

# Discussion of “Stop Believing in Reserves”

by Sriya Anbil, Alyssa Anderson, Ethan Cohen, and Romina Ruprecht

Wenhao Li

USC Marshall

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# Motivation: Why Studying Monetary Policy Transmission


From ChatGPT:

- Understanding economic impacts of monetary policies.
  - ▶ ... influence *borrowing costs*, impact *consumer and business spending*, and ultimately affect the *output of the economy*.
- Policy implementation and communication.
  - ▶ Help central banks in effectively communicating their policy decisions and expectations to market participants.
- Financial stability considerations
  - ▶ ... impact overall risk appetite in financial markets.
- International spillovers
  - ▶ promote coordination and cooperation among central banks.

# Summary

- Where does this paper fit in? Understanding the economic impacts of monetary policies in the post-crisis ample-reserve framework.
- A two-period equilibrium model that has rich descriptions of reality:
  - ▶ Agents: banks, MMF, households, firms, broker-dealers, central bank, and the government.
  - ▶ Markets: repo market, government bond market, bank deposit market, and MMF deposit market.
  - ▶ Policy instruments: IOER, QE/QT, and RRP.
- Questions to answer:
  - ▶ How do various policies transmit to different markets?
  - ▶ How large the Fed balance sheet should be maintain the ample-reserve regime?
  - ▶ What is the role of the RRP facility?

# Overview of the Model



# Model Setup

- One period, two times,  $t = 1$  and  $t = 2$ .
- Both government debt and reserves can be converted into “commodity money” for consumption at  $t = 2$  (think as continuation value).
- Optimizing agents: households, commercial banks, MMF
  - ▶ Household preference:  $u(\text{firm product}) + \text{commodity money consumption}$
  - ▶ Commercial banks and MMF are maximizing profits.
- Policies: IOER, RRP rate, balance sheet operations (QE/QT).
- Frictions:
  - ▶ Bank lending is subject to a convex cost  $\chi(\ell)$  for  $\ell$  amount of loans.
  - ▶ Bank and MMFs have linear balance sheet cost  $k^b$  and  $k^m$  (social costs)
  - ▶ Banks and households bargain over deposit surplus.

# Mechanism: interest rate policy

- Higher interest rate
  - banks get higher return on reserves
  - reduced lending (with smaller marginal cost) and partial passthrough to a higher deposit rate
  - households increase bank deposit holding but reduce MMF share holding
  - less repo financing
  - higher equilibrium govt bond yield.
  
- The same mechanism regardless of whether reserve is abundant or not.

# Mechanism: reverse repo rate

Case 1: RRP is slack (RRP rate  $<$  repo rate):

- no effect.

Case 2: RRP is tight (RRP rate = repo rate):

- higher reverse repo rate
- higher repo rate due to perfect substitution
- higher govt bond yield and also higher MMF rate
- households increase MMF holding but reduce bank deposit holding
- banks reduce lending.

# Mechanism: balance sheet operations

- Larger Fed holding of Tsy (QE)
  - reduced demand of financing via repo
  - lower MMF yield and outflows of funds from MMF
  - inflows of bank deposits that drive lower deposit rate
  - lower loan rate and expanded bank lending.
  
- Silent on reserve side. “Stop believing in reserves” ?
  - ▶ The above mechanism is not about expansion of reserves, but purchase of Treasury securities.
  - ▶ In the model, the Fed can “costless produce general good at no cost” . Reserves are backed by this “production technology” .
  - ▶ How to account for the balance sheet identity: more Treasuries on assets, more reserves on liability.



# Comment 1: Model Structure

- Non-banks are not allowed to hold Treasuries in the model.
  - ▶ However, Treasuries are critical for liquidity provision and crowds out bank deposits (Li, Ma, and Zhao 2023).
  - ▶ See the aggregate estimation of substitution among Treasuries, bank deposits, and shadow bank deposits in Krishanmurthy and Li (2022).
- Banking regulation is missing in the model.
  - ▶ Critical for understanding post-crisis monetary transmission to various markets. Balance sheet costs matter for Treasury pricing (Du, Heber, and Li, 2022).
  - ▶ In crises, bank regulation is key for monetary passthrough (Blank, Stein, Hanson, and Sunderam 2020)
  - ▶ Liquidity regulation drives up bank demand of public liquidity (Bech and Keister 2017).
- The model can treat broker-dealers and MMF as one sector absent from broker-dealer frictions.
  - ▶ In reality, MMF directly holds T-bills.

## Comment 2: Alternative Demand of Treasuries and the Role of Repo

- In the model: total Treasury supply = Fed holding + broker-dealer holding (financed by repo).
- Given Treasury supply, one dollar reduction of Fed holding implies one dollar needed for repo!
- This is unrealistic. Broker-dealer total Treasury holding is about 200 billion v.s. 18 trillion marketable Treasuries (excluding Fed holding).
- Stress in the repo market critically depends on who else demand for Treasuries.

## Comment 2: Alternative Demand of Treasuries and the Role of Repo

- Here is a rough decomposition of Treasury holdings for 2020 (Jansen, Li, and Lukas 2023):
  - ▶ Foreign investors: 30%
  - ▶ Fed: 30%
  - ▶ MMF: 10%
  - ▶ Pension funds: 6%
  - ▶ Insurance companies: 6%
  - ▶ Mutual funds: 5%
  - ▶ Commercial banks: 6%
  - ▶ Broker dealers: 1%
  - ▶ Rest: 6%
- $\text{MMF holding} / (\text{total Tsy} - \text{Fed holding})$  is about 14%. Repo market is NOT the dominant form of financing for holding Treasuries.

## Comment 3: Quantification

- Model parameters: (1) policy-related; (2) preference related.
- Currently, all of these parameters are targeted to quantities and rates based on data from March 2022 to October 2022.
- Problem: preferences are stable and should not be inferred from a short-horizon of data.
  - ▶ Households utility function.
  - ▶ Bank operational cost
  - ▶ Bank market power
- Suggestion: use a much longer horizon to infer preference parameters.

# Summary

- Understanding monetary policy transmission is critical for central banks and the government.
- This paper provides a framework to understand the transmission, particularly focused on balance sheet operations and the repo market.
- Suggestions:
  - ▶ Clarify the key mechanism and highlight the main contribution.
  - ▶ Adjust model structure to reflect regulation and non-financial sector demand of Treasuries.
  - ▶ Better quantification via matching moments based on longer horizons.