# A Discussion of Heterogeneous Intermediary Asset Pricing by Mahyar Kargar

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# Intermediary Asset Pricing: An Illustration



## Intermediary Asset Pricing: An Illustration



# Contributions of This Paper

- Build a tractable model with intermediary heterogeneity.
  Key message: Heterogeneity matters for asset prices and risk premium!
- Show the empirical relevance for the heterogeneity factor, constructed from bank holding companies and broker-dealers.

### Model

- Three types of agents: *intermediaries of type A* (low risk aversion), *intermediaries of type B* (high risk aversion), and *households* (highest risk aversion).
- Intermediaries are subject to a leverage constraints.

**Note**: general approaches in the literature:

• Only intermediaries invest in risky assets (or lend to firms) + intermediary equity friction

Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010; He and Krishnamurthy 2012; Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014

Both intermediaries and households invest in risky assets + intermediaries are "born to be different".

Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl 2018

## Dissecting the Mechanism

- Heterogeneous risk aversions  $\Rightarrow$  Intermediary heterogeneity matters.
  - Less risk averse intermediaries get largest equity decline in downturns.
  - Intermediary sector is hit more severely than households in downturns.
  - Both affect the average risk aversion, therefore, the risk premium.
- Leverage constraint for intermediaries (binding only for low risk-aversion intermediaries) ⇒ Procyclical leverage dynamics.
  - Is generating procyclical leverage the only role of this assumption?
  - ► Tightness of leverage constraint may serve as an independent factor.

# How to Categorize Intermediaries?

- The paper focuses on bank holding companies (more risk-averse intermediaries) and broker dealers (less risk-averse intermediaries).
- In reality, bank holding companies own many broker-dealer subsidiaries.



#### Alternative Construction of Intermediary Heterogeneity

• Current measure is the equity ratio

$$\frac{\mathsf{BD}_t}{\mathsf{BHC}_t + \mathsf{BD}_t}$$

- I suggest checking the other definitions of intermediary heterogeneity. Example:
  - Sort intermediaries by their risk tolerance, proxied by the fraction of repo and commercial paper financing (denoted by ξ<sub>j</sub>). Denote equity of intermediary j as E<sub>j</sub>.
  - Then define an average risk tolerance

$$y_t^{data} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^N \xi_j E_j}{\sum_{j=1}^N E_j}$$

Then take the residual of y<sup>data</sup> regressed on x<sup>data</sup> to maximize the new information content of heterogeneity measure.

#### The Heterogeneity Across Intermediaries

• Both short-term financing (repo+CP) ratio and size differ widely.



#### Comparison between the New and the Old Measures

• An easy exercise for robustness check. Maybe the new measure contains more information.



## Conclusion

- The paper addresses a very important question in intermediary asset pricing.
- Excellent executions in both theory and empirics!
- Need more discussions on the relevance of leverage constraint.
- Check alternative constructions of heterogeneity factor for robustness.