A Literature Review on Macroeconomics and Capital Structure

Wenhao Li

February 16, 2016

Wenhao Li

Macro and Capital Structure

February 16, 2016 1 / 35

-

The Central Question

- How macro economic conditions affect capital structure choice.
- Macro economic conditions include
 - Consumption growth rate and volatility.
 - Asset liquidity.
 - Investment opportunities.
 - ▶ ...

Multiple Dimensions of Capital Structure Change

- Equity issuance $\Delta E(t)$ and debt issuance $\Delta D(t)$.
- Equity and debt level E(t) and D(t).
- Leverage L(t) = D(t)/(D(t) + E(t)), including book leverage and market leverage.
- When should we measure these changes?
 - At refinancing point
 - Time average

JIN NOR

An Overview

Empirical Research

- Empirical evidence dates back to [Hickman, 1953], on the volume of stock and bond financing.
- Empirical evidence tends to contradict each other in terms of cyclicality of debt/equity financing and leverage dynamics.
- Theoretical Research
 - Theoretical studies that link macro conditions with capital structure starts from [Choe et al., 1993]. The most outstanding stream of literature starts from [Hackbarth et al., 2006] that uses the regime shift approach for macro conditions.
 - There are many well-established theories on capital structure and all of them are related to macro conditions, providing potentially conflicting predictions.

伺 ト イヨト イヨト ヨヨ のくら

Theory

~~~	an	hao	
		LI AU	

Theories – Optimal Capital Structure

- Trade-off theory.
  - In general, defaults are more costly in economic downturns, because of lower liquidity and higher SDF. ⇒ lower optimal leverage in downturns ⇒ pro-cyclical leverage at refinancing point
- Agency theory.
  - Debt overhang and risk shifting are more likely in downturns.
  - $\blacktriangleright \Rightarrow$  lower optimal leverage in downturns  $\Rightarrow$  pro-cyclical leverage at refinancing point
- Asymmetric information.
  - At economic downturns, there is more uncertainty in the cash flows, and thus more asymmetric information between managers and outside investors. ⇒ Less equity issuance ⇒ Pro-cyclical equity issuance

伺 ト イヨト イヨト ヨヨ のくら

# A Summary of Theoretical Research

Table: A Summary of Theory Papers on Macro and Capital Structure

	$\Delta D$	$\Delta E$	D	Ε	L = D/(D+E)
[Hackbarth et al., 2006]	+		+	+	<ul> <li>– (static, ref pt.)</li> </ul>
[Chen, 2010]	+			+	+ (dyn, ref pt.)
					<ul> <li>– (dyn, time avg)</li> </ul>
[Bhamra et al., 2010b] and	+			+	+ (dyn, ref pt.)
[Bhamra et al., 2010a]					— (dyn, time avg)
[Jermann and Quadrini, 2006]	+	—			
[Levy and Hennessy, 2007]	+		_	+	— (time avg)
[Choe et al., 1993]	_	+			

+ means procyclical and – means countercyclical. D denotes the market value of debt. E denotes the market value of equity.  $\Delta E$  and  $\Delta D$  are net issuances. D/(D + E) is the market leverage. All measures except leverage are time average.

Theory 1: [Hackbarth et al., 2006]

Firm's EBIT

$$f(x_t, y_t) = x_t y_t$$
$$dx_t = \mu x_t dt + \sigma x_t dW_t$$

 $y_t$  follows a two state Markov Chain  $y_L$  and  $y_H$  with  $y_L > y_H > 0$ .

- Based on tradeoff theory: Bankruptcy cost and tax shield.
- Forward looking will make optimal leverage countercyclical.
  - Without regime shift, the leverage will be the same for cases (1)  $y_t = y_L$  forever and (2)  $y_t = y_H$  forever.

5 1 SQA

• Abandonment value (before bankruptcy costs)

$$A_i(x) = E[\int_0^\infty e^{-rt}(1-\tau)x_ty_t dt | x_0 = x, y_0 = y_i], \ i = L, H$$

$$\sim h(1-\tau)xy_i + (1-rh)\lambda_ih \cdot A_{-i}(x+h) + (1-rh)(1-\lambda_ih) \cdot A_i(x+h)$$

• ODE system (easily solvable)

$$rA_{i}(x) = (1 - \tau)xy_{i} + \mu xA_{i}'(x) + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}x^{2}A_{i}''(x) + \underbrace{\lambda_{i}(A_{-i}(x) - A_{i}(x))}_{i}$$

regime shift

- Default Boundary
  - ► To solve the problem, an important trick is to intuitively derive the optimal default boundary for y_t ∈ {y_L, y_H} (no shifting regime). The standard way of writing the equity value with a different setting y_t = y_i for all t ≥ 0 is

$$(\frac{y_i x}{r-\mu}-\frac{c}{r})(1-\tau)+A(x,X^D)(-\frac{y_i X_D}{r-\mu}+\frac{c}{r})(1-\tau)$$

with optimal boundary

$$X_i^D = \beta/y_i$$

- So naturally  $X_L^D > X_H^D$
- $X_i^D y_i = \beta$  is constant. Are macro conditions varying?
- When there is shifting regime, the relationship is maintained,  $x_L^* > x_H^*$ .

▲母 ▶ ▲ ヨ ▶ ▲ ヨ ▶ ヨ ヨ ● の ○ ○

• Let  $d_i(x_t)$  be the valuation of debt at time t (because of constant principal, it is only a function of  $x_t$ ) when  $y_t = y_i$ ,  $i \in \{L, H\}$ .

$$d_i(x) = E[\int_0^\infty \mathbf{1}(t \leq \tau_D)(c + mp)e^{-mt}dt | x_0 = x]$$

• For  $x_H^* \leq x \leq x_L^*$ ,

$$\begin{cases} \mu x d_{H}'(x) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} x^2 d_{H}''(x) + \lambda_H(\alpha_L A_L(x) - d_H(x)) + c + mp \\ d_L(x) = \alpha_L A_L(x) \end{cases}$$

• For  $x > x_L^*$ ,

$$\begin{cases} \mu x d_{H}'(x) + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2} x^{2} d_{H}''(x) + \lambda_{H}(d_{L}(x) - d_{H}(x)) + c + mp \\ \mu x d_{L}'(x) + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2} x^{2} d_{L}''(x) + \lambda_{L}(d_{H}(x) - d_{L}(x)) + c + mp \end{cases}$$

A ∃ ► ∃ = 1 = 1000

- Model Prediction (static capital structure)
  - Countercyclical optimal leverage
    - $L_i^*(m,p) = L_i(x,c^*(x),m,p) = d_i^*(x,c,m,p)/v_i^*(x,c).$
  - Default is not more costly in bad state in [Hackbarth et al., 2006].

	Contraction coupon	Regime leverage	Expansion coupon	Regime leverage
	0.1106	10.72	0.1207	16.61
Base	0.1196	19.72	0.1206	10.01
$\sigma = 0.20$	0.1513	24.97	0.1523	21.03
$\sigma = 0.30$	0.0958	15.70	0.0967	13.24
$\lambda_L = 0.10$	0.1064	19.91	0.1082	15.98
$\lambda_L = 0.20$	0.1289	19.57	0.1295	17.02
$\overline{T} = 3$	0.0910	15.31	0.0913	12.83
$\overline{T} = 7$	0.1453	23.39	0.1473	19.83

ELE SQC

• Is low leverage puzzle solved?

	Parameter choices		
risk free interest rate	r = 0.055		
initial level of cash flow	$x_0 = 1$		
growth rate of cash flows	$\mu = 0.005$		
volatility of cash flows	$\sigma = 0.25$		
tax advantage of debt	$\tau = 0.15$		
recovery rate on assets	$\alpha_H = \alpha_L = 0.6$		
persistence of shocks	$\lambda_L = 0.15,  \lambda_H = 0.1$		
average debt maturity	$\overline{T} = 5 \ (m = 0.2)$		

• Note:  $y_H/y_L$  is suppressed in [Chen, 2010], and instead they use

$$\frac{A_H(x) - A_L(x)}{A_L(x)} = 0.2 \quad (\Rightarrow y_H/y_L = 4) \text{ Is this reasonable?}$$

ELE SQC

**EN 4 EN** 

• Credit spreads for different leverages (30%, 40%, ···, 70%)



Wenhao Li

ъ

#### • A summary of [Hackbarth et al., 2006]

- A very tractable model. Regime shift with Markov chain.
- It generates low leverage, but with unbelievable productivity shocks.
- The term structure is quite unusual.
- The most important feature of macro economic cycle is missing: the pricing kernel. So it generates wired credit spreads, and the cyclicality of leverage is the opposite to our intuition.

#### Theory 2: [Bhamra et al., 2010a]

- This paper captures economic cycles much better than [Hackbarth et al., 2006] by introducing a pricing kernel from consumers and integrate it with capital structure.
- There is a representative household with stochastic differential utility

$$U_t = E_t(\int_t^\infty f(c_s, U_s)ds)$$

and consumption process

$$\frac{dC_t}{C_t} = g_t dt + \sigma_{C,t} dB_{C,t}$$

• Fixing default probabilities, higher intertemporal risks will make default more costly, providing household doesn't like long-run risks (Relative Risk Aversion > 1/Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution).

ELE SQC

• Each firm f produces a perpetual stream of cash flows

$$\frac{dX_{n,t}}{X_{n,t}} = \theta_t dt + \sigma_X^{id} dB_{X,n,t}^{id} + \sigma_{X,t}^s dB_{X,t}^s$$

and the aggregate output is  $X_t$ .

• Production and consumption are correlated.

$$dB_{X,t}^{s}dB_{C,t} = \rho_{XC}dt$$

• Consumption is a sum of output and wages.

1

$$C = \sum_{n=1}^{N} X_n + W$$

- There are two states of the world, 2 is better.
  - Consumption growth  $g_t \in \{g_1, g_2\}$ ,  $g_1 < g_2$
  - Production growth  $\theta_t \in \{\theta_1, \theta_2\}$ ,  $\theta_1 < \theta_2$
  - Consumption volatility  $\sigma_{C,t} \in \{\sigma_{C,1}, \sigma_{C,2}\}, \sigma_{C,1} > \sigma_{C,2}$
  - ▶ Systematic production growth volatility  $\sigma_{X,t}^s \in \{\sigma_{X,1}^s, \sigma_{X,2}^s\}$ ,  $\sigma_{X,1}^s > \sigma_{X,2}^s$
- Denote state of the world as  $v_t$ . Under risk-neutral probabilities, the transition rates  $\lambda_1$  and  $\lambda_2$  are distorted

$$\hat{\lambda}_1 = \lambda_1 / w < \lambda_1, \quad \hat{\lambda}_2 = \lambda_2 w > \lambda_2$$

• So macro economic conditions are reflected in the risk neutral pricing.

- Equity holders decide optimal refinancing boundaries as well as optimal coupons and default boundaries.
- To study cyclical behavior of leverage, we have to do simulations.

#### Parameter estimates

Panel	A: Unconditional estimat	es	
	Mean	Std. dev.	
Real consumption growth	0.0333	0.0099	
Real earnings growth	0.0343	0.1072	
Panel	B: Time-varying estimate	es	
Parameter	Symbol	State 1	State 2
Consumption growth rate	$g_i$	0.0141	0.0420
Consumption growth volatility	$\sigma_{C,i}$	0.0114	0.0094
Earnings growth rate	$\hat{\theta}_i$	-0.0401	0.0782
Earnings growth volatility	$\sigma_{X_i}^{\hat{s}}$	0.1334	0.0834
Correlation	$\rho_{XC}$	0.1998	0.1998
Actual long-run probabilities	$f_i$	0.3555	0.6445
Actual convergence rate to long-run	p	0.7646	0.7646
Annual discount rate	$\beta$	1%	1%
Tax rate	η	15%	15%
Bankruptcy costs	$1-a_i$	30%	10%
Idiosyncratic earnings growth volatility	$\sigma_{Y}^{id}$	0.2258	02258
Relative risk aversion	γ	10	10
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution	Ψ	1.5	1.5
Issuance costs	$\phi_i$	0.03	0.01

ELE OQO



- Procyclical leverage at refinancing point.
- $\bullet~\times$  represents the values for state 1, and  $\ldots$  represents the values for state 2

• Aggregate dynamics of capital structure – strongly countercyclical leverage.



# A Summary of Tradeoff Based Theories

- The changing in pricing kernel makes default more costly in bad state, so the leverage at refinancing point is procyclical.
- Equity value fluctuates much more than debt value, thus making the leverage strongly countercyclical on time average.
- Leverage is driven by many factors, and is not a good summary of preference information.
- Structural models have little predictions over equity issuance and debt issuance.

# **Empirical Studies**

→ Ξ →

<br/>

三日 のへの

#### Leverage



Fig. 1. Aggregate nonfinancial corporate debt to asset ratio across NBER expansions (shaded) and contractions (light). Debt to asset ratio is measured as the total credit instruments of nonfinancial corporations measured at book value, divided by the sum of credit market instruments and the market value of equity, as reported in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Flow of Funds Accounts."

#### From [Korajczyk and Levy, 2003]

101	0.0	hao	
_ V V	en	IIau.	

Macro and Capital Structure

#### Leverage

• Counter-cyclical for relatively unconstrained firms, but pro-cyclical (less significant) for the relatively constrained firms.

Lev	ST+LT Debt Market assets	ST+LT Debt Market assets	LT Debt Market assets	ST+LT Debt Book assets	ST+LT Debt-cash Market assets-cash
Panel A: unconstrained firms					
2-year corp. profit growth	$-0.083^{***}$	$-0.106^{***}$	-0.044***	$-0.062^{***}$	-0.035*
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.020)
2-year equity market return	-0.053***	-0.050***	-0.014**	$-0.012^{**}$	-0.057***
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Commercial paper spread	3.585***	5.345***	1.547***	5.546***	3.349***
	(0.552)	(0.934)	(0.530)	(0.562)	(0.892)
Fixed effect	Firm	4 digit SIC	Firm	Firm	Firm
Number of obs.	45,443	45,443	45,443	45,443	44,882

From [Korajczyk and Levy, 2003]

EL OQO

4 E b

### Equity and Debt Issuance

• Countercyclical debt issuance and procyclical equity issuance.



No. of issuance (left) and Adjusted Volume Over Business Cycles (Equity and Debt) from 1971-1991. The red dotted line is for debt and the blue solid line is for equity. Odd numbers in the x-axis mean upturns in business cycles and even numbers mean downturns. Data from [Choe et al., 1993].

### Equity and Debt Issuance

• Procyclical debt issuance and countercyclical equity issuance.



### Equity and Debt Issuance

#### • Procyclical debt issuance and procyclical equity issuance.



From [Covas and Haan, 2011] and sorted by size.

# Are Theory Papers Citing the Right Empirical Evidence?

- [Hackbarth et al., 2006] mentions that "the model predicts that market leverage should be countercyclical, consistent with the evidence reported by [Korajczyk and Levy, 2003]".
  - However, the "countercyclical leverage" in [Bhamra et al., 2010a] is the leverage at refinancing while in [Korajczyk and Levy, 2003] is the mean leverage.

# A Summary of Empirical Studies

- There are very few papers on leverage cycles, and no paper distinguishing leverage at refinancing point and leverage of time average.
- Dramatically different results on equity and issuance.

#### **Research Opportunities**

→ Ξ →

• • • • • • • •

三日 のへで

### Possibilities for Future Research

#### Theoretical Research

- How does debt and equity issuance change across business cycles?
- How does agency costs and asymmetric information influence capital structure across business cycles?
- How is term structure of credit spreads influenced by business cycles (using the modeling trick of finite maturity debt and Epstein-Zin preference)?

#### • Empirical Research

- Is there a big difference of leverage cyclicality at refinancing point and on time average, as predicted by [Chen, 2010], [Bhamra et al., 2010a], and [Bhamra et al., 2010b]?
- Why there is a dramatic difference among previous research on debt and equity issuance?

### Supplements

### Finite Debt Maturity

Principal p, coupon  $c = c_0/m$ , and maturity T = 1/m



Bhamra, H. S., Kuehn, L.-A., and Strebulaev, I. A. (2010a). The aggregate dynamics of capital structure and macroeconomic risk. *Review of Financial Studies*, 23(12):4187–4241.

Bhamra, H. S., Kuehn, L.-A., and Strebulaev, I. A. (2010b). The levered equity risk premium and credit spreads: A unified framework.

Review of Financial Studies, 23(2):645-703.

#### Chen, H. (2010).

Macroeconomic conditions and the puzzles of credit spreads and capital structure.

The Journal of Finance, 65(6):2171–2212.

Choe, H., Masulis, R. W., and Nanda, V. (1993). Common stock offerings across the business cycle: Theory and evidence.

Journal of Empirical finance, 1(1):3-31.



Covas, F. and Haan, W. J. D. (2011).

The cyclical behavior of debt and equity finance.

The American Economic Review, pages 877-899.

 Hackbarth, D., Miao, J., and Morellec, E. (2006).
 Capital structure, credit risk, and macroeconomic conditions. Journal of Financial Economics, 82(3):519–550.

#### Hickman, W. B. (1953).

The volume of corporate bond financing since 1900. *NBER Books*.

Jermann, U. and Quadrini, V. (2006).
 Financial innovations and macroeconomic volatility.
 Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.



Journal of financial economics, 68(1):75–109.



Wenhao Li

#### Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(6):1545–1564.

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆三▶ ◆三▶ 三目目 のへで