$ (bps)	95	65	95
$y^{\mathbb{P}}$ (bps)	95	65	95
$r$ (bps)	100		
$i^l$ (bps)	95		
$i^s$ (bps)	75		
$D_0^{syn}$	4		
$\xi$	1		
$D_{U,0}$	9.5		
$D_{H,0}$	0.5		
$\eta_U = \eta_H$	50		


The two figures below demonstrates the by varying net bond supply and dealer balance sheet capacity, our model can match the stylized facts discussed in the main text for both the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods.

Figure A3: All-Regimes with Large Dealer Balance Sheet Capacity and Small Bond Supply.



Notes: This figure plots the synthetic lending spread  $r^{syn} - r$ , swap-Treasury spread  $r_n - y$ , and the ratio of Treasury position over total Treasury and CIP arbitrage position  $q^{bond}/\bar{q}$ , as a function of the swap curve term premium  $r_n - r$ , holding fixed expected future rates and assuming a relatively large dealer balance sheet capacity, a small bond supply, and a large spread between  $y^{bill}$  and  $r$ . The functional forms and parameters used to generate the figure are described in Internet Appendix Section C.

Figure A4: All-Regimes with Small Dealer Balance Sheet Capacity and Large Bond Supply.



Notes: This figure plots the synthetic lending spread  $r^{syn} - r$ , swap-Treasury spread  $r_n - y$ , and the ratio of Treasury position over total Treasury and CIP arbitrage position  $q^{bond}/\bar{q}$ , as a function of the swap curve term premium  $r_n - r$ , holding fixed expected future rates, with a relatively small dealer balance sheet capacity, large bond supply, and small spread between  $y^{bill}$  and  $r$ . The functional forms and parameters used to generate the figure are described in Internet Appendix Section C.

## D Details of the Term Structure Model

The term structure model consists  $\mathbb{P}$  and  $\mathbb{Q}$  dynamics

$$z_{t+1} = k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{P}} + K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{P}} z_t + (\Sigma_z)^{1/2} \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{P}}, \quad \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{P}} \sim N(0, I_N),$$

$$z_{t+1} = k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} + K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} z_t + (\Sigma_z)^{1/2} \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{Q}}, \quad \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{Q}} \sim N(0, I_N).$$

The state variable vector  $z_t$  is 5-by-1, include the first three PCs of OIS term structure ( $r_t^{PC1}$ ,  $r_t^{PC2}$ , and  $r_t^{PC3}$ ) and the first two PCs of the cross-currency basis term structure ( $r_t^{cip,PC1}$  and  $r_t^{cip,PC2}$ ),

$$z_t = \begin{bmatrix} r_t^{PC1} \\ r_t^{PC2} \\ r_t^{PC3} \\ r_t^{cip,PC1} \\ r_t^{cip,PC2} \end{bmatrix}.$$

The OIS rate and the synthetic rate are both affine functions of the state vector,

$$r_t = \delta_0 + (\delta_1)^T z_t,$$

$$r_t^{syn} = \hat{\delta}_0 + (\hat{\delta}_1)^T z_t,$$

For pricing Treasury securities, we also need the state vector  $x_t = (x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, x_{3,t})$ , constructed from the data as

$$x_{1,t} = \ln(I_t^l - R_t + R_t^{syn})$$

$$x_{2,t} = \ln(I_t^s + R_t - R_t^{syn})$$

$$x_{3,t} = y_t^{bill}$$

where  $I_t^l$  is the financing rate measured according to (A1), and  $I_t^s$  is the interest received on cash collateral.

To operationalize the term structure model and reduce dimensionality, we assume that the vec-

tor  $x_t$  is affine in the state vector  $z_t$ ,

$$x_t = \begin{bmatrix} x_{1,t} \\ x_{2,t} \\ x_{3,t} \end{bmatrix} = \gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t + (\Sigma_x)^{\frac{1}{2}} \varepsilon_{x,t}, \quad \varepsilon_{x,t} \sim N(0, I_3).$$

All state variables  $x_{k,t}, k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$  represent yields at the monthly frequency. However, due to the lack of data, we use overnight tri-party rate and overnight security lending rate as proxies for their monthly counterparts. Furthermore, the one-month CIP basis is subject to a quarter-end effect, where the one-month CIP basis spikes at the end of each quarter due to capital regulation, as documented by [Du et al. \(2018b\)](#). To avoid such effect, we instead use the three-month CIP basis to construct the synthetic rate. The underlying assumption is that the rate difference due to maturity difference between one month and three months is negligible.

From our estimations, the variance matrix  $\Sigma_x$  is close to zero (the maximum eigenvalue of  $\Sigma_x$  is about  $7 \times 10^{-5}$ , and much smaller than the maximum eigenvalue of  $\Sigma_z$  which is  $4 \times 10^{-3}$ ). To simplify our exposition, we set  $\Sigma_z = 0$  and limit the actual state space to be five-dimensional. Thus, we impose

$$x_t = \gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t$$

In what follows, we first show the derivations of the OIS term structure and the basis term structure. Then we provide details on how the model generates dealer net long and net short curves. Next, we discuss the conversions between zero-coupon yields and par yields. Finally, we discuss how to estimate the model.

## D.1 OIS Term Structure

The zero-coupon OIS term structure is the “risk-free rate” term structure in our model. Denote the swap rate as  $r_{n,t}$ . The swap exchanges floating payment pegged to the short-term OIS rate  $r_t$  to the fixed swap rate  $r_{n,t}$ . By construction, the floating leg and the fixed leg should have the same present value. Thus,

$$\exp(nr_{n,t})E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}\left[\exp\left(\sum_{k=1}^n -r_{t+k-1}\right)\right] = 1$$

Conjecture

$$nr_{n,t} = a_n^{swap} + (b_n^{swap})^T z_t$$

Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \exp(-nr_{n,t}) &= \exp(-a_n^{swap} - (b_n^{swap})^T z_t) = E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-\sum_{k=1}^n r_{t+k-1})] \\ &= E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[E_{t+1}^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-\sum_{k=1}^{n-1} r_{(t+1)+k-1})] \exp(-r_t)] \\ &= E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-A_{n-1}^{swap} - (b_{n-1}^{swap})^T z_{t+1} - \delta_0 - \delta_1^T z_t)] \\ &= E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-A_{n-1}^{swap} - (b_{n-1}^{swap})^T k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} - (b_{n-1}^{swap})^T K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} z_{t+1} + \frac{1}{2} (b_{n-1}^{swap})^T \Sigma_z b_{n-1}^{swap} - \delta_0 - \delta_1^T z_t)] \end{aligned}$$

which implies

$$\begin{aligned} a_n^{swap} &= \delta_0 + a_{n-1}^{swap} + (b_{n-1}^{swap})^T k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} - \frac{1}{2} (b_{n-1}^{swap})^T \Sigma_z b_{n-1}^{swap} \\ b_n^{swap} &= \delta_1 + (K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}})^T b_{n-1}^{swap} \end{aligned}$$

for all  $n \geq 1$ . The starting values are  $a_0^{swap} = 0$  and  $b_0^{swap} = \vec{0}$ .

## D.2 Synthetic-Rate Term Structure

We denote the synthetic rate as  $r_{n,t} + r_{n,t}^{cip} \equiv r_{n,t}^{syn}$ , i.e., composed of both OIS rate and the cross-currency basis. Conjecture that the cumulative synthetic rate is affine in the state vector,

$$n(r_{n,t}^{cip} + r_{n,t}) = a_n^{syn} + (b_n^{syn})^T z_t$$

Then we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& \exp(-n(r_{n,t}^{cip} + r_{n,t})) = \exp(-a_n^{syn} - (b_n^{syn})^T z_t) \\
& = E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(\sum_{k=1}^n (-r_{t+k-1}^{cip} - r_{t+k-1}))] \\
& = E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[E_{t+1}^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(\sum_{k=1}^{n-1} (-r_{(t+1)+k-1}^{cip} - r_{(t+1)+k-1}))] \exp(-r_t^{cip} - r_t)] \\
& = E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-a_{n-1}^{syn} - (b_{n-1}^{syn})^T z_{t+1} - (\delta_0 + \hat{\delta}_0) - (\delta_1^T + \hat{\delta}_1^T) z_t)] \\
& = E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[\exp(-a_{n-1}^{syn} - (b_{n-1}^{syn})^T k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} - (b_{n-1}^{syn})^T K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} z_{t+1} + \frac{1}{2} (b_{n-1}^{syn})^T \Sigma_z b_{n-1}^{syn} - (\delta_0 + \hat{\delta}_0) - (\delta_1^T + \hat{\delta}_1^T) z_t)]
\end{aligned}$$

The above equation is the present value of a CIP strategy that earns the CIP deviations, and the values is the same as the long-term CIP discounted at the long-term discount rate. Then we obtain the following iteration:

$$\begin{aligned}
a_n^{syn} &= \delta_0 + \hat{\delta}_0 + a_{n-1}^{syn} + (b_{n-1}^{syn})^T k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} - \frac{1}{2} (b_{n-1}^{syn})^T \Sigma_z b_{n-1}^{syn} \\
b_n^{syn} &= \delta_1 + \hat{\delta}_1 + (K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}})^T b_{n-1}^{syn}
\end{aligned}$$

with the starting values  $a_0^{syn} = 0$  and  $b_0^{syn} = \vec{0}$ .

### D.3 Treasury Net Long Curve

Next, we derive the iteration steps for the Treasury net long curve.

$$e^{-ny_{n,t}^l} e^{x_{1,t}} = E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{-(n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}^l}]$$

We use  $\iota_1 = (1, 0, 0)$  to denote the indicator vector of the first element, so  $x_{1,t} = \iota_1^T x_t = \iota_1^T (\gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t)$ . Conjecture that the cumulative yield is affine in the state vector,

$$ny_{n,t}^l = a_n^l + (b_n^l)^T z_t$$

For all  $n \geq 7$ , the iteration is

$$\begin{aligned}
\exp(- (a_n^l + (b_n^l)^T z_t)) &= E_t^Q[e^{-(n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}^l - \mathbf{1}_1^T (\gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t)}] \\
&= E_t^Q[\exp(- (a_{n-1}^l + (b_{n-1}^l)^T z_{t+1} + \mathbf{1}_1^T (\gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t)))] \\
&= E_t^Q[\exp(- (a_{n-1}^l + (b_{n-1}^l)^T (k_{0,z}^Q + K_{1,z}^Q \cdot z_t + (\Sigma_z)^{1/2} \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^Q) + \mathbf{1}_1^T (\gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t)))] \\
&= E_t^Q[\exp(- (a_{n-1}^l + (b_{n-1}^l)^T k_{0,z}^Q + \mathbf{1}_1^T \gamma_0 - \frac{1}{2} (b_{n-1}^l)^T \Sigma_z b_{n-1}^l + ((b_{n-1}^l)^T K_{1,z}^Q + \mathbf{1}_1^T \Gamma_1) z_t))]
\end{aligned}$$

which implies the iteration equation

$$\begin{aligned}
a_n^l &= \mathbf{1}_1^T \gamma_0 + a_{n-1}^l + (b_{n-1}^l)^T k_{0,z}^Q - \frac{1}{2} (b_{n-1}^l)^T \Sigma_z b_{n-1}^l \\
(b_n^l)^T &= \mathbf{1}_1^T \Gamma_1 + (b_{n-1}^l)^T K_{1,z}^Q
\end{aligned}$$

At  $n = 6$ , we have, with  $\mathbf{t}_3 = (0, 0, 1)$ ,

$$6y_{6,t}^l = 6y_t^{bill} = 6x_{3,t} = 6\mathbf{t}_3^T (\gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t)$$

and hence initial values

$$a_6^l = 6\mathbf{t}_3^T \gamma_0, \quad (b_6^l)^T = 6\mathbf{t}_3^T \Gamma_1.$$

## D.4 Treasury Net Short Curve

Next, we derive the iteration steps for the Treasury net short curve.

$$e^{-ny_{n,t}^s} e^{x_{2,t}} = E_t^Q[e^{-(n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}^s}]$$

Similar arguments as in the last section, with  $\mathbf{t}_2 = (0, 1, 0)$ , will lead to cumulative yield

$$ny_{n,t}^s = a_n^s + (b_n^s)^T z_t$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} a_n^s &= \iota_2^T \gamma_0 + a_{n-1}^s + (b_{n-1}^s)^T k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} - \frac{1}{2} (b_{n-1}^s)^T \Sigma_z b_{n-1}^s \\ (b_n^s)^T &= \iota_2^T \Gamma_1 + (b_{n-1}^s)^T K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} \end{aligned}$$

At  $n = 6$ , we have

$$6y_{6,t}^s = 6y_t^{bill} = 6x_{3,t} = 6\iota_3^T (\gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t)$$

and hence initial values

$$a_6^s = 6\iota_3^T \gamma_0, \quad (b_6^s)^T = 6\iota_3^T \Gamma_1$$

## D.5 Par Curve and Zero Curve Conversion

In our term structure model, all the yields are zero-coupon yields. In the data, on the other hand, yields are par yields. The ideal way to resolve the mismatch is asking the model to convert all zero-coupon yields into par yields. However, the model is solved thousands of times when we estimate it, and the extra conversion significantly slows the estimation process. Thus, we do the following:

- We convert the OIS term structure and the CIP basis term structure into zero-coupon yields for model estimation purposes.
- Once we finish estimating the model, we generate the net long and net short zero-coupon curves, and convert them into annualized par yields for display purposes.

For the par-to-zero conversion, we follow the standard Svensson (1994) method that fits the whole yield curve with a parsimonious functional form and infer the zero yields.

For the zero-to-par conversion, we directly use the definition. We want to transform the monthly zero-coupon yields  $y_{n,t}$  into annualized par yields  $y_{n,t}^{par}$  with coupon payment every 6 months. Then for a coupon-bond of maturity  $n$ , the pricing relationship is

$$q_{n,t}^{par} = \frac{y_{n,t}^{par}}{2} \left( e^{-6y_{t,6}} + e^{-12y_{t,12}} + \dots + e^{-ny_{n,t}} \right) + e^{-ny_{n,t}} \quad (\text{D-1})$$

For a bond at the par, the price is  $q_{n,t}^{par} = 1$ , indicating the par yield as

$$y_{n,t}^{par} = 2 \times \frac{1 - e^{-ny_{n,t}}}{e^{-6y_{t,6}} + e^{-12y_{t,12}} + \dots + e^{-ny_{n,t}}} \quad (\text{D-2})$$

## D.6 Model Estimation

We estimate the model to fit the OIS and basis term structure. Then we use regression-implied coefficients  $\gamma_0$  and  $\Gamma_1$  to obtain the model-implied net long and net short curves. Denote the observed OIS yield of maturity  $n$  at time  $t$  as

$$\hat{r}_{n,t} = r_{n,t} + \xi_{n,t}^{ois}, \quad \xi_{n,t}^{ois} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma_{ois})$$

and the observed basis as

$$\hat{r}_{n,t}^{cip} = r_{n,t}^{cip} + \xi_{n,t}^{basis}, \quad \xi_{n,t}^{basis} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma_{basis})$$

We denote the stacked OIS yields (across different maturities) as  $\hat{r}_t$ , and the stacked basis rates as  $\hat{r}_t^{cip}$ . For the estimation step, the set of parameters is  $\Theta = \{k_{0,z}^Q, K_{1,z}^Q, k_{0,z}^P, K_{1,z}^P, \Sigma_z, \Sigma_{ois}, \Sigma_{basis}, \delta_0, \delta_1, \hat{\delta}_0, \hat{\delta}_1\}$ . The objective of the estimation is to maximize the log likelihood that the observed yields are generated by the model,

$$\mathcal{L}(\{\hat{r}_t, \hat{r}_t^{cip}, z_t\}_{t \in \text{data}}; \Theta)$$

Denote the log likelihood an  $N$ -variable normal variable  $Z$  with mean  $\mu$  and variance matrix  $\Sigma$  as  $\mathcal{G}(Z, \mu, \Sigma)$ . Then the objective function is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}(\{\hat{r}_t, \hat{r}_t^{cip}, z_t\}_{t \in \text{data}}; \Theta) = \\ \sum_{t \in \text{data}} \left( \underbrace{\mathcal{G}(z_t - k_{0,z}^P - K_{1,z}^P z_{t-1}, 0, \Sigma_z)}_{\text{state variable physical dynamics}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{G}(\hat{r}_t - r_t, 0, \Sigma_{ois})}_{\text{OIS fitting}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{G}(\hat{r}_t^{cip} - r_t^{cip}, 0, \Sigma_{basis})}_{\text{basis fitting}} \right) \end{aligned}$$

The whole estimation problem is thus

$$\max_{k_{0,z}^Q, K_{1,z}^Q, k_{0,z}^P, K_{1,z}^P, \Sigma_z, \Sigma_{ois}, \Sigma_{basis}, \delta_0, \delta_1, \hat{\delta}_0, \hat{\delta}_1} \mathcal{L}(\{\hat{r}_t, \hat{r}_t^{cip}, z_t\}_{t \in \text{data}}; \Theta) \quad (\text{D-3})$$

To reduce dimensionality, we assume that the covariance matrices for observation errors are in the form of  $\Sigma_{ois} = \sigma_{ois}I$  and  $\Sigma_{basis} = \sigma_{basis}I$ .

Compared to the classical term structure estimation problem, the key challenge of this problem is that we need to estimate two inter-linked term structures simultaneously. However, the canonical form transformation in [Joslin et al. \(2011\)](#) only applies to one term structure. To resolve the challenge and at the same time taking advantage of the canonical form, we design the following two-step procedure that applies the canonical form to each individual term structure as initialization (the initial values for this high-dimensional optimization problem are quite important):

1. Divide the state-space into two blocks, an OIS block,  $z_t^{ois} = (z_{1,t}, z_{2,t}, z_{3,t})$ , and a basis block  $z_t^{basis} = (z_{4,t}, z_{5,t})$ . Similarly, we denote the associated sub-group risk-neutral dynamic parameters as  $k_{0,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{Q}}, K_{1,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{Q}}$  and  $k_{0,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{Q}}, K_{1,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{Q}}$ . Denote the sub-group physical dynamic parameters as  $k_{0,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{P}}, K_{1,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{P}}$  and  $k_{0,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{P}}, K_{1,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{P}}$ . Also divide the observations into the OIS group and basis group. Then apply the standard canonical form estimation procedure to two models separately,

$$\mathcal{L}(\{\hat{r}_t, z_t\}_{t \in \text{data}}^{ois}; k_{0,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{Q}}, K_{1,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{Q}}, k_{0,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{P}}, K_{1,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{P}}, \Sigma_z^{ois}, \Sigma_{ois}, \delta_0^{ois}, \delta_1^{ois})$$

$$\mathcal{L}(\{\hat{r}_t, z_t\}_{t \in \text{data}}^{basis}; k_{0,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{Q}}, K_{1,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{Q}}, k_{0,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{P}}, K_{1,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{P}}, \Sigma_z^{basis}, \Sigma_{basis}, \delta_0^{basis}, \delta_1^{basis})$$

where the short rate in the first estimation is  $\delta_0^{ois} + (\delta_1^{ois})^T z_t^{ois}$ , and the short rate in the second estimation is  $\delta_0^{basis} + (\delta_1^{basis})^T z_t^{basis}$  is a two-dimensional vector that loads on  $z_t^{basis}$ . The covariance matrix  $\Sigma_z^{ois}$  is  $3 \times 3$  and  $\Sigma_z^{basis}$  is  $2 \times 2$ . After estimating the above dynamics, we construct an initialization of the original problem as

$$k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} = \begin{pmatrix} k_{0,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{Q}} \\ k_{0,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{Q}} \end{pmatrix}, \quad K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} = \begin{pmatrix} K_{1,z^{ois}}^{\mathbb{Q}} & \\ & K_{1,z^{basis}}^{\mathbb{Q}} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \Sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix} \Sigma_z^{ois} & \\ & \Sigma_z^{basis} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\delta_0 = \delta_0^{ois}, \quad \delta_1 = \begin{pmatrix} \delta_1^{ois} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \hat{\delta}_0 = \delta_0^{ois} + \delta_0^{basis}, \quad \hat{\delta}_1 = \begin{pmatrix} \delta_1^{ois} \\ \delta_1^{basis} \end{pmatrix}$$

We initialize the physical dynamic parameters  $(k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{P}}, K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{P}})$  simply from linear regressions,

$$z_t \sim k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{P}} + K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{P}} \cdot z_{t-1}$$

2. Then we feed these initial values to the whole estimation problem (D-3), and apply the optimization package in Matlab to optimize over the whole high-dimensional parameter space. We use the equivalent implementation of the CIP short rate (instead of the synthetic lending short rate),  $r_t^{syn} - r_t$ , and the corresponding loading  $\hat{\delta}_0 - \delta_0 + (\hat{\delta}_1 - \delta_1)^T z_t$ .

After we finish estimating the key parameter set  $\Theta$ , we proceed to obtain  $\gamma_0$  and  $\Gamma_1$  via a simple linear regressions,

$$x_t \sim \gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 z_t$$

We find that the residual standard errors for this linear regression are one order of magnitude smaller than  $\Sigma_z$ . In other words, we are able to obtain very accurate approximation of  $x_t$  through the state vector  $z_t$ , so adding the extra estimation error to the above approximation in the model will not cause much difference, but it requires augmenting the state space. For this reason, we make the assumption that  $x_t$  is spanned by  $z_t$  in the main model.

Finally with estimated  $\Theta$  and  $(\gamma_0, \Gamma_1)$ , we are able to obtain the Treasury net long and net short curves. We convert these curves into par curves to be comparable with the Treasury yield data.

Figures A5 and A6 below illustrate the fit of our model. Consistent with the literature on affine Gaussian term structure models, we find that the model is able to simultaneously fit the cross-section and time series of the two yield curves.

Figure A7 illustrate the net-long and net-short curves together with the actual Treasury yield data. To better visualize the relationship between the actual Treasury yields and the net-long and net-short curves, we plot the differences between these curves and the OIS curves of the same maturities in Figure A8.


Note that the six-month yield is constructed by regressing bill yields on the factors of our term structure model, and by assumption the net long and net short curves are identical at this maturity. We include it in these graphs to illustrate that, for the most part, our model captures the fluctuations in the bill-OIS spread. These fluctuations play an important role in the movements of the net long and net short curves at the one-year maturity point; they play a relatively minimal role for longer

maturities. Intuitively, movements in the six-month bill-OIS spread are amortized over longer maturities and hence have only small effects on longer-maturity yields.

To understand which factors drive the gap between net long and net short curves, in Figure A9, we plot the long and short Treasury curves in alternative setups that shutoff elements of the model.


Finally, we plot the maturity-specific relative yield index defined in equation (22). We obtain the net primary dealer coupon Treasury bond position in maturity buckets of <3 years, 3-6 years, 6-11 years, and >11 years from the FR2004 primary dealer statistics published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. We then normalize each of these by the total assets of primary dealers, and plot them with the relative yield index at the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 20-year maturities. The bond position and relative yield index are plotted on different axes (because they are not in comparable units), with the zero points on each axis aligned.

Figure A5: Fit of the TS Model to Dollar OIS Curves.




*Notes:* In this figure, we show the fitting of the dollar swap curve using our term-structure model. Data are from 2003 to 2021. More details on the term structure model can be found in Section 2.4 and Internet Appendix Section D.

Figure A6: Fit of the TS Model to USD-EUR CIP Deviations.




*Notes:* In this figure, we show the fitting of the OIS-Based EUR-USD CIP Deviations using our term structure model. The CIP deviations are shown as the spread between the synthetic dollar interest rate and the USD OIS rate (the negative of the quoted cross-currency basis). Data are from 2003 to 2021. More details on the term structure model can be found in Section 2.4 and Internet Appendix Section D.

Figure A7: Long and Short Curves.




*Notes:* In this figure, we show the model-implied net-long and net-short curves for Treasury securities, together with the actual Treasury yields. Data are from 2003 to 2021. All yields are par yields. More details on the term structure model can be found in Section 2.4.

Figure A8: Long and Short Curves – OIS Spreads.




*Notes:* In this figure, we show the model-implied long and short Treasury curves minus the OIS rates for corresponding maturities, together with the actual Treasury–OIS spreads. Data are from 2003 to 2021. All yields are par yields. More details on the term structure model can be found in Section 2.4.

Figure A9: Decomposition of Model Predictions.



Notes: In this figure, we show the model-implied long and short Treasury curves minus the OIS rates for the 10-year maturity. In panel (a), we shut off the T-bill convenience, i.e., we set  $x_{3,t}$  equal to the 6-month OIS rate, instead of 6-month T-bill rate. In panel (b), we shut off the financing spreads, i.e., we set  $I_t^l = I_t^s = R_t$  in the definitions of  $x_{1,t}$  and  $x_{2,t}$ . In panel (c), we shut off the balance sheet costs, i.e., we set  $x_{1,t} = \ln(I_t^l)$  and  $x_{2,t} = \ln(I_t^s)$ . All panels use the same estimated dynamics of state-vector  $z_t$ . More details on the term structure model can be found in Section 2.4.

Figure A10: Relative Yield and Position by Maturity.



*Notes:* In this figure, we plot the relative yield index versus actual scaled primary dealer Treasury positions. The relative yield index is defined as  $2 \cdot (\text{long curve} - \text{Treasury curve}) / (\text{long curve} - \text{short curve}) - 1$ . The scaled primary dealer Treasury position is calculated as the ratio of the primary dealer net position in the Treasury securities for the corresponding maturity bucket (published by Federal Reserve Bank of New York) to total financial assets of the broker-dealer sector (published by Flows of Funds). The position data corresponding to 2-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 20-year yields in the figure are defined based on the following maturity buckets, 1-to-3 years, 3-to-6 years, 6-to-11 years, over 11 years, respectively. Data are from 2003 to 2021.

## D.7 Stationarity Restrictions

Treasury yields can appear non-stationary (in sample), but the spread between an OIS rate and the matched-maturity Treasury yield cannot diverge due to arbitrage incentives in financial markets. Our main approach does not impose such a restriction for simplicity. In this subsection, we discuss how to impose stationarity on the process  $x_t$  and show that results are broadly similar.

First, our estimation reveals that  $z_t$  contains unit-root processes. In particular, the  $\mathbb{Q}$ -dynamics of  $z_t$  contains unit-root elements. Denote the eigenvalue decomposition of  $K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}}$  as

$$K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} = VDV^{-1}$$

where  $D$  is an diagonal matrix that contains all the eigenvalues of  $K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}}$ , and  $V$  is the matrix of all the column eigenvectors for  $K_{1,z}^{\mathbb{Q}}$ . We find that two among the five eigenvalues have absolute values above 0.999, which is a strong sign of unit root.

To operationalize the stationarity restriction, we rotate the state vector  $z_t$  to  $\tilde{z}_t = V^{-1}z_t$ , and rewrite the  $\mathbb{Q}$ -dynamics in (15) as

$$\tilde{z}_{t+1} = V^{-1}k_{0,z}^{\mathbb{Q}} + D\tilde{z}_t + V^{-1}(\Sigma_z)^{1/2}\varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{Q}}, \quad \varepsilon_{z,t+1}^{\mathbb{Q}} \sim N(0, I_N)$$

We denote the spread vector as

$$\hat{x}_t = x_t - \begin{pmatrix} r_t + r_t^{cip} \\ r_t - r_t^{cip} \\ r_t \end{pmatrix}$$

Then we project  $\hat{x}_t$  on the stationary components of  $\tilde{z}_t$ , i.e., three of five with (absolute values of) eigenvalues below 0.999. The loadings on the non-stationary components are set as zeros. Then we denote the whole projection as

$$\hat{x}_t = \tilde{\gamma}_0 + \tilde{\Gamma}_1 \tilde{z}_t$$

Next, we rotate back to  $z_t$ ,

$$\hat{x}_t = \tilde{\gamma}_0 + \tilde{\Gamma}_1 V^{-1}z_t$$


Thus, we obtain

$$x_t = \tilde{\gamma}_0 + \tilde{\Gamma}_1 V^{-1} z_t + \begin{pmatrix} r_t + r_t^{cip} \\ r_t - r_t^{cip} \\ r_t \end{pmatrix}$$

In the implementation, we find that there are complex-number eigenvalues, so the resulting  $\tilde{\gamma}_0$  and  $\tilde{\Gamma}_1 V^{-1}$  are also complex numbers. Nevertheless, the imaginary parts are quite small so we only keep the real parts.

With the projection of  $x_t$  on  $z_t$ , we are able to derive the Treasury net long and net short curves. We illustrate the results in Figure A11. We find that results are very close to the baseline results in Figure A8. Furthermore, all other results, such as the relative yield index matching the movements in dealer position, are quite similar. For conciseness, we omit other results in this appendix.

Figure A11: Long and Short Curves – OIS Spreads using the Alternative Projection Method.



Notes: In this figure, we show the model-implied long and short Treasury curves minus the OIS rates for corresponding maturities, together with the actual Treasury–OIS spreads. We use the alternative projection method as in Internet Appendix Section D.7. Data are from 2003 to 2021. All yields are par yields.

## E Proofs for the Equilibrium Model

### E.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Long Regime)

Define the function

$$f_1^{long}(y, r^{syn}, S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H, \delta_{syn}) = -ny + (n-1)(y_{\mathbb{Q}} + \varepsilon) + i^l + r^{syn} - r$$

and the function

$$f_2^{long}(y, r^{syn}, S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H, \delta_{syn}) = \bar{q} - e^{-(ny - (n-1)(\varepsilon - \omega))} S^{bond} + D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)(y_{\mathbb{P}} + \varepsilon)) + \delta_U - (D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) + \delta_{syn}).$$

By assumption,  $D_U$  and  $D^{syn}$  are continuously differentiable, and hence  $f_1^{long}$  and  $f_2^{long}$  are continuously differentiable.

The variables  $\varepsilon$  and  $\omega$  will allow us to shock  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  and  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$  simultaneously. The variables  $\delta_U$ ,  $\delta_H$ , and  $\delta_{syn}$  allow us to shock hedged Treasury demand, un-hedged Treasury demand, and synthetic dollar demand, respectively.

The function  $f_1^{long}$  is the difference between the net long yield  $y^l$  and the log yield of the bond, scaled by  $n$  (see (28)). The function  $f_2^{long}$  is the excess supply of synthetic loans, calculated under the assumption dealers are long.

Suppose there exists a  $(y^*, r^{syn*})$ , given the exogenous values  $y_{\mathbb{P}}, r, i^l, y^{bill}$  and some initial point  $(S^{bond} > 0, \bar{q} > 0, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, \varepsilon = 0, \omega = 0, \delta_U = 0, \delta_H = 0, \delta_{syn} = 0)$ , a solution

$$\begin{bmatrix} f_1^{long}(y^*, r^{syn*}, S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \\ f_2^{long}(y^*, r^{syn*}, S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix},$$

such that the dealer bond position is positive,

$$D_H(ny^* - r^{syn*} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) + D_U(ny^* - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) < e^{-ny^*} S^{bond}.$$

Such a point constitutes an equilibrium.

Observe that

$$\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} < 0, \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} > 0, \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} > 0, \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} > 0,$$

and consequently

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}$$

is invertible (its determinant is strictly negative).

It follows that the long-regime equilibrium  $(y^*, r^{syn*})$ , if it exists, is unique. Suppose not and there exists another equilibrium  $(y, r^{syn})$  in the long regime. If  $r^{syn} > r^{syn*}$ , then  $y > y^*$  according to  $f_1^{long}(y, r^{syn}) = 0$ . By monotonicity of  $f_2^{long}$ , we have  $f_2^{long}(y, r^{syn}) > f_2^{long}(y^*, r^{syn*}) = 0$ , which contradicts to  $(y, r^{syn})$  being an equilibrium. A symmetric argument rules out all  $r^{syn} < r^{syn*}$ , and strict monotonicity ensures the uniqueness of  $y^*$  given  $r^{syn*}$ . Thus, there is at most one long-regime equilibrium.

By the implicit function theorem,

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} \\ \frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \end{bmatrix} = - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \end{bmatrix}$$

for any  $x \in \{S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_Q, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H, \delta_{syn}\}$ . Observe that the signs of the negative inverse matrix are

$$\text{sgn} \left( - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \right) = \text{sgn} \left( \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} & -\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ -\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial y} \end{bmatrix} \right) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -1 & -1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

We solve for the comparative statics as follows:

1. An increase in  $S^{bond}$ :  $\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ , and therefore  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ .

2. A decrease in  $\bar{q}$  or a decrease in  $\delta_U$ :  $\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$  and

$$\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = -\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{e^{-ny} \cdot \partial(S^{bond})}.$$

Thus, the decrease in  $\bar{q}$  or  $\delta_U$  is equivalent to the same size expansion in the dollar supply of bonds.

3. An increase in  $\delta_H$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ , and therefore  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ .

4. An increase in  $y_Q$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$  and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ .

5. An increase of  $dy$  in both  $y_Q$  and  $y_P$  is equivalent to an increase  $\varepsilon$  by  $\Delta\varepsilon = dy$  in both  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  and an increase in  $\omega$  by  $\Delta\omega = dy$ . The increase in  $\varepsilon$  causes an  $\frac{n-1}{n}\Delta\varepsilon$  increase in  $y$  and no change in  $r^{syn}$ . The increase in  $\omega$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ , and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ . Taking the two effects together, clearly  $r^{syn*}$  will decrease. To determine the sign on  $y^*$ , we can evaluate the change of  $dy$  in both  $y_Q$  and  $y_P$  directly and obtain  $\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ , which implies  $y^*$  will increase. In summary, we find that the increase of  $dy$  in both  $y_Q$  and  $y_P$  increases  $y^*$  by less than  $\frac{n-1}{n}dy$  and decreases  $r^{syn*}$ . Furthermore, the absolute value of the effect of  $\omega$  is smaller than that of  $\varepsilon$ , indicating that the total effect is still to increase bond yield.

Taking the two effects together, we find that the increase of  $dy$  in both  $y_Q$  and  $y_P$  increase  $y^*$  by less than  $\frac{n-1}{n}\Delta\varepsilon$  and decreases  $r^{syn*}$ .

6. An increase in  $\delta_{syn}$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{long}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ , and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ .

## E.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (Short Regime)

Define the function

$$f_1^{short}(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_Q, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H, \delta_{syn}) = -ny + (n-1)(y_Q + \varepsilon) + i^s + r - r^{syn}$$

and the function

$$\begin{aligned}
f_2^{short}(y, r^{syn}, S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H, \delta_{syn}) = & \bar{q} + e^{-(ny - (n-1)(\varepsilon - \omega))} S^{bond} \\
& - D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)(y_{\mathbb{P}} + \varepsilon)) - \delta_U \\
& - (D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) + \delta_{syn}) \\
& - 2(D_H(ny - y^{syn} - (n-1)(y_{\mathbb{P}} + \varepsilon)) + \delta_H)
\end{aligned}$$

By assumption,  $D_U$ ,  $D_H$ , and  $D^{syn}$  are continuously differentiable, and hence  $f_1^{short}$  and  $f_2^{short}$  are continuously differentiable.

The variables  $\varepsilon$  and  $\omega$  will allow us to shock  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  and  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$  simultaneously. The variables  $\delta_U$ ,  $\delta_H$ , and  $\delta_{syn}$  allow us to shock hedged Treasury demand, un-hedged Treasury demand, and synthetic dollar demand, respectively.

The function  $f_1^{short}$  is the difference between the net short yield  $y^s$  and the log yield of the bond, scaled by  $n$  (see (31)). The function  $f_2^{short}$  is the excess supply of synthetic loans, calculated under the assumption dealers are short.

Suppose there exists a  $(y^*, r^{syn*})$ , given the exogenous values  $y_{\mathbb{P}}, r, i^s, y^{bill}$  and some initial point ( $S^{bond} > 0, \bar{q} > 0, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, \varepsilon = 0, \omega = 0, \delta_U = 0, \delta_H = 0, \delta_{syn} = 0$ ), a solution

$$\begin{bmatrix} f_1^{short}(y^*, r^{syn*}; S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \\ f_2^{short}(y^*, r^{syn*}; S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix},$$

such that dealer bond positions are negative,

$$D_H(ny^* - r^{syn*} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) + D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) > e^{-ny^*} S^{bond}.$$

Such a point constitutes a short-regime equilibrium.

Observe that

$$\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} < 0, \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} < 0, \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} < 0, \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} > 0,$$

and consequently

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}$$

is invertible (its determinant is strictly negative).

It follows that the short-regime equilibrium  $(y^*, r^{syn*})$ , if it exists, is unique. Suppose not and there exists another pair  $(y, r^{syn})$  that satisfies the equilibrium in the short regime. If  $r^{syn} > r^{syn*}$ , we must have  $y < y^*$  due to  $f_1^{short}(y, r^{syn}) = f_1^{short}(y^*, r^{syn*})$ . It follows that  $f_2^{short}(y, r^{syn}) > f_2^{short}(y^*, r^{syn*}) = 0$ , and hence  $r^{syn}$  cannot be part of an equilibrium. A symmetric argument rules out all  $r^{syn} < r^{syn*}$ , and strict monotonicity ensures the uniqueness of  $y^*$  given  $r^{syn*}$ . Thus, there is at most one short-regime equilibrium.

By the implicit function theorem,

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} \\ \frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \end{bmatrix} = - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \end{bmatrix}$$

for any  $x \in \{S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_Q, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H\}$ . Observe that the signs of the negative inverse matrix are

$$\text{sgn} \left( - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \right) = \text{sgn} \left( \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} & -\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ -\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial y} \end{bmatrix} \right) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

We solve for the comparative statics as follows:

1. An increase in  $S^{bond}$ :  $\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ , and therefore  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ . Thus, bond yield  $y^*$  increases, but the synthetic rate  $r^{syn*}$  decreases.
2. An increase in  $\bar{q}$  or a decrease in  $\delta_U$  (i.e., a parallel decrease in  $D_U$ ):  $\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$  and

$$\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial \bar{q}} = -\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial \delta_U} = \frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{e^{-ny} \cdot \partial(S^{bond})}.$$

Thus, the increase in  $\bar{q}$  or the same decrease in  $\delta_U$  are equivalent to the same size expansion in the dollar supply of bonds.

3. An increase in  $\delta_H$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ , and therefore  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ .
4. An increase in  $y_Q$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$  and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ .
5. An increase of  $dy$  in both  $y_Q$  and  $y_P$ : this change is equivalent to an increase  $\varepsilon$  by  $dy$  in both  $f_1^{short}$  and  $f_2^{short}$  and an increase in  $\omega$  by  $dy$ . The increase in  $\varepsilon$  causes an  $\frac{n-1}{n}\Delta\varepsilon$  decrease in  $y$  and no change in  $r^{syn*}$ . The increase in  $\omega$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ , and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ . Taking the two effects together, clearly  $r^{syn*}$  will increase. To determine the sign on  $y^*$ , we can evaluate the change of  $dy$  in both  $y_Q$  and  $y_P$  directly and obtain  $\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ , which implies  $y^*$  will increase. In summary, we find that the increase of  $dy$  in both  $y_Q$  and  $y_P$  increases  $y^*$  by less than  $\frac{n-1}{n}\Delta\varepsilon$  and increases  $r^{syn*}$ .
6. An increase in  $\delta_{syn}$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{short}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ , and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ .

### E.3 Proof of Proposition 4 (Intermediate Regime)

Define the functions

$$f_1^{int}(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_Q, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H, \delta_{syn}) = \bar{q} - e^{-(ny - (n-1)(\varepsilon - \omega))} S^{bond} - (D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) + \delta_{syn}) \\ + D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)(y_P + \varepsilon)) + \delta_U$$

and

$$f_2^{int}(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_Q, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H, \delta_{syn}) = \bar{q} - (D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)(y_P + \varepsilon)) + \delta_H) \\ - (D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) + \delta_{syn}).$$

By assumption,  $D_U$ ,  $D_H$ , and  $D^{syn}$  are continuously differentiable, and hence  $f_1^{int}$  and  $f_2^{int}$  are continuously differentiable.

The function  $f_1^{int}$  is the excess demand for the Treasury bond, under the assumption that the dealer uses all its balance sheet for synthetic lending (in which case  $\bar{q} - D^{syn}(\cdot) = D_H$ ). The function  $f_2^{int}$  is the excess supply of synthetic loans, under the same assumption.

The variables  $\varepsilon$  and  $\omega$  will allow us to shock  $y_Q$  and  $y_P$  simultaneously. The variables  $\delta_U$ ,  $\delta_H$ , and  $\delta_{syn}$  allow us to shock hedged Treasury demand, un-hedged Treasury demand, and synthetic

dollar demand, respectively.

Suppose there exists a  $(y^*, r^{syn*})$ , given the exogenous values  $y_{\mathbb{P}}, r, y^{bill}$  and some initial point  $(S^{bond} > 0, \bar{q} > 0, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, \varepsilon = 0, \omega = 0, \delta_U = 0, \delta_H = 0, \delta_{syn} = 0)$ , a solution

$$\begin{bmatrix} f_1^{int}(y^*, r^{syn*}; S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \\ f_2^{int}(y^*, r^{syn*}; S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix},$$

such that

$$y^s < y^* < y^l$$

Such a point constitutes an interior intermediate-regime equilibrium.

Observe that

$$\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} = ne^{-ny}S^{bond} + nD'_U > 0$$

$$\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} = -(D^{syn})' > 0$$

$$\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} = -nD'_H < 0$$

$$\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} = D'_H - (D^{syn})' > 0$$

Then the determinant of the derivative matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}$$

is positive, which implies that the derivative matrix is invertible.

It follows that the equilibrium  $(y^*, r^{syn*})$ , if it exists, is unique. Suppose not and there exists another pair  $(r^{syn}, y)$  that satisfies the equilibrium in the intermediate regime. If  $r^{syn} > r^{syn*}$ , we must have  $y > y^*$  due to  $f_2^{int}(y, r^{syn}) = f_2^{int}(y^*, r^{syn*})$ . It follows that  $f_1^{int}(y, r^{syn}) > f_1^{int}(y^*, r^{syn*}) = 0$ , and hence  $r^{syn}$  cannot be part of an equilibrium. A symmetric argument rules out all  $r^{syn} < r^{syn*}$ . Strict monotonicity guarantees the uniqueness of  $y^*$  given  $r^{syn*}$ . Therefore, there is at most one interior intermediate-regime equilibrium.

By the implicit function theorem,

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} \\ \frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \end{bmatrix} = - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} \end{bmatrix}$$

for any  $x \in \{S^{bond}, \bar{q}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}, \varepsilon, \omega, \delta_U, \delta_H\}$ . Observe that the signs of the negative inverse matrix are

$$\text{sgn} \left( - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \right) = \text{sgn} \left( - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} & -\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} \\ -\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} & \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial y} \end{bmatrix} \right) = \begin{bmatrix} -1 & 1 \\ -1 & -1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

We solve for the comparative statics as follows:

1. An increase in  $S^{bond}$ :  $\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ , and therefore  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ . Thus, both the bond yield  $y^*$  and the synthetic rate  $r^{syn*}$  increase.
2. An increase in  $\bar{q}$ :  $\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial \bar{q}} > 0$ . Thus, we have  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ . To determine the sign of  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x}$ , we note that

$$\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} = D'_H - (D^{syn})' > \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} = -(D^{syn})' > 0$$

$$\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial \bar{q}} = \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial \bar{q}} = 1$$

Thus,

$$\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} \propto \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} - \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} < 0$$

3. An increase in  $\delta_U$ :  $\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial \bar{q}} = 0$ . Thus, we have  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ .
4. An increase in  $\delta_H$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ , and therefore  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ .
5. An increase in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$  and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ .
6. An increase of  $dy$  in both  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  and  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$ : this change is equivalent to an increase  $\varepsilon$  by  $dy$  in both  $f_1^{int}$  and  $f_2^{int}$  and an increase in  $\omega$  by  $dy$ . The increase in  $\varepsilon$  causes an  $\frac{n-1}{n}dy$  increase in  $y$

and no change in  $r^{syn*}$ . The increase in  $\omega$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = 0$ , and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ . To determine the total effect on  $y^*$ , we can evaluate the change of  $dy$  in both  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  and  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$  directly and obtain  $\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} < 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ , which implies that the total effect on  $y^*$  is positive. In summary, we find that the increase of  $dy$  in both  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  and  $y_{\mathbb{P}}$  increases  $y^*$  (by less than  $\frac{n-1}{n}dy$ ) and decreases  $r^{syn*}$ .

7. An increase in  $\delta_{syn}$  has  $\frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial x} = -1$ , and thus  $\frac{\partial y^*(\cdot)}{\partial x} \propto \frac{\partial f_2^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} - \frac{\partial f_1^{int}(\cdot)}{\partial r^{syn}} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial r^{syn*}(\cdot)}{\partial x} > 0$ .

## E.4 Proof of Proposition 3

Propositions 1, 2, and 4 establish that there is at most one equilibrium in each regime. (Note that a non-interior intermediate regime is either a long-regime or a short-regime equilibrium). To proceed, we first prove that across all possible regimes, the equilibrium is unique. Then we show the existence of an equilibrium. Finally, we will show how bond supply  $S^{bond}$  and the risk premium  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  affects the equilibrium regime.

Define

$$f_1(y, r^{syn}, S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = -ny + (n-1)y_{\mathbb{Q}} + i^l + r^{syn} - r$$

$$f_2(y, r^{syn}, S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = \bar{q} - e^{-ny} S^{bond} - D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) + D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}).$$

$$f_3(y, r^{syn}, S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = e^{-ny} S^{bond} - D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) - D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}).$$

$$f_4(y, r^{syn}, S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = -ny + (n-1)y_{\mathbb{Q}} + i^s - r^{syn} + r$$

$$f_5(y, r^{syn}, S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = \bar{q} + e^{-ny} S^{bond} - D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) - D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) - 2D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}).$$

where  $f_1$  is the residual of long-regime dealer indifference equation (28),  $f_2$  is the residual of the long-regime market indifference curve (29),  $f_3$  is the residual of the bond-market clearing condition in (24),  $f_4$  is the residual of short-regime dealer indifference equation (31), and  $f_5$  is the residual of the short-regime market indifference curve (32).

In equilibrium, bond market clearing (24) and synthetic lending market clearing (27) implies

$$f_3 = q^{bond}$$

$$D_H + D^{syn} = q^{syn}$$

By assumption,  $r > i^l > i^s$ , and in any equilibrium,  $r^{syn} \geq r$ . It follows that

$$f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < f_1(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}).$$

**In a long-regime equilibrium,  $q^{bond} > 0$ , so**

$$\bar{q} = q^{bond} + q^{syn}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} f_5(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) &= \bar{q} + f_3(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) - D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) - D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) \\ &= \bar{q} + q^{bond} - q^{syn} \\ &= 2q^{bond} \\ &> 0. \end{aligned} \tag{E-1}$$

Furthermore, the equilibrium conditions in the long equilibrium require

$$f_1 = f_2 = 0, \quad f_3 = q^{bond} > 0$$

**In a short-regime equilibrium,  $q^{bond} < 0$ , so**

$$\bar{q} = -q^{bond} + q^{syn}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
f_2(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) &= \bar{q} - f_3(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) - D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) - D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) \\
&= \bar{q} - q^{bond} - D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) - D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) \\
&= \bar{q} - q^{bond} - q^{syn} \\
&= -2q^{bond} \\
&> 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{E-2}$$

Furthermore, the equilibrium conditions in the short equilibrium require

$$f_4 = f_5 = 0, \quad f_3 = q^{bond} < 0$$

**In an intermediate-regime equilibrium,**  $f_3 = q^{bond} = 0$ , so

$$\bar{q} = q^{syn}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
f_2(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) &= \bar{q} - q^{bond} - q^{syn} = 0 \\
f_5(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) &= \bar{q} + q^{bond} - q^{syn} = 0
\end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, the intermediate-regime equilibrium requires that the yield is between the long and short thresholds, so

$$f_1 \geq 0 \geq f_4$$

Note that  $f_1$ ,  $f_3$ , and  $f_5$  are decreasing in  $y$  and increasing in  $r^{syn}$ , whereas  $f_2$  is increasing in both  $y$  and  $r^{syn}$  and  $f_4$  is decreasing in both in both  $y$  and  $r^{syn}$ .

We next show that the existence of either a long or a short equilibrium rules out the existence of another kind of equilibrium. Since all equilibria involve  $q^{bond} > 0$ ,  $q^{bond} < 0$ , or  $q^{bond} = 0$ , it follows that an intermediate-regime equilibrium cannot coexist with other equilibria as well (i.e., the uniqueness of the intermediate-regime equilibrium holds once we prove the other two). Thus, the equilibrium, if it exists, must be unique.

### E.4.1 Uniqueness of a Long Regime Equilibrium

Suppose there is a  $(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn})$  that is a long equilibrium. Equilibrium conditions imply

$$f_4(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot) < 0 = f_1(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot) = f_2(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot)$$

$$f_3(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot) > 0, \quad f_5(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot) > 0$$

The goal is to show that there cannot be another equilibrium in the short or the intermediate regime.

1. Now suppose there is another equilibrium  $(y, r^{syn})$  that is in the intermediate regime, which implies

$$f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_5(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = 0$$

$$f_1(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) \geq 0 \geq f_4(y, r^{syn}; \cdot)$$

If  $r^{syn} > r_{long}^{syn}$ , we must have  $y > y_{long}$  by  $f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) < f_3(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot)$ , but in this case,

$$f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > f_2(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot) = 0,$$

which results in a contradiction.

If  $r^{syn} < r_{long}^{syn}$ , we have  $y < y_{long}$  by  $f_1(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > f_1(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot)$ , but in this case

$$f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) < f_2(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot) = 0,$$

which results in a contradiction.

If  $r^{syn} = r_{long}^{syn}$ , it is not possible to simultaneously increase  $f_1$  and decrease  $f_3$  by changing  $y$ , and therefore no intermediate equilibrium exists.

Consequently, there is no alternative equilibrium in the intermediate regime.

2. Now suppose there is another equilibrium  $(y, r^{syn})$  that is in the short regime, which implies

$$f_1(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > 0 = f_4(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_5(y, r^{syn}; \cdot)$$

$$f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > 0, \quad f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) < 0$$

If  $r^{syn} > r_{long}^{syn}$ , we must have  $y > y_{long}$  by  $f_3(y, r^{syn}) < f_3(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot)$ , but in this case  $f_4(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) <$

$f_4(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot) < 0$ , which leads to a contradiction.

If  $r^{syn} < r_{long}^{syn}$ , we have have  $y < y_{long}$  by  $f_1(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > f_1(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot)$ , but in this case  $f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) < f_2(y_{long}, r_{long}^{syn}; \cdot) = 0$ , which again leads to a contradiction.

If  $r^{syn} = r_{long}^{syn}$ , it is not possible to simultaneously increase  $f_1$  and decrease  $f_3$  by changing  $y$ , and therefore no short equilibrium exists.

Consequently, there is no alternative equilibrium in the long regime.

#### E.4.2 Uniqueness of a Short Regime Equilibrium

Suppose there is a  $(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn})$  that is a short equilibrium. Equilibrium conditions imply

$$f_1(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) > 0 = f_4(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) = f_5(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot)$$

$$f_2(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) > 0, \quad f_3(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) < 0$$

1. Now suppose there is another equilibrium  $(y, r^{syn})$  in the intermediate regime, which implies

$$f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_5(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = 0$$

$$f_1(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) \geq 0 \geq f_4(y, r^{syn}; \cdot)$$

If  $r^{syn} > r_{short}^{syn}$ , we must have  $y > y_{short}$  by  $f_5(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_5(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot)$ , but in this case  $f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > f_2(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) > 0$ , which leads to a contradiction.

If  $r^{syn} < r_{short}^{syn}$ , we have have  $y < y_{short}$  by  $f_5(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_5(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot)$ , but in this case  $f_4(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > f_4(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) = 0$ , which leads to a contradiction.

If  $r^{syn} = r_{short}^{syn}$ , then by  $f_5(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = 0$  we must have  $y = y_{short}$ . However, then this leads to  $f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_3(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) < 0$ , which is a contradiction.

Consequently, there is no alternative equilibrium in the intermediate regime.

2. Now suppose there is another equilibrium  $(y, r^{syn})$  in the long regime, which implies

$$f_4(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) < 0 = f_1(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) = f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot)$$

$$f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > 0, \quad f_5(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > 0$$

If  $r^{syn} > r_{short}^{syn}$ , we have  $y > y_{short}$  by  $f_1(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) < f_1(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot)$ , but in this case  $f_2(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > f_2(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) > 0$ , which is a contradiction.

If  $r^{syn} < r_{short}^{syn}$ , we must have  $y < y_{short}$  by  $f_3(y, r^{syn}) > f_3(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot)$ , but in this case  $f_4(y, r^{syn}; \cdot) > f_4(y_{short}, r_{short}^{syn}; \cdot) = 0$ , which is a contradiction.

If  $r^{syn} = r_{short}^{syn}$ , it is not possible to simultaneously increase  $f_3$  and decrease  $f_1$  by changing  $y$ , and therefore no long equilibrium exists.

Consequently, there is no alternative equilibrium in the short regime.

### E.4.3 Equilibrium Existence

Next, we prove the existence of the equilibrium. The high-level idea is to construct the equilibrium as a convex mapping from a compact and convex set to itself, and then apply the Kakutani fixed-point theorem.

First, we show the compactness of the relevant space of  $(y, r^{syn})$ .

#### Compactness of the $y$ dimension.

In any equilibrium, we must have

$$f_3(y, r; \mathcal{S}^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \leq f_3(y, r^{syn}; \mathcal{S}^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \leq \bar{q}.$$

Because  $f_3$  is decreasing in  $y$ , there is a  $y_{min}$  such that

$$f_3(y_{min}, r; \mathcal{S}^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > \bar{q},$$

and any equilibrium must have  $y \geq y_{min}$ . We must also have, in any equilibrium,

$$f_3(y, r^{syn}; \mathcal{S}^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \geq -\bar{q},$$

which yields, by  $D_H \geq 0$ ,

$$e^{-ny} \mathcal{S}^{bond} - D_U(ny - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) \geq -\bar{q}.$$

Defining  $y_{max}$  by

$$e^{-ny_{max}} \mathcal{S}^{bond} - D_U(ny_{max} - y^{bill} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}) = -\bar{q},$$

it follows that  $y \leq y_{max}$ .

**Compactness of the  $r^{syn}$  dimension.**

Define  $r^{min}$  as

$$D^{syn}(r^{min} - r) = \bar{q},$$

By assumption  $D^{syn}(0) > \bar{q}$  and  $D^{syn}$  is a strictly decreasing function, we have  $r^{min} - r > 0$ . For any  $r^{syn} < r^{min}$ ,

$$D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) > \bar{q},$$

which violates the synthetic market clearing condition in (27). Consequently, in any equilibrium,  $r^{syn} \geq r^{min}$ .

Next, we will find an upper bound  $r^{max}$  such that for any  $r^{syn} > r^{max}$ , one of the market clearing conditions are violated. First, we note that there exists a  $r_1^{max}$  such that for all  $r^{syn} > r_1^{max}$ , for any feasible  $y$  we consider, i.e.  $y \in [y_{min}, y_{max}]$ ,

$$-ny + i^l + r^{syn} - r > -(n-1)y_{\mathbb{Q}} > -ny + i^s + r - r^{syn}$$

which says that  $y \in (y^s, y^l)$  and thus the equilibrium is in the intermediate regime and dealer chooses  $q^{bond} = 0$ , and supply  $\bar{q}$  to the synthetic lending market. We will show that if  $r^{syn}$  is too large, the synthetic lending market demand will fall below this supply.

Define synthetic lending demand as

$$m(y, r^{syn}) = D^{syn}(r^{syn} - r) + D_H(ny - r^{syn} - (n-1)y_{\mathbb{P}}).$$

which decreases in  $r^{syn}$ . There exists a  $r^{max} \geq r_1^{max}$  such that, for all  $r^{syn} > r^{max}$  and  $y \in [y_{min}, y_{max}]$ ,

$$m(y, r^{syn}) < \bar{q},$$

which breaks the synthetic lending market clearing condition.

Consequently, if  $r^{syn} \geq r^{max}$ , no equilibrium can exist.

**Convex and Closed Correspondence.**

So far we have found a compact and convex space  $\mathcal{C} = [y_{min}, y_{max}] \times [r^{min}, r^{max}]$  where the equilibrium  $(y, r^{syn})$  must belong. Next, we define the correspondence for the equilibrium and

prove that it is convex and closed.

The mapping we construct will constitute four dimensions, including  $(y, r^{syn})$ , the dealer bond position  $q^{bond}$ , and dealer synthetic lending  $q^{syn}$ .

From the dealer optimization problem, the demand correspondence only depends on  $(y, r^{syn})$  and is defined as follows

$$Q(y, r^{syn}) = \begin{cases} \{(\bar{q}, 0)\} & \text{if } f_1(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < 0 \\ \{(q^{bond}, q^{syn}) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 : q^{bond} + q^{syn} = \bar{q}\} & \text{if } f_1(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0, \\ \{(q^{bond}, q^{syn}) \in \mathbb{R}_- \times \mathbb{R}_+ : -q^{bond} + q^{syn} = \bar{q}\} & \text{if } f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0, \\ \{(-\bar{q}, 0)\} & \text{if } f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > 0, \\ \{(0, \bar{q})\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The first case  $f_1 < 0$  is the only-long region where  $y > y^l$ . The second case  $f_1 = 0$  is the long region where  $y = y^l$ . The third case  $f_4 = 0$  is the sell region where  $y = y^s$ . The fourth case  $f_4 > 0$  is the sell-only region where  $y < y^s$ . The fifth case is the intermediate region where  $y^s < y < y^l$ .

Define the aggregate excess demand correspondence as

$$Z(y, r^{syn}) = \{(z_1, z_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2 : (z_1 + f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot), m(y, r^{syn}) - z_2) \in Q(y, r^{syn})\}.$$

Here,  $z_1$  represents the excess demand for bonds, and  $z_2$  is the excess demand for synthetic loans. By definition,  $f_3(\cdot)$  is the bond supply less non-intermediary demand, and hence  $f_3(\cdot) + z_1$  must equal the intermediary demand  $q^{bond}$ . Likewise,  $m(\cdot)$  is synthetic loan demand, and  $m(\cdot) - z_2$  must equal the synthetic loan supply  $q^{syn}$ .

Note that this correspondence is non-empty, u.h.c. (by the u.h.c. property of  $q$ , which ultimately arises from the continuity of  $f_1, f_4$ , and the continuity of  $f_3$  and  $m$ ). Note that it is also convex-valued, a property it inherits from  $Q$ . Define the maximum and minimum possible excess demands by

$$\begin{aligned} z_{max}^{bond} &= \max_{(y, r^{syn}) \in [y_{min}, y_{max}] \times [r^{min}, r^{max}]} \bar{q} - f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot), \\ z_{min}^{bond} &= \min_{(y, r^{syn}) \in [y_{min}, y_{max}] \times [r^{min}, r^{max}]} -\bar{q} - f_3(y, r^{syn}; \cdot), \end{aligned}$$

$$z_{max}^{syn} = \max_{(y, r^{syn}) \in [y_{min}, y_{max}] \times [r^{min}, r^{max}]} m(y, r^{syn}),$$

$$z_{min}^{syn} = \min_{(y, r^{syn}) \in [y_{min}, y_{max}] \times [r^{min}, r^{max}]} m(y, r^{syn}) - \bar{q},$$

Now define a price player, who solves, given any vector  $(z_1, z_2) \in [z_{min}^{bond}, z_{max}^{bond}]$ ,

$$\max_{(y, r^{syn}) \in [y_{min}, y_{max}] \times [r^{min}, r^{max}]} (y, r^{syn}) \cdot \begin{bmatrix} -z_1 \\ z_2 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Let  $p^*(z)$  be the optimal policy correspondence, and note that it is non-empty, u.h.c., and convex-valued (which follows from the concavity of the objective).

Now define the correspondence

$$g(y, r^{syn}, z) = \begin{bmatrix} p^*(z) \\ Z(y, r^{syn}) \end{bmatrix}$$

which maps  $[y_{min}, y_{max}] \times [r^{min}, r^{max}] \times [z_{min}^{bond}, z_{max}^{bond}] \times [z_{min}^{syn}, z_{max}^{syn}]$  to itself. Note that this set is compact, and by the u.h.c. properties of  $p^*$  and  $Z$  and the compactness of this set,  $g$  has a closed graph. Consequently, by Kakutani's fixed point theorem, a fixed point  $(y^*, r^{syn*}, z^*)$  exists.

By construction, at  $y_{min}$ ,

$$f_3(y_{min}, r; \mathcal{S}^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > \bar{q},$$

and consequently all values  $Z_1(y, r^{syn})$  are negative. The best response of the price player at this point would be  $y_{max}$ , and hence there cannot be a fixed point with  $y^* = y_{min}$ . Essentially the same logic rules out  $y^* = y_{max}$ . Similarly, if  $r^{syn*} = r^{min}$ , then all values of  $Z_2(y^*, r^{syn*})$  are positive, and the price player's best response is  $r_{max}$ , and hence this cannot be a fixed point. Likewise, if  $r^{syn*} = r^{max}$ , then all values of  $Z_2(y^*, r^{syn*})$  are negative, and the price player's best response is  $r^{syn} = r^{min}$ . It follows that the fixed point is interior, and hence that  $z^* = Z(y^*, r^{syn*}) = (0, 0)$ . Note that a fixed point with  $z^* = (0, 0)$  cannot exist in which there is no supply of synthetic lending; consequently, the equilibrium is either a long regime equilibrium,

$$f_4(y, r^{syn}; \mathcal{S}^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < f_1(y, r^{syn}; \mathcal{S}^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0,$$

a short regime equilibrium,

$$0 = f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < f_1(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}),$$

or an intermediate equilibrium,

$$f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < 0 < f_1(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}).$$

#### E.4.4 Bond Supply and Equilibrium Regime

To prove that the existence of cutoffs  $S^s$  and  $S^l$  with  $0 \leq S^s \leq S^l \leq \infty$ , such that the short-regime, the intermediate regime, and the long-regime fall into the three regions, we simply prove that there is a ranking of the equilibrium along the supply of bonds  $S$ .

Suppose  $S^{bond} = S$ . According to the previous proofs, an equilibrium  $(y, r^{syn})$  exists and must be unique.

##### Long Equilibrium

First, we show that if  $S^{bond} = S$  generates a long-regime equilibrium, then for any  $\bar{S} > S$ , if  $S^{bond} = \bar{S}$ , the equilibrium  $(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn})$  must also be a long equilibrium.

Suppose instead the equilibrium for  $S^{bond} = \bar{S}$  is a short-regime equilibrium with  $(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn})$ . Then we must have  $y = y^l > y^s = \bar{y}$ . In the  $S^{bond} = S$  equilibrium, excess bond demand is zero:  $f_2(y, r^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0$ . In the  $S^{bond} = \bar{S}$  equilibrium, if dealers were instead long, there would be excess bond demand:  $f_2(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > 0$ . Because excess bond demand is decreasing in bond supply, this second fact implies  $f_2(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > f_2(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > 0$ . Because excess bond demand is increasing in both bond yields and synthetic rates, and  $y > \bar{y}$ , it follows that  $f_2(y, r^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0$  implies  $r^{syn} < \bar{r}^{syn}$ . Short-regime excess bond supply ( $f_5$ ) is decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates. It follows that

$$f_5(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > f_5(y, r^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}).$$

However, in the short regime, this excess is zero,  $f_5(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0$ , and in the long regime, if dealers were short, there would be excess supply,  $f_5(y, r^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > 0$ . Excess supply is increasing in supply, and therefore  $f_5(y, r^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > f_5(y, r^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > 0$ , which is a contradiction. Thus,  $\bar{S}$

cannot lead to a short equilibrium.

Next, suppose that  $\bar{S}$  corresponds to an intermediate-regime equilibrium. Then we have  $y = y^l \geq \bar{y}$ , and intermediate-regime excess bond supply is zero ( $f_3(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_Q) = 0$ ). For the long regime equilibrium of  $S^{bond} = S$ , there is excess bond supply if dealers take no position ( $f_3(y, r^{syn}; S, y_Q) > 0$ ). Excess bond supply is increasing in bond supply, and therefore  $f_3(y, r^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_Q) > f_3(y, r^{syn}; S, y_Q) > 0$ . Excess bond supply is decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates, and therefore  $f_3(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_Q) = 0$  implies  $r^{syn} > \bar{r}^{syn}$ .

Long-regime excess bond demand ( $f_2$ ) is increasing in yields and synthetic rates, and therefore  $f_2(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S, y_Q) < f_2(y, r^{syn}; S, y_Q)$ . Excess bond demand is decreasing in bond supply, and therefore  $f_2(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; \bar{S}, y_Q) < f_2(y, r^{syn}; S, y_Q)$ . However, in both the long and intermediate regimes,  $f_2 = 0$ , a contradiction.

In summary, if  $S$  generates a long-regime equilibrium, for any  $\bar{S} > S$ , the equilibrium  $(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn})$  must also be a long-regime equilibrium.

### Short Equilibrium

Second, we show that if  $S$  corresponds to a short-regime equilibrium, then for any  $\underline{S} < S$ , the equilibrium solution  $(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn})$  must also be a short-regime equilibrium.

Suppose that instead the equilibrium for  $S^{bond} = \underline{S}$  is a long-regime equilibrium. Then we must have  $y = y^s < y^l = \underline{y}$ . Short-regime excess bond supply must be zero for the short-regime equilibrium ( $f_5(y, r^{syn}; S, y_Q) = 0$ ) and must be excessive in the long regime ( $f_5(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; \underline{S}, y_Q) > 0$ , see (E-1)). Excess bond supply is increasing in supply, and therefore  $f_5(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S, y_Q) > f_5(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; \underline{S}, y_Q) > 0$ . Because short-regime excess bond supply is decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates, it follows that  $\underline{r}^{syn} > r^{syn}$ .

Long regime excess bond demand ( $f_2$ ) is increasing in yields and synthetic rates, and decreasing in bond supply. It follows that

$$f_2(y, r^{syn}; S, y_Q) < f_2(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S, y_Q) < f_2(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; \underline{S}, y_Q) = 0.$$

However, in the short-regime, bond demand would be excessive if dealers were long ( $f_2(y, r^{syn}; S, y_Q) > 0$ , see (E-2)), a contradiction.

Now suppose that the equilibrium for  $S^{bond} = \underline{S}$  is an intermediate-regime equilibrium. We must have  $y = y^s \leq \underline{y}$ . Short regime excess bond supply is zero in both equilibria ( $f_5(y, r^{syn}; S, y_Q) =$

$f_5(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; \underline{S}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0$ ), and would be excessive in the intermediate equilibrium if supply were higher ( $f_5(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > 0$ ). Short-regime excess bond supply is decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates, and therefore  $\underline{r}^{syn} > r^{syn}$ .

Long regime excess bond demand ( $f_2$ ) is increasing in yields and synthetic rates, and decreasing in bond supply. Therefore

$$f_2(y, r^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < f_2(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < f_2(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; \underline{S}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0.$$

However, in the short-regime, bond demand would be excessive if dealers were long ( $f_2(y, r^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > 0$ , see (E-2)), a contradiction.

In summary, if  $S$  generates a short-regime equilibrium, for any  $\underline{S} < S$ , the equilibrium  $(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn})$  must also be a short-regime equilibrium.

### Regime Ranking

From the above, we know that there must be cutoffs  $S^s$  and  $S^l$  with  $0 \leq S^s \leq S^l \leq \infty$ , such that a short-regime equilibrium exists in the left region, an intermediate-regime equilibrium exists in the middle region, and a long-regime equilibrium exists in the right region. However, we still have to prove whether the intervals are open or closed.

### Intervals for Regimes

We now show that the interval of long-regime equilibrium should be  $(S^l, \infty)$  instead of  $[S^l, \infty)$ . Suppose that  $S^{bond} = S$  is a long-regime equilibrium, with solutions  $(y, r^{syn})$ , and  $q^{bond}$ . By definition,  $q^{bond} > 0$ .

In the long regime,  $f_3(y, r^{syn}; S, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = q^{bond}$ . We know that  $q^{bond} > 0$  increases in the total supply of bond and the mapping is continuous. Therefore, there exists a smaller bond supply  $S^{bond} = S - \varepsilon$  for  $\varepsilon > 0$ , such that the new equilibrium still has  $q^{bond} > 0$ . Consequently, the interval of  $S^{bond}$  for the long-regime equilibrium must be an open set.

Similarly, the interval for the short-regime equilibrium must also be an open set,  $(-\infty, S^s)$ .

### E.4.5 Term Premium and Equilibrium Regime

Next, we study how the term premium  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  affects the equilibrium. According to previous proofs, an equilibrium solution  $(y, r^{syn})$  exists and is unique.

## Long Equilibrium

First, we show that if  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  corresponds to a long-regime equilibrium, then for any  $\bar{y}_{\mathbb{Q}} < y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , the equilibrium  $(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn})$  must also be a long equilibrium.

Suppose instead the equilibrium for  $\bar{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}$  is a short-regime or intermediate-regime equilibrium with  $(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn})$ .

Excess bond supply in the short regime ( $f_5$ ) is zero in short-regime and intermediate-regime equilibria and strictly positive in the long regime (by (E-1)), and invariant in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , and therefore

$$0 = f_5(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, \bar{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}) = f_5(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < f_5(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}).$$

Likewise, excess bond demand in the long regime ( $f_2$ ) is zero in the long regime equilibrium and weakly positive in short-regime and intermediate-regime equilibrium, and invariant in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , and therefore

$$f_2(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, \bar{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}) = f_2(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \geq f_2(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0. \quad (\text{E-3})$$

The short-regime excess bond supply is decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates, whereas the long-regime excess bond demand is increasing in both yields and synthetic rates. It follows that we must have  $\bar{y} > y$ , as otherwise

$$f_5(y, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \leq f_5(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < f_5(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}})$$

and

$$f_2(y, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \geq f_2(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \geq f_2(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0,$$

which cannot hold as both  $f_2$  and  $f_5$  are increasing in  $r^{syn}$ .

In the intermediate or short-regimes, the long-regime excess bond price ( $f_1$ ) must be weakly positive. The excess bond price is increasing in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , and therefore

$$f_1(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > f_1(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, \bar{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}) \geq f_1(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0.$$

The long-regime excess bond price  $f_1$  is decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates, and therefore we must have  $\bar{r}^{syn} > r^{syn}$ .

Likewise, in the long-regime, the short-regime excess bond price ( $f_4$ ) must be strictly negative. This excess bond price is also increasing in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , but decreasing in both yields and synthetic rates, and therefore

$$0 > f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) > f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, \bar{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}) > f_4(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, \bar{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}),$$

which contradicts the requirements of a short-regime equilibrium.

An intermediate-regime equilibrium  $(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn})$  requires equality in (E-3), but  $f_2$  is increasing in yields and synthetic rates, and  $\bar{y} > y$  and  $\bar{r}^{syn} > r^{syn}$ , a contradiction.

In summary, if  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  is a long-regime equilibrium, for any  $\bar{y}_{\mathbb{Q}} < y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , the equilibrium  $(\bar{y}, \bar{r}^{syn})$  must also be a long equilibrium.

### Short Equilibrium

Second, we show that if  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  corresponds to a short-regime equilibrium, then for any  $\underline{y}_{\mathbb{Q}} > y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , the equilibrium  $(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn})$  must also be a short-regime equilibrium.

Suppose instead the equilibrium for  $\underline{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}$  is a long-regime or intermediate-regime equilibrium with  $(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn})$ .

Excess bond supply in the short regime ( $f_5$ ) is zero in short-regime equilibrium and weakly positive in intermediate and long regime equilibria (by (E-1)), and invariant in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , and therefore

$$f_5(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, \underline{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}) = f_5(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \geq f_5(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) = 0. \quad (\text{E-4})$$

Likewise, excess bond demand in the long regime ( $f_2$ ) is zero in a long or intermediate regime equilibrium and strictly positive in a short-regime equilibrium, and invariant in  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$ , and therefore

$$0 = f_2(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, \underline{y}_{\mathbb{Q}}) = f_2(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) < f_2(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}).$$

The short-regime excess bond supply is decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates, whereas the long-regime excess bond demand is increasing in both yields and synthetic rates. It follows that we must have  $\underline{y} < y$ , as otherwise

$$f_5(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \geq f_5(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}}) \geq f_5(\underline{y}, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_{\mathbb{Q}})$$

and

$$f_2(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_Q) < f_2(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_Q) \leq f_2(\underline{y}, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_Q)$$

which cannot hold as both  $f_2$  and  $f_5$  are increasing in  $r^{syn}$ .

In a long or intermediate regime equilibrium, the short-regime excess bond price ( $f_4$ ) must be weakly negative. The excess bond price is increasing in  $y_Q$ , and therefore

$$f_4(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_Q) < f_4(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, \underline{y}_Q) \leq f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_Q) = 0.$$

The short-regime excess bond price is decreasing in yields and in synthetic rates, and therefore we must have  $\underline{r}^{syn} > r^{syn}$ .

Likewise, in the short-regime, the long-regime excess bond price ( $f_1$ ) must be strictly positive. This excess bond price is also increasing in  $y_Q$ , but decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates, and therefore

$$0 < f_1(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, y_Q) < f_4(y, r^{syn}; S^{bond}, \underline{y}_Q) < f_4(\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}; S^{bond}, \underline{y}_Q),$$

which contradicts the requirements of a long-regime equilibrium.

An intermediate-regime equilibrium ( $\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}$ ) requires equality in (E-4), but  $f_5$  is decreasing in yields and increasing in synthetic rates, and  $\underline{y} < y$  and  $\underline{r}^{syn} > r^{syn}$ , a contradiction.

In summary, if  $y_Q$  is a short-regime equilibrium, for any  $\underline{y}_Q > y_Q$ , the equilibrium ( $\underline{y}, \underline{r}^{syn}$ ) must also be a short-regime equilibrium.

### Regime Ranking

From the above discussions, we know that there must be cutoffs  $y_Q^s$  and  $y_Q^l$  with  $-\infty \leq y_Q^l \leq y_Q^s \leq \infty$ , such that a long-regime equilibrium, an intermediate-regime equilibrium, and a short-regime equilibrium exists in the left, middle and right regions. However, we still need to determine whether those intervals are open or closed sets.

### Intervals for Regimes

We now show that the interval of long-regime equilibrium should be  $(-\infty, y_Q^l)$  instead of  $(-\infty, y_Q^l]$ . Suppose that  $y_Q$  is a long-regime equilibrium, with solutions  $(y, r^{syn})$ , and  $q^{bond}$ . By definition,  $q^{bond} > 0$ .

In the long regime, we know that  $q^{bond} > 0$  is a continuous function of  $y_Q$ . Therefore, there

exists a smaller risk-neutral expectation  $y_{\mathbb{Q}} - \varepsilon$ , where the new equilibrium is still in the long regime with  $q^{bond} > 0$ . Consequently, the interval of  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  for the long-regime equilibrium must be an open set.

Similarly, the interval of  $y_{\mathbb{Q}}$  for the short-regime equilibrium must also be an open set.

## F Additional Derivations

### F.1 Dealers and Levered Clients

In Section 2, we developed net long and net short curves from the perspective of a securities dealer, yields at which the dealer would be willing to either net long or net short Treasury bonds. In this section, we extend our model to consider the perspective of a levered Treasury investor (e.g. a hedge fund) financed by a security dealer of the kind considered in that section. The main result is that levered clients will have the same net long and net short curves as the dealer that finances them. That is, the net long curve represents a yield at which the levered client would be willing to buy the Treasury bond, irrespective of its beliefs about the stochastic process driving Treasury yields, and a symmetric result holds for the net short curve. This result occurs in spite of the fact that the levered client is not itself directly affected by balance sheet constraints.

This result is important from a general equilibrium perspective. Dealers are never on net long or short a large quantity of Treasury bonds during our sample, relative to the overall Treasury supply. Dealers moved from a net short of roughly 100 hundred billion in 2005 to a net long of 200 hundred billion in 2020. The overall supply of Treasury securities rose from 4 trillion to 22 trillion over the same period.

However, dealers intermediate repo and reverse-repo for their levered clients in much greater quantities— on the order of trillions each day. In this section we will argue that the recipients of much of this financing will act like dealers, and subsequently provide some suggestive evidence on this point.

Consider the following trading strategy for the dealer: finance a client’s entire purchase of a Treasury using bilateral repo, use the resulting collateral to raise financing, and reduce CIP activity so that the trade is balance sheet neutral. In a competitive market, the profits of such a strategy are

zero:

$$\underbrace{(R_t^{bi} - I_t^l)}_{\text{Lending/Borrowing Spread}} - \underbrace{(R_t^{syn} - R_t)}_{\text{Forgone CIP profits}} = 0, \quad (\text{F-1})$$

where  $R_t^{bi}$  is the gross return on repo lending in the bilateral market. That is, the dealer must be indifferent between matched book repo lending and taking advantage of CIP arbitrage, as both activities use balance sheet.

Let's now consider the perspective of a levered client who can purchase a Treasury bond, financed by this intermediary, and can trade derivatives with the securities dealer. Because the levered client can trade derivatives with the dealer, the projection of its stochastic discount factor onto the space of derivative returns must agree with the same projection for the dealer's SDF. Equivalently, the risk-neutral measure  $Q$  is shared (within this space) by the levered clients and the dealer.

We will also assume that the levered client can engage in risk-free unsecured borrowing<sup>55</sup> from the unsecured dealer at the synthetic lending rate. The dealer is unwilling to lend at a rate lower than this, as otherwise it would be better off engaging in CIP arbitrage.

Under these assumptions, the levered client considers buying an  $n$ -month Treasury and then selling one month later:

$$\underbrace{e^{-ny_{n,t}} R_t^{bi}}_{\text{secured financing}} + \underbrace{e^{-ny_{n,t}} R_t^{syn}}_{\text{unsecured financing}} \geq E_t^Q [e^{-(n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}}]. \quad (\text{F-2})$$

Substituting in (F-1), this condition becomes identical to (5). It follows immediately that levered clients must be willing to go net long if the yield reaches the net long curve.

Essentially identical logic applies to the net short curve: the dealers indifference between matched book repo (in the net short case, intermediating between security lenders and short-sellers) and CIP arbitrage converts the levered client's indifference condition to the dealer's indifference condition.


We conclude that levered clients who are dependent on dealers for financing will act as if they face the same balance sheet costs that dealers face, even if they are not themselves directly regulated. As a result, balance sheets costs will influence a substantial segment of the Treasury

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<sup>55</sup>It is probably better to think of this as secured borrowing using non-Treasury securities that the dealer cannot itself finance in a repo market.

market, even though dealers are on their own hold a relatively small quantity of Treasury bonds on net.

Figure A12: Primary Dealer Treasury Holdings and Implied Treasury Holding of Levered Investors



*Notes:* This figure plots the primary dealer’s net position in coupon-bearing Treasury securities from Primary Dealer Statistics published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the short position in the Treasury futures market by levered funds from the Commitments of Traders Report published by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

In Figure A12, we provide evidence consistent with this perspective. While the Treasury positions of levered investors are not publicly available, we can infer the holdings of investors that engage in Treasury cash-future trades from Treasury futures positions. Figure A12 plots the primary dealer net coupon holdings and levered funds’ short positions in Treasury futures contracts published by the CTFC. For relative value hedge funds that arbitrage Treasury cash-futures basis, a short position in Treasury futures corresponds to a long position in the cash Treasury bonds. We see that primary dealer positions and the levered funds’ short Treasury futures position are strongly positively correlated, which is consistent with our result that dealers and levered investors take similar positions and can be considered as a consolidated intermediary.

## F.2 Partial Equilibrium Arbitrage Bounds

In this appendix section, we construct the net short and net long curves described in the main text as arbitrage bounds under weaker assumptions than those employed in the main text. In particular, in the main text we assumed that zero-cost, zero-balance sheet trades are weakly unattractive under a common SDF (i.e., a version of the no-arbitrage assumption). That assumption leads to  $y_{n-1,t+1} \leq y_{n-1,t+1}^l$  with probability one. Here, we instead assume that there could be profitable zero-cost, zero-balance sheet trading strategies under the intermediary's stochastic discount factor. Then we consider the question of whether this intermediary is willing to go net long or net short a Treasury bond, irrespective of the intermediary's preferences or beliefs about the stochastic process driving Treasury yields.

We will assume that this intermediary's SDF prices derivatives, and that the intermediary believes with probability one that  $x_{1,t} \geq r_t \geq x_{2,t}$ , where  $x_{1,t}$  and  $x_{2,t}$  are defined as in the main text. We discuss the role of this assumption below.

### The Net Long Curve

Consider first the trade in which the intermediary buys a zero-coupon seven-month Treasury bond, and then sells it in one month, at which time the Treasury bond becomes a zero-coupon T-bill. The intermediary can finance this purchase with a mix of tri-party repo and unsecured debt. This trade, in combination with a reduction in CIP activity, is a balance-sheet neutral, zero-financing trade. The intermediary is therefore willing to get net long if this strategy is weakly appealing under the SDF that prices derivatives. Let  $\mathbb{Q}$  denote the risk-neutral measure associated with this SDF. We assume that  $r_t$  is the log risk-free rate associated with this SDF.<sup>56</sup>

Let  $y_{7,t}^l$  denote a (monthly) log yield at which this trade is attractive to the dealer, and define  $y_{6,t}^l = y_t^{bill}$ . The dealer will be indifferent between employing and not employing this trading

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<sup>56</sup>That is, we assume the one-month OIS swap rate is the intermediary's unsecured borrowing rate. This assumption is consistent with the empirical observation that the one-month OIS rate closely tracks other unsecured rates, for example the one-month highly rated financial commercial paper rate. It is also consistent with the industry practice of using the OIS curve to discount derivative cashflows. Lastly, it is consistent with the observation that the unsecured borrowing rate is the appropriate discount rate for off-balance-sheet cashflows, under our generalized no-arbitrage assumption.

strategy if

$$\underbrace{e^{-7y_{7,t}^l}}_{\text{Purchase price}} \left( \underbrace{I_t^l}_{\text{Repo Financing}} + \underbrace{R_t^{\text{syn}} - R_t}_{\text{Forgone CIP profits}} \right) = \underbrace{E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{-6y_{t+1}^{\text{bill}}}]_{\text{Sale price}}}.$$

Cheap financing ( $I_t^l < R_t$ ) makes the trade attractive and hence decreases the required yield, while the opportunity cost of using balance sheet ( $R_t^{\text{syn}} > R_t$ ) has the opposite effect. We assume that  $x_{1,t} \geq r_t$ , which is consistent with the post-GFC data and implies that

$$R_{t+j}^{\text{syn}} - R_{t+j} \geq R_{t+j} - I_{t+j}^l.$$

This assumption states that the balance sheet cost exceeds the financing advantage. It can be justified on the grounds that, if it did not hold, it would be efficient for dealers to purchase Treasury bills from money market funds, financed by repo loans from those same money market funds. This would lead to large dealer balance sheets, causing the leverage constraint to tighten, and hence cannot be part of an equilibrium.

Let us now define a yield curve,  $y_{n,t}^l$ , such that the dealer will be certainly be willing to purchase an  $n$ -month Treasury bond, regardless of her preferences or beliefs, if its yield exceeds this value. This will be the net long curve. We will conjecture and verify that the curve defined recursively by

$$e^{-\frac{n}{12}y_{n,t}^l} (I_t^l + R_t^{\text{syn}} - R_t) = E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{-\frac{n-1}{12}y_{n-1,t+1}^l}]$$

has this property. That is, the net long curve is defined by the log discount rate  $x_{1,t}$ , as in the main text.

Fix some  $n > 7$  and suppose  $y_{m,t}^l$  is defined by this recursion for all  $m \in \{6, \dots, n-1\}$ . Consider a trading strategy that purchases the bond, finances the trade with repo and unsecured borrowing, offsets the balance sheet cost by reducing CIP activity, and unwinds at the first moment at which the bond yield becomes weakly lower than  $y_{m,t}^l$ . Let  $\tau$  denote the months elapsed and let  $y_{n-\tau,t+\tau} \leq y_{n-\tau,t+\tau}^l$  be the bond price at which the trade is unwound. According to the strategy, we have  $y_{n-j,t} > y_{n-j,t}^l$  for all  $j \in \{0, \dots, \tau-1\}$ . Further,  $\tau \leq n-6$  is guaranteed because by assumption, the intermediary always unwinds the trade once the bond has six-month remaining maturity.

The intermediary will be willing to engage in this strategy provided that

$$\begin{aligned}
 \underbrace{e^{-ny_{n,t}}}_{\text{purchase price}} + E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} \underbrace{e^{-\sum_{k=0}^j r_{t+k}}}_{\text{discount rate}} \underbrace{e^{-(n-j)y_{n-j,t+j}}}_{\text{interim bond price}} \left( \underbrace{(I_{t+j}^l - R_{t+j})}_{\text{repo financing benefits}} + \underbrace{(R_{t+j}^{\text{syn}} - R_{t+j})}_{\text{forgone CIP profits}} \right) \right] \\
 \leq E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \underbrace{e^{-\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} r_{t+k}}}_{\text{discount rate}} \underbrace{e^{-(n-\tau)y_{n-\tau,t+\tau}}}_{\text{sale price}} \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

Since derivatives are priced by the intermediary, hedging does not affect the economic profit in the above trade. We could add a hedging component to this equation, so that certain future fluctuations in the financing rate are fixed at the beginning of the trade. We omit this extra zero-cost component for simplicity.

However, this strategy cannot be fully hedged by interest rates swaps. First, the time  $\tau$  at which the bond yield falls below  $y_{m,t}^l$  is uncertain, as is the ultimate sale price. Second, the interim price of the bond before  $\tau$  affects the size of the trade that needs to be financed, and consequently both the benefit of cheap financing via tri-party repo and the opportunity cost of the balance sheet. The effects of intermediate bond prices occur because the intermediary uses short term, as opposed to term, financing, and because the assets are marked to market. Thus, even if it were possible to perfectly hedge all of the relevant interest rates, the attractiveness of this trade would depend in part on the intermediary's beliefs about the stochastic process driving bond yields.

However, the worse case scenario for the sale price is that it is exactly equal to the unwinding threshold,  $y_{n-\tau,t+\tau} = y_{n-\tau,t+\tau}^l$ . Under the assumption that  $x_{1,t} \geq r_t$ , the worse case scenario for the intermediate bond yields is that they are as low as possible (i.e.  $y_{n-j,t+j} = y_{n-j,t+j}^l$ ), which is to say that the trading strategy uses up the maximum possible balance sheet capacity. Consequently, the intermediary will definitely be willing to buy the bond if, for all possible stopping times  $\tau$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
 e^{-ny_{n,t}} \leq -E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} e^{-(n-j)y_{n-j,t+j}^l} e^{-\sum_{k=0}^j r_{t+k}} (e^{x_{1,t+j}} - R_{t+j}) \right] \\
 + E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ e^{-\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} r_{t+k}} e^{-(n-\tau)y_{n-\tau,t+\tau}^l} \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

and this is in fact the tightest possible bound. Rewriting the definition of net long curve, we obtain

$$e^{-\sum_{k=0}^{j-1} r_{t+k}} e^{-(n-j)y_{n-j,t+j}^l} = -e^{-\sum_{k=0}^j r_{t+k}} e^{-(n-j)y_{n-j,t+j}^l} (e^{x_{1,t+j}} - R_{t+j}) \\ + e^{-\sum_{k=0}^j r_{t+k}} E_{t+j}^{\mathbb{Q}} [e^{-(n-j-1)y_{n-j-1,t+j+1}^l}]$$

for any  $j$ , and thus for any bounded stopping time  $\tau$ . By the definition of the net long curve, the intermediary will be willing to engage in this strategy if

$$y_{n,t} \geq y_{n,t}^l$$

Thus, the intermediary will be willing to buy the bond, regardless of the nature of the intermediary's preferences and beliefs about the bond price process, if  $y_{n,t} \geq y_{n,t}^l$ .

We conclude that the intermediary's demand for a zero-coupon bond should be high if its yield exceeds the net long curve yield. This demand is limited only by the intermediary's leverage constraint: at some point, the intermediary will have switched entirely to doing the Treasury arbitrage as opposed to other arbitrages, at which point  $r_t^{syn} - r_t$  is no longer a valid measure of the opportunity cost of balance sheet. We therefore predict that if a bond's yield exceeds the buy yield, the intermediary's demand should be substantial.

## The Net Short Curve

We next develop parallel logic for the case of short-selling. There is some asymmetry between the two cases, because for the short curve we will use a different argument to bound the interim balance sheet costs.

We assume that the intermediary borrows the security from a securities lender in exchange for cash equal to the market value of the security, and receives a log interest rate  $i_t^s < r_t$  on the cash lent.

The intermediary will be willing to short a seven-month bond at yield  $y_{7,t}$  if

$$\underbrace{e^{-7y_{7,t}}}_{\text{Sale price}} \underbrace{I_t^s}_{\text{Gross return on cash in sec. lending}} \geq \underbrace{E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} [e^{-6y_{t+1}^{bill}}]}_{\text{Repurchase price}} + e^{-7y_{7,t}} \underbrace{(R_t^{syn} - R_t)}_{\text{Forgone CIP profits}} . \quad (\text{F-3})$$

Note that the sign of the forgone CIP profits has changed, relative to the analogous equation for the

net long curve, reflecting the fact that both buying and short-selling increase the size of the balance sheet. In equation (F-3), moving the right-hand-side OIS term to the left and dividing both sides by  $\exp(r_t)$ , we obtain

$$e^{-7y_{7,t}} \geq e^{-7y_{7,t}} e^{-r_t} (R_t^{syn} - I_t^s) + e^{-r_t} E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{-6y_{t+1}^{bill}}] \quad (\text{F-4})$$

Under the assumption that yields are weakly positive,  $y_{7,t} \geq 0$ , the intermediary is definitely willing to short if

$$e^{-7y_{7,t}} \geq e^{-7y_{7,t}^s} \equiv e^{-r_t} (R_t^{syn} - I_t^s) + e^{-r_t} E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{-6y_{t+1}^{bill}}]. \quad (\text{F-5})$$

Following the same spirit, let us define  $y_{n,t}^s$  recursively for  $n \geq 8$  as

$$e^{-ny_{n,t}^s} = e^{-r_t} \left( R_t^{syn} - I_t^s + E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{-(n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}^s}] \right), \quad (\text{F-6})$$

which can be interpreted as the pricing equation for a bond with a monthly coupon of  $R_t^{syn} - I_t^s$ , discounted using the OIS curve.

As above, fix some  $n > 7$  and suppose  $y_{m,t}^s$  is defined as above. Consider a trading strategy that short-sells the bond, borrows the bond from a securities lender, offsets the balance sheet cost by reducing CIP activity, and unwinds at the first moment at which the bond yield becomes weakly higher than  $y_{m,t}^s$ . Let  $\tau$  denote this time and let  $y_{n-\tau,t+\tau} \geq y_{n-\tau,t+\tau}^s$  be the bond price at which the trade is unwound. Note that  $\tau \leq n - 6$  is guaranteed by the assumption that dealers always unwinds the trade once the bond has six-month remaining maturity. The intermediary will be willing to engage in this strategy provided it is profitable,

$$e^{-ny_{n,t}} \geq E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} e^{-(n-j)y_{n-j,t+j}} e^{-\sum_{k=0}^j r_{t+k}} (R_{t+j}^{syn} - I_{t+j}^s) \right] + E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} [e^{-\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} r_{t+k}} e^{-(n-\tau)y_{n-\tau,t+\tau}}]. \quad (\text{F-7})$$

Note that, because  $i_t^s < r_t^{syn}$ , the worst-case scenario is the one that makes intermediate bond prices as high as possible. Unlike the net long curve, the fact that  $y_{n-j,t+j} < y_{n-j,t+j}^s$  is of no help in generating a bound. In this case, we instead assume a lower bound on yields,  $y_{m,t} \geq 0$ , motivated the possibility of substitution to cash. In the worst-case scenario, the pricing condition becomes

$$e^{-ny_{n,t}} \geq E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} e^{-\sum_{k=0}^j r_{t+k}} (R_{t+j}^{syn} - I_{t+j}^s) \right] + E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} [e^{-\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} r_{t+k}} e^{-(n-\tau)y_{n-\tau,t+\tau}}]. \quad (\text{F-8})$$

For all stopping times  $\tau$  (bounded above by  $n - 6$ ), this is equivalent to

$$y_{n,t} \leq y_{n,t}^s, \quad (\text{F-9})$$

which is to say that the intermediary will be willing to short-sell if yields are below  $y_{n,t}^s$ , irrespective of intermediary's preferences or beliefs about future bond prices.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, we will illustrate that to a first-order approximation, the net-short curve in this appendix is the same as the net-short curve (21) in the main text. Ignoring the covariance terms, the net-short curve in this appendix is

$$\begin{aligned} 1 + r_t - ny_{n,t}^s &\approx r_t^{\text{syn}} - i_t^s + E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[1 - (n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}^s], \\ ny_{n,t}^s &\approx i_t^s - (r_t^{\text{syn}} - r_t) - (n-1)E_t^{\mathbb{Q}}[y_{n-1,t+1}^s], \\ ny_{n,t}^s &\approx E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{n-7} (i_t^s - (r_t^{\text{syn}} - r_t)) + 6y_{t+n-6}^{\text{bill}} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

It is straightforward to show that equation (21) in the main text also leads to the same linear approximation.

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<sup>57</sup>Subject to the caveat that the intermediary must believe in the zero lower bound. Our formulas can be readily generated to other (non-zero) lower bounds, at the expense of additional notation.